Tyson v. Britton

• Decision Date: 01 January 1851
• Parties: TYSON, ADM'X, v. BRITTON.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

6 Tex. 222

TYSON, ADM'X,

v.BRITTON.

Supreme Court of Texas.

1851.

Where the statute of limitations begins to run it continues to run, notwithstanding any supervening disability of the party entitled to sue or liable to be sued. (Note 35.)

The third section of the statute of limitations of 1841 is limited to actions upon accounts for goods, wares, and merchandise, or for articles charged in a store account, and the exception contained in this section in favor of the creditor cannot be extended to any other causes of action than those enumerated.

Where the Legislature has prescribed a general rule with special disabilities or privileges, these cannot be enlarged or extended to objects not embraced within the exception by mere implication or from parity of reason. (Note 36.)

Error from Bowie.

S. H. Morgan, for plaintiff in error.

HEMPHILL, Ch. J.

The maker of the note in suit departed this life after the maturity of the note, but previous to the expiration of the term allowed by law for the commencement of the action. Some months elapsed before the grant of letters of administration, and the only question in the case which I shall examine is whether the statute ceased running in the interval between his death and the grant of administration on his estate. If this interval be stricken from the computation, the suit was properly brought; if otherwise, the bar had operated and the judgment must be reversed. The rule which governs the case is well established and too familiar to require discussion, and it is this: that where the statute of limitations begins to run it shall continue, notwithstanding any supervening disability of the party entitled to sue or liable to be sued. The death of neither party can impede the operation of the statute. The rule of the Spanish, Louisiana, and civil law generally is carried further. Under those systems of jurisprudence prescription runs against a succession, though vacant, abandoned, and without a curator, whether the cause accrued before or during the vacancy of the estate, on the ground that the creditors have it in their power to procure the appointment of a curator, and therefore cannot avail themselves of the rule contra non valentem agere nulla currit prescriptio. (Pothier on Obligations, vol. 1, p. 353; Davis v. Elkins, 9 La. R., 142.) This rule appears to be well supported by the reasons on which it is based, and requires no special comment in this case.

In support of the judgment we have...