Tyus v. Va. Coll., LLC
| Decision Date | 26 May 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:15-cv-211-WKW-PWG |
| Parties | BRITTNEY TYUS, Plaintiff, v. VIRGINIA COLLEGE, LLC and EDWARD DAVIS, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
Plaintiff Brittney Tyus brings this action under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., seeking redress for alleged sexual harassment by Defendants Virginia College, LLC ("Virginia College"), and Edward Davis, who is an instructor at Virginia College.1 (Doc. 1). Generally, Plaintiff avers that, during her time as a student at Virginia College, Defendant Davis subjected her to unwelcome sexual advances consisting of comments and touching, she reported Davis's conduct to administrators with Virginia College, after she reported theconduct Davis took adverse action against her including lowering her grades, there are other women who are students and who have been subjected to unwanted sexual advances by Davis, and that Virginia College knows about the allegations against Davis and turns a blind eye. (Doc. 1).
Subject-matter jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Personal jurisdiction and venue are uncontested, and there are adequate allegations to support both. On April 13, 2015, this case was referred to the undersigned for review by United States District Judge W. Keith Watkins. (Doc. 5); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Rule 72, Fed. R. Civ. P.; United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980); Jeffrey S. v. State Board of Education of State of Georgia, 896 F.2d 507 (11th Cir. 1990).
This matter is presently before the court on "Defendant Virginia College, LLC's Motion to Compel Arbitration and/or Motion to Dismiss, and Supporting Memorandum of Law."2 (Doc. 6). Virginia College contends and provides supporting evidence that Plaintiff's claims against it are subject to four separate arbitration agreements and petitions for an order compelling Plaintiff to arbitrate herclaims against it and dismissing the lawsuit.3 For her part, Plaintiff "vehemently disputes that she agreed to any arbitration provision" and filed evidence that, if credited and believed, shows that she did not sign, agree to, or was even aware of the written agreements proffered by Virginia College, including the arbitration agreements, but that the documents were completed by employees of Virginia College without Plaintiff's knowledge or assent. (Docs. 1 & 8).4
While Virginia College largely ignores Plaintiff's evidence and premises mostof its arguments on the mistaken notion that the court can disregard that evidence, the existence of an agreement to arbitrate is in issue. That issue cannot be resolved as a matter of law on the disputed evidence of record. Therefore, upon consideration, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the motion to compel arbitration and/or to dismiss (Doc. 6) is due to be DENIED and that this matter should be set for a jury trial or a bench trial, as appropriate, on the questions of arbitrability and mutual assent for the reasons and as discussed infra.
"Under the FAA, 'parties cannot be forced to submit to arbitration if they have not agreed to do so.'" Chambers v. Groome Transp. of Alabama, 41 F.Supp.3d 1327, 1339 (M.D. Ala. 2014) (quoting Chastain v. Robinson-Humphrey Co., 957 F.2d 851, 854 (11th Cir. 1992)) (Watkins, J.). A court must determine whether there is an agreement to arbitrate, which is generally a decision for the court and not an arbitrator unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise. See Chambers, supra (discussing First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944-45 (1995)). This case falls within that general rule and the parties do not argue otherwise.
Chambers, 41 F.Supp.3d at 1334.
The test to determine arbitrability and the allocation of the parties' burdens is clear:
Section 2 [of the FAA] requires a two-pronged inquiry: first, whether there is an arbitration agreement in writing; and second, if so, whether the agreement is part of a transaction involving interstate commerce. [The party seeking to compel arbitration] bears the burden of proving both prongs. Univ. of S. Ala. Found. v. Walley, No. 99cv1287, 2001 WL 237309, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 30, 2001); see also Williams v. Eddie Acardi Motor Co., No. 07cv782, 2008 WL 686222,at *7 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 2008) (). These prongs also are not resolved with the "thumb on the scale in favor of arbitration because the federal policy favoring arbitration does not apply to the determination of whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate between the parties." Bd. of Trs. of City of Delray Beach & Firefighters, 622 F.3d 1335, 1342 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 478, 109 S.Ct. 1248, 103 L.Ed.2d 488 (1989) ().
Chambers, 41 F.Supp.3d at 1338.
Moreover, courts must usually look to state law principles as to the formation of contracts to determine whether an agreement to arbitrate exists. See Chambers, 41 F.Supp.3d at 1342. See also First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944, 115 S.Ct. 1920 (1995). Under Alabama law,6 Virginia College has the burden of showing the existence of a contract to arbitrate. See Owens v. Coosa Valley Health Care, Inc., 890 So.2d 983, 986 (Ala. 2004); Chambers, 41 F.Supp.3d at 1342. "Conduct of one party to a contract from which the other may reasonably draw an inference of assent to an agreement is effective as acceptance." Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Kilgore, 751 So.2d 8, 11 (Ala. 1999) (). Parties to a contract do not have to sign the document for there to be an enforceable agreement, but there must be evidence of assent by other means. See, e.g., id.
Plaintiff, who challenges the existence of an arbitration agreement, also has the following burden:
[The Eleventh Circuit has] said that a party seeking to avoid arbitration must unequivocally deny that an agreement to arbitrate was reached and must offer some evidence to substantiate the denial. [Chastain v. Robinson-Humphrey Co., 957 F.2d 851, 854 (11th Cir. 1992)]. More specifically, we require a party resisting arbitration to "substantiate[ ] the denial of the contract with enough evidence to make the denial colorable." Wheat, First Secs., Inc. v. Green, 993 F.2d 814, 819 (11th Cir. 1993) (quotation and citation omitted). Once an agreement to arbitrate is thus put "in issue," the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) requires the district court to "proceed summarily to the trial thereof" and if the objecting party has not requested a jury trial, "the court shall hear and determine such issue." 9 U.S.C. § 4.
Magnolia Capital Advisors, Inc., 272 Fed. App'x. at 785 ().
The parties' positions regarding the motion to compel arbitration are reviewed in light of that backdrop.
Plaintiff is a nursing student at Virginia College. She first enrolled on September 17, 2013 and later re-enrolled on September 12, 2014. (Doc. 6-1 at p. 11). That is the extent of the parties' agreement on the material facts with respect to the matter of arbitrability. The remaining facts are disputed and to such a strong degree that there is no way to reconcile the two versions of events without making findings of fact. As such, a fact finder, whether it be the court or a jury at trial, will necessarily determine that one party is being truthful and one party is not.
The version of facts put forward by Virginia College, in a distilled form, is that Plaintiff agreed to conduct transactions electronically, including agreeing to arbitrate disputes, and that there are witnesses to Plaintiff having personally executed those agreements. Virginia College filed an evidentiary submission consisting, in relevant part, of (1) documents which it represents are contracts between the parties wherein Plaintiff agreed to electronically sign enrollment documents and assented toarbitration8 and bearing what Virginia College claims is Plainti...
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