U.S. Bank N.A. ex rel. Holders of J.P. Morgan Mortg. Acquisition Tr. 2006-RM1 v. Grason
| Decision Date | 23 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | NO. 4-19-0085,4-19-0085 |
| Citation | 2020 IL App (4th) 190085 -U |
| Parties | U.S. BANK N.A, as Trustee on Behalf of the Holders of the J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2006-RM1 Asset Backed Pass Through Certificates, Series 2006-RM 1, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTHONY J. GRASON, a/k/a ANTHONY JAMES GRASON; RONALD GRASON; CRAFTMASTERS, INC.; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; STATE OF ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE; UNKNOWN OWNERS and NON RECORD CLAIMANTS, Defendants (Ronald Grason, Defendant-Appellant). |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
NOTICE
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Macon County
Honorable Thomas E. Little, Judge Presiding.
¶ 1 Held: Plaintiff had standing to bring foreclosure proceedings. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted plaintiff's motion to file a late reply to defendant's affirmative defenses.
¶ 2 Defendant, Ronald Grason, appeals the summary judgment entered in favor of plaintiff, U.S. Bank N.A., on its complaint to foreclose a mortgage. Defendant argues: (1) a material question of fact exists as to whether plaintiff had standing to bring foreclosure proceedings, (2) the trial court abused its discretion when it struck his affirmative defense that plaintiff lacked standing to bring foreclosure proceedings, (3) the court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to amend the pleadings to assert as a new affirmative defense that plaintiff lacked standing to bring foreclosure proceedings for a different reason than previously alleged, (4) the court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the complaint because plaintiff lacked standing to bring foreclosure proceedings, (5) the court abused its discretion when it confirmed the sale of the mortgaged property because plaintiff lacked standing to bring a foreclosure proceeding, and (6) the court erred when it granted plaintiff's motion to file a late reply to defendant's second set of affirmative defenses. We affirm.
¶ 4 On December 22, 2014, plaintiff filed its complaint to foreclose a mortgage on property owned by defendant. In its complaint, plaintiff identified the original mortgagee as "[Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.], as Nominee for ResMae Mortgage Corporation [(ResMae)]." Plaintiff attached to its complaint a copy of the subject mortgage (the Mortgage), originally dated May 22, 2006, which was signed by defendant. Plaintiff also attached to its complaint a copy of an "Assignment of Mortgage" pursuant to which ResMae's interest in the Mortgage had been transferred to plaintiff. In support of its claim to be the current mortgagee, plaintiff attached a copy of an "adjustable rate note" (the Note), also dated May 22, 2006. Adjacent to the signature block of the Note was a stamp from ResMae which stated, "Pay to the order of __________ without recourse." Under the stamp was the signature of ResMae's collateral control manager.
¶ 5 On March 10, 2015, defendant filed an answer, affirmative defenses, and a counterclaim. Among the affirmative defenses pleaded by defendant, he alleged, "[Plaintiff] is not an interested party duly authorized to bring its instant foreclosure complaint and fails to provide any documentation whatsoever evidencing its authority to file the instant complaint." Specifically,defendant challenged the "validity" of the assignment of the Mortgage to plaintiff. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion to strike defendant's affirmative defenses and dismiss defendant's counterclaim. After a hearing, the trial court struck defendant's counterclaim with prejudice and struck defendant's affirmative defenses without prejudice. Defendant subsequently filed a second set of affirmative defenses which were identical to those initially pleaded. Almost four months later, over defendant's objection, plaintiff successfully petitioned the court for leave to file a reply to defendant's second set of affirmative defenses. Plaintiff filed a reply as well as a motion to strike defendant's affirmative defenses, which was subsequently granted.
¶ 6 Defendant filed a third set of affirmative defenses, making the same allegations contained in the first two sets. In response, plaintiff again filed a motion to strike defendant's affirmative defenses. Prior to a hearing on plaintiff's motion to strike, defendant filed a "Motion for Leave to File Amended Pleadings." In defendant's motion, he asserted as a new affirmative defense that plaintiff was not "the holder of the indebtedness," and, consequently, was not entitled to bring a foreclosure action under the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law (735 ILCS 5/15-1101 et seq. (West 2012)). Specifically, defendant asserted that
¶ 7 On October 25, 2016, the trial court conducted a hearing on plaintiff's motion to strike defendant's affirmative defense and on defendant's motion for leave to amend the pleadings. Regarding plaintiff's motion, defendant argued his affirmative defense that plaintiff lacked standing to bring a foreclosure action was meritorious because there was "no record of [the Note] ever be[ing] endorsed and [sic] blank or to any identifiable person—and that's the reason for my amended pleadings to—because in Illinois, *** you have to sue on the note, not the mortgage."
Regarding defendant's motion, defendant argued that he "d[idn't] think" the stamp on the Note was an endorsement in blank. Following the hearing, the trial court struck defendant's affirmative defenses with prejudice and denied defendant's motion to file amended pleadings.
¶ 8 On January 25, 2017, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. In his response to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, defendant argued plaintiff "lack[ed] a security interest and should not be allowed to pursue this foreclosure action" because "[plaintiff] received an assignment of the [M]ortgage without transfer of the [N]ote." In addition to defendant's response to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, he also filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint in which he alleged plaintiff lacked standing to bring foreclosure proceedings because plaintiff only held "an assignment of the [M]ortgage without the accompanying indebtedness." Following a hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint and granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
¶ 9 On March 16, 2017, the trial court entered a judgment of foreclosure and sale in favor of plaintiff. The property subject to the Mortgage was sold at a sheriff's sale on August 14, 2018. The court confirmed the sale on November 20, 2018, over defendant's objection that plaintiff lacked standing to bring a foreclosure proceeding. The court subsequently denied defendant's "Motion to Reconsider and or Vacate the Order of Confirmation of Sale" in which defendant alleged plaintiff had not "demonstrated procession [sic] of any 'note' linking and or connecting their right to foreclosure under the [Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law]."
¶ 10 This appeal followed.
¶ 12 On appeal, defendant argues: (1) a material question of fact exists as to whether plaintiff had standing to bring foreclosure proceedings, (2) the trial court abused its discretionwhen it struck his affirmative defense that plaintiff lacked standing to bring foreclosure proceedings, (3) the court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to amend the pleadings to assert as a new affirmative defense that plaintiff lacked standing to bring foreclosure proceedings for a different reason than previously alleged, (4) the court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the complaint because plaintiff lacked standing to bring foreclosure proceedings, (5) the court abused its discretion when it confirmed the sale of the mortgaged property because plaintiff lacked standing to bring a foreclosure proceeding, and (6) the court erred when it granted plaintiff's motion to file a late reply to defendant's second set of affirmative defenses.
¶ 13 We first address defendant's contention that summary judgment was improper because a material question of fact exists as to whether plaintiff had standing to foreclose on the Mortgage. Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2016). "The purpose of a summary-judgment proceeding is not to try an issue of fact, but instead, to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists." Essig v. Advocate BroMenn Medical Center, 2015 IL App (4th) 140546, ¶ 38, 33 N.E.3d 288. Our review of a summary judgment ruling is de novo. Standard Mutual Insurance Co. v. Lay, 2013 IL 114617, ¶ 15, 989 N.E.2d 591.
¶ 14 "The doctrine of standing is designed to preclude persons who have no interest in a controversy from bringing suit." Raintree Homes, Inc. v. Village of Long Grove, 209 Ill. 2d 248, 262, 807 N.E.2d 439, 447 (2004). The doctrine "requires a person seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the court to have some real interest in the cause of action or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy." Ferguson v. Patton, 2013 IL 112488, ¶ 27, 985N.E.2d 1000.
¶ 15 Defendant correctly argues that the assignment of the Mortgage alone was insufficient to confer upon plaintiff standing to foreclose on defendant's property. See Moore v. Lewis, 51 Ill. App. 3d 388, 391, 366 N.E.2d 594, 599 (1977) (...
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