U.S. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. St. Joseph's Hosp., Inc.
| Decision Date | 07 December 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 15-14551,15-14551 |
| Citation | 842 F.3d 1333,33 A.D. Cases 179 |
| Parties | United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Plaintiff Appellee-Cross Appellant, v. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., Defendant Appellant-Cross Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Gail S. Coleman, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Office of General Counsel-Appellate Services, WASHINGTON, DC, Ana Consuelo Martinez, Kimberly Ann McCoy, Daniel Lewis Seltzer, MIAMI, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross Appellant.
Thomas M. Gonzalez, Erin G. Jackson, Thompson Sizemore Gonzalez & Hearing, PA, TAMPA, FL, for Defendant-Appellant-Cross Appellee.
Rae Thiesfield Vann, Norris Tysse Lampley & Lakis, LLP, WASHINGTON, DC, Amicus Curiae for EQUAL EMPLOYMENT ADVISORY COUNCIL.
Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, DUBINA, Circuit Judge, and HUCK,* District Judge.
The Americans with Disabilities Act's provision for reasonable accommodation of disabled workers is at the heart of this case. Leokadia Bryk, a disabled nurse, sought a reasonable accommodation in the form of a job reassignment to another unit at St. Joseph's Hospital because she required the use of a cane, which posed a safety hazard in the psychiatric ward where she worked. She was given the opportunity to apply for other jobs at St. Joseph's Hospital, but was required to compete for them. When Bryk did not obtain another Hospital position, the Hospital terminated her employment and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission brought suit on her behalf.
Both sides have appealed the various rulings of the district court. Notably, the EEOC appeals the district court's finding that the ADA did not require job reassignment without competition as a reasonable accommodation. The framework of U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett , 535 U.S. 391, 122 S.Ct. 1516, 152 L.Ed.2d 589 (2002), informs the Court's decision affirming the district court on this point. This Court also agrees with the district court's summary judgment rulings finding the employee was a "disabled qualified individual" under the ADA and that the Hospital's 30-day allowance to apply for alternate jobs was reasonable as a matter of law.
This Court, however, disagrees with the district court's order granting in part the EEOC's Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) motion for alteration of the judgment. Except in rare circumstances not present here, motions under Rule 59(e) may not be used to raise new legal theories or arguments, much less in this case where the movant under Rule 59(e), the EEOC, was seeking to contravene language in the jury instructions and verdict form that the EEOC had previously proposed.1 The EEOC failed to meet the Rule 59(e) standard and the district court erred in altering the judgment.
Leokadia Bryk was employed as a nurse in the psychiatric ward of St. Joseph's Hospital from January 2, 1990, until her termination on November 21, 2011. St. Joseph's Hospital is a member of BayCare Health Systems, an alliance of hospitals, medical centers, and home health care providers. From October 17 until November 21, 2011, Bryk was working as a Clinical Nurse II, which was a demotion from her prior position as a Charge Nurse. The Hospital demoted Bryk because she failed to follow Hospital procedures in the psychiatric ward. Rather than terminate Bryk for violating procedures, the Hospital demoted her and placed a final written warning in her file on October 17, 2011. Bryk's demotion is not at issue in this appeal.
In 2002, Bryk began experiencing back pain. An MRI revealed that a disc was narrowing her spinal canal and pressing on her nerve roots, a condition known as spinal stenosis
. She also developed arthritis and underwent hip replacement in 2009. Bryk began to use a cane to alleviate her back pain and to provide support. Without the cane, Bryk, a 62-year old obese woman, could only walk short distances and would need to stop to realign her body. Starting in 2009, Bryk began using a cane in the psychiatric ward. At the time, she was a Charge Nurse and spent some time working at a desk. During the course of the disciplinary action in October 2011, Susan Wright, Director of Behavioral Health Operations, observed Bryk using a cane in the psychiatric ward. Wright was concerned the patients could use the cane as a weapon. When Wright raised the concern, Bryk for the first time provided a doctor's note recommending use of the cane in the psychiatric ward.
On October 21, 2011, shortly after her demotion, the Hospital advised Bryk that she could no longer use the cane in the psychiatric ward as it posed a safety risk. Krista Sikes, Manager of Team Resources, spoke to Bryk and offered her the opportunity to remain employed with the Hospital. The Hospital allowed Bryk 30 days to identify and apply for other positions. Normally, the Hospital did not permit internal candidates to apply for a transfer, unless they had been in their current position for at least six months and had no final written warnings in their record. Bryk met neither criteria. However, the Hospital waived the requirements. The Hospital allowed Bryk to compete with other internal applicants, as opposed to being in the general pool of job applicants. Although the Hospital authorized Bryk to apply through internal channels as an active employee, all of Bryk's job applications were as an external applicant.
Team Resources Director Pat Teeuwan told Bryk, "it wasn't their job to get a job for [her]." However, Krista Sikes was available to answer questions and guide Bryk through the process, but she was not charged with reassigning Bryk to another position. Bryk advised Sikes that she was going on vacation for two weeks at the start of the 30-day period and that she would not look at the Hospital's job board until her return. Bryk never came to Sikes with questions about the application process, the website, or the particular details of any position. Bryk did not apply for another position until November 11, 2011—three weeks into her 30-day allowance. The Hospital job board listed over 700 jobs available. Bryk applied for seven positions, three of which she applied for on the last day of the 30-day period and one of which she applied for after her 30-day application period had expired. At summary judgment, the EEOC focused on three of those seven positions as being positions for which Bryk was qualified.
Bryk testified that she was limited to certain positions because she had worked only in psychiatric and chemical dependency units during her 21 years with the Hospital. Bryk stated she could not safely work in medical or surgical units. She was not familiar with newer nursing procedures, she had no skills in placing intravenous lines on patients, and she would not be able to work with a cane in fast-paced units. As a nurse in the psychiatric ward, Bryk did not treat patients with medical surgical issues. Patients were admitted to the psychiatric ward only if they had medical clearance. If a psychiatric patient developed a medical condition or needed an intravenous line, the Hospital transferred the patient to the medical surgery unit.
At trial, the parties focused on three positions for which Bryk applied during the 30-day period: Educational Specialist, Care Transition Coordinator, and Home Health Clinician. The Hospital did not interview Bryk for any of these positions.
An Educational Specialist is responsible for monthly orientation of new hires at one of BayCare's locations, as well as training nurses on new equipment, electronic medical records, and regulations. The job also entails chart reviews and on-the-spot training for nurses or other employees with identified deficiencies. This job vacancy was for one of the two educators on staff at South Florida Baptist, a small community hospital. Each educator had to be qualified to train nurses in every unit, including the Emergency Department, a Surgical Department, a medical floor, an Intensive Care Unit, a Step-Down Unit, and an OB/GYN Floor. The Hospital considered this position to be a promotion for Bryk. The EEOC, however, presented evidence at trial that Bryk earned more in her then-current job as a Clinical Nurse ($36.44/hour) than the minimum salary for an Educational Specialist ($27.95/hour).
Two people were involved in hiring for the position, Pamela Wayne, the hiring manager, and Rose-Mary Myers, a recruiter. On November 21, 2011, Myers called Wayne and told her that Bryk had applied to become an Educational Specialist. Due to the requirement that the Educational Specialist be qualified to train employees in a myriad of units, Wayne determined that Bryk would not be a "good fit for the job" and decided not to interview her. Although Bryk met the requirements on the job post, Wayne thought the applicant would need at least one or two years of "medical surgical experience" and "more education experience, as well." On December 27, 2011, the Hospital formally rejected Bryk's application on its system.
On February 16, 2012, the Hospital hired Brenda Carlson for the position. A current employee of the Hospital, Carlson had a background in OB/GYN, which requires a foundation in surgery and general medicine. While working as a nurse, Carlson also held a second job for a few years teaching public high school students studying to become certified in health related fields. These students were enrolled in a "health academy," a program which Carlson created and developed.
A Home Health Clinician cares for patients in their homes following their discharge from the hospital. More specifically, a Home Health Clinician plans a patient's hospital discharge, oversees the patient's care at home, determines the plan of care with the physician, and performs surgical wound
care and infusions. At the time Bryk submitted her application, the Hospital had already hired Virginia Surrency. Nobody from the Hospital...
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