U.S. ex rel. Harlan v. Bacon
| Decision Date | 31 March 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-1807,93-1807 |
| Citation | 21 F.3d 209 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America ex rel. Lemuel A. HARLAN, Appellant, v. Harold BACON, Bonnie Bacon, John Bacon, and Kelly Bacon, Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Robert L. Sikma, Sioux City, IA, argued. Appearing on the brief was Patrick J. Phipps, for appellant.
William C. Stanek, Omaha, NE, argued, for appellees.
Before JOHN R. GIBSON * and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges, and BARTLETT, ** District Judge.
Relator Lemuel A. Harlan ("Harlan"), brought this action on behalf of the United States to recover the crops and money obtained by the Bacons under a sharecrop agreement with the Omaha Indian Tribe because the lease was not approved by the relevant governmental officials. The District Court 1 entered summary judgment for the defendants, 851 F.Supp. 367, and Harlan appeals. The issue is whether 25 U.S.C. Sec. 81 applies to a lease of Indian lands for purposes of sharecropping. We hold that it does not and therefore affirm.
The parties are in agreement about the facts of the case.
From 1986 through 1990, the Bacons leased farmland from the Omaha Indian Tribe under a sharecrop arrangement, with 40% of the produce to be delivered to the tribe. In 1990, the Superintendent of the Bureau of Indian Affairs notified the Bacons by letter that Section 81 of Title 25 and 25 C.F.R. Chapter 3 put them at risk. The relevant portions of 25 U.S.C. Sec. 81 provide that:
No agreement shall be made by any person with any tribe of Indians ... for the payment or delivery of any money or other thing of value, ... or for the granting or procuring any privilege to him, ... in consideration of services for said Indians relative to their lands, ... unless such contract or agreement be executed and approved as follows:
* * * * * *
... it shall bear the approval of the Secretary of the Interior and the commissioner of Indian Affairs indorsed upon it.
The statute further provides that:
All contracts or agreements made in violation of this section shall be null and void, and all money or other thing of value paid to any person by any Indian or tribe, or any one else, for or on his or their behalf, on account of such services, in excess of the amount approved by the Commissioner and Secretary for such services, may be recovered by suit in the name of the United States....
The Bacons' lease was never approved by the Bureau of Indian Affairs or the Department of the Interior. The Bacons continued to farm the property through what was left of the lease term, harvesting and selling their share of the crops.
When construing a statute, we are obliged to look first to the plain meaning of the words employed by the legislature. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). We "must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Id. Our decision, however, is:
not to be reached by a strict construction of the words of the Act, nor by application of artificial canons of construction. On the contrary, we are to read the statutory language in its ordinary and natural sense, and if doubts remain, resolve them in the light, not only of the policy intended to be served by the enactment, but, as well, by all other available aids to construction. But it is not our function to engraft on a statute additions which we think the legislature logically might or should have made.
United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 605, 61 S.Ct. 742, 744, 85 L.Ed. 1071 (1941).
If we parse the statute before us, it seems to command that:
(4) for
(i) any money or
(ii) other thing of value, in present or in prospective
or for
(6) unless such contract or agreement be executed and approved ...
Condition (1) is satisfied: the Bacons' lease is clearly an "agreement." The Bacons, who are "persons" within the meaning of condition (2), also clearly received something of value as contemplated under condition (4)(a)(ii) or (4)(b), namely, a leasehold. The issue then becomes whether the Bacons received this thing of value either "in consideration of services for" the Omaha Indian Tribe "relative to their lands," or in reference to any benefice emanating from the United States.
The wording of the statute appears to concern all contracts where Indians are called on to relinquish a government benefit or pay for services "relative to their lands." From the facts to which both parties agree, it does not appear to us that the Bacons received their leasehold interest in exchange for "services for the Indians relative to their lands" or in reference to trust property held or emanating from the government. Instead, it is clear the Bacons received the leasehold in exchange for crops.
Harlan argues that the language of Section 81 is broad and reflects a policy that all contracts made by non-Indians with Indians on the reservation affecting Indian lands be supervised by the federal government. This argument is not persuasive. It is difficult to explain how Congress could have chosen the word "services" had it intended that this particular statute should effect such a sweeping policy. We are reluctant to give the word "services" any meaning other than its commonly understood one.
It is possible, we suppose, to read the statute as follows:
(4) for
(i) any money or
(ii) other thing of value, in present or in prospective
or for
(5) unless such contract or agreement be executed and approved The distinction of this particular reading is that it limits the "consideration of services" clause to agreements concerning grants or procurement of privileges. This limitation seems concomitantly to expand the clause we have marked as (4)(a) to encompass the entire universe of contracts.
Unfortunately, we cannot uncover any legislative history that might help to resolve the apparent ambiguity. Nevertheless, we are not persuaded that the statute should be read this second way for two reasons. First, it is a cardinal and long-revered canon of statutory construction that Congress is not to be presumed to have done a vain thing, namely, using superfluous language. A reading which expands the "money or thing of value" clause to include the universe of contracts reduces the "in consideration of services" and "trust property" clauses to nullities. What conceivable contract could fall under either of these clauses without falling first under the "money or thing of value" clause? Such an interpretation also renders other provisions of title 25 dealing with contracts redundant. Section 85, for example, invalidates any contract made with an Indian involving tribal funds or property in the hands of the government, and forbids payment "for services rendered in relation thereto." Similarly, Sec. 177 forbids agreement effecting conveyances of Indian lands. An...
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