U.S. ex rel. Hayward v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 28 January 1975
• Docket Number: No. 74-1335,74-1335
• Citation: 508 F.2d 322
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America ex rel. William HAYWARD, Appellant, v. Robert L. JOHNSON, Superintendent State Correctional Institution, Graterford, Pennsylvania, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Page 322

508 F.2d 322

UNITED STATES of America ex rel. William HAYWARD, Appellant, v. Robert L. JOHNSON, Superintendent State Correctional

Institution, Graterford, Pennsylvania, Appellee.

No. 74-1335.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued Nov. 15, 1974.

Decided Jan. 28, 1975.

Robert Scandone, Brobyn, Forceno, Curran & Scandone, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant.

Bonnie Brigance Leadbetter, Mark Sendrow, Steven H. Goldblatt, Abraham J. Gafni, Richard A. Sprague, F. Emmett Fitzpatrick, Jr., Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Civil Action No. 73-2867).

Before VAN DUSEN, HUNTER and GARTH, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

JAMES HUNTER, III, Circuit Judge:

This case, an appeal from an order denying habeas corpus relief, presents us with one of the most difficult tasks in the law: that of determining whether a confession obtained after custodial police interrogation was voluntary.

Appellant William Hayward, a seventeen-year old drug addict with a tenth grade level of education, was indicted for murder, aggravated robbery and conspiracy for his alleged role in the death of a Mr. William Smith. Prior to the start of his trial, Judge Joseph L. McGlynn, Jr., of the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas held a suppression hearing on the admissibility of the confession. After a ruling that the confession was admissible, appellant was brought to trial, convicted of aggravated robbery and conspiracy and sentenced to 6-20 years' imprisonment. His conviction was sustained on appeal, and he thereupon sought habeas corpus relief in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Although a federal magistrate recommended an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied relief without holding such a hearing.

Appellant makes two principal contentions in challenging the admissibility of his confession. First, he argues that the undisputed facts determined at the suppression hearing compel a finding that his confession had been obtained involuntarily. Second, he argues that the district court at least should have held an evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed issues of fact concerning the voluntariness of his confession which he asserts were inadequately adjudicated by the state court during the suppression hearing. We reject both contentions and affirm the judgment below.

I.

With respect to the first contention, the uncontested facts, based on testimony from the suppression hearing, are as follows: The decedent, William Smith, was discovered by a neighbor in a badly beaten condition and was taken to the hospital where he died on September 15, 1970. Appellant was questioned on three separate occasions with respect to Smith's death, each time in a small interrogation room at the police station and each time after receiving the full Miranda warnings. Although the police never had a warrant when they took him into custody, he went voluntarily and with his mother's permission each time he was questioned.

The first questioning occurred on September 21, 1970, when Detective Kelly of the Philadelphia police picked appellant up at his home at 2:30 p.m. At the police station, he was questioned initially for about one hour. During this questioning, he admitted knowing the decedent, but gave a generally exculpatory statement. After voluntarily submitting to a lie detector test, which he failed, appellant was questioned for another forty minutes. That period of questioning was terminated when appellant began to suffer withdrawal symptoms and became quite ill. The police then drove him home.

The second occasion on which the police questioned appellant was September 24, after picking him up at his home at 6:20 a.m. ¹ On this date, appellant changed his story somewhat and stated that he observed two other (Len and Nelson Johnson) take money from Smith and beat him. However, appellant continued to deny any involvement in the incident. Although the questioning was concluded at 8:00 a.m. the police kept appellant at the station while they went over his story. At 1:00 p.m., he again began to suffer from withdrawal symptoms, and was again driven home.

On October 3, the third time appellant was questioned, he gave his confession. He was picked up at his home at 12:30 a.m. ² and driven to the police station, where he arrived at 1:10 a.m. From 1:25 a.m. to 2:40 a.m. he gave an oral statement in which he admitted that he had suggested robbing Smith and that he shared in the proceeds. After a twenty minute recess during which he went to the lavatory, he gave a six-page written statement from 3:00 a.m. to 4:50 a.m., and he signed every page. ³ Subsequently, ⁴ however, he again suffered withdrawal symptoms, becoming so ill that he was taken to the hospital in an emergency patrol wagon. While at the hospital, he was examined by Dr. B. Duvall, who reported that appellant told him that he would rather die than go into withdrawal and that he had tried to commit suicide four times while at the police station. This report was admitted into evidence at the suppression hearing.

At the conclusion of the testimony and arguments by counsel, Judge McGlynn made the following findings:

I will find as a fact that (Hayward) was advised of his constitutional rights; that he understood them; that he freely and voluntarily made the statement, and it was not the result of either physical force or psychological duress; that the fact that he later on suffered withdrawal does not affect the voluntariness of the statement.

Since it is evident from this excerpt that Judge McGlynn made both factual and legal findings, it is necessary to distinguish between them in order to determine the scope of our review. The purely factual findings-- that appellant was warned of his rights and that he understood them, and that he suffered withdrawal after giving his statement-- are binding on us, since we are satisfied that sufficient evidence exists to support them and since they are not contested on appeal. ⁵ The remaining findings, which pertain to the voluntariness of the statement, are at least mixed questions of law and fact, and they do not foreclose our independent review. We are in fact obligated to make our own determination on the basis of the uncontested facts ⁶ and the specific factual findings supported by the record, as to whether appellant's statement was voluntarily given. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515, 83 S.Ct. 1336, 10 L.Ed.2d 513 (1963); Malinski Ct. 781, 89 L.Ed. 1029 401, 404, 65 S.Ct. 781, 89 L.Ed. 1029 (1945); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 147-148, 64 S.Ct. 921, 88 L.Ed. 1192 (1944).

In determining whether a confession was voluntary, we must satisfy ourselves that the confession was 'the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker,' ⁷ that it was 'the product of a rational intellect and a free will' ⁸ and that the appellant's will was not 'overborne.' ⁹ In making this determination, it is essential for us to consider the 'totality of the circumstances' surrounding the obtaining of the confession. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226-227, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 87 S.Ct. 1338, 18 L.Ed.2d 423 (1967); Haynes v. Washington, supra at 513-514 of 373 U.S.,83 S.Ct. 1336.

Applying these standards, we acknowledge that this is a close case, and we are troubled by the police conduct here, involving a late night questioning, without any apparent justification, ¹⁰ of a seventeen-year old youth. We also acknowledge that the Supreme Court's decision in Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 68 S.Ct. 302, 92 L.Ed. 224 (1947), on which appellant relies, is in some respects similar to the case before us. In that case, the Supreme Court held involuntary the confession of a fifteen-year old boy who was taken from his home at night and questioned steadily from 12:00 midnight to 5:00 a.m.

However, we believe that Haley is distinguishable, and we are satisfied that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has sustained its burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, ¹¹ that appellant's confession was voluntarily given. One important distinction is the fact that the youth in Haley was never informed of his right to remain silent or to have a lawyer present, ¹² whereas in this case appellant was read all four Miranda warnings prior to each questioning. On October 3, he was read those warnings twice, once before the initial questioning and again before giving his written statement. In addition, each time he was read the warnings, he was also asked a series of questions from the standard police interrogation card, ¹³ and all his responses indicated that he was willing to talk without delay and without the assistance of counsel. Neither at the suppression hearing nor on appeal does appellant challenge the sufficiency of his warnings or deny a willingness to talk without an attorney present.

We recognize that the goving of such warnings is but one factor in the 'totality of circumstances ' that we must consider, albeit an important one, and we certainly do not suggest that a confession obtained after a suspect has been fully informed of his rights can never be found involuntary. ¹⁴ However, there are additional factors in this case which further distinguish it from Haley and which likewise point toward voluntariness. First, the period of questioning was shorter and the manner of questioning seems less coercive. Unlike the youth in Heley, who gave his confession only after five hours of continuous incommunicado questioning by five or six policemen in relays of one or two each, appellant here began to give his confession early on the third occasion he was questioned, ¹⁵ and the questioning was conducted predominantly by one person, Detective Kelly. ¹⁶

Furthermore, the confession was obtained only on the third occasion he was questioned. By October 3, the circumstances of his questioning and the...