U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Industrial Acc. Commission

• Decision Date: 19 March 1962
• Citation: 20 Cal.Rptr. 395,201 Cal.App.2d 545
• Parties: UNITED STATES PIPE AND FOUNDRY COMPANY, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION of the State of California and Antonio Hinojoza, Respondents. Civ. 20271.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 395

20 Cal.Rptr. 395

201 Cal.App.2d 545

UNITED STATES PIPE AND FOUNDRY COMPANY, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION of the State of California and Antonio Hinojoza, Respondents.

Civ. 20271.

District Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

March 19, 1962.

John P. MacMeeken, Chickering & Gregory, San Francisco, for petitioner.

Everett A. Corten, Emily B. Johnson, San Francisco, for respondent Industrial Accident Commission.

Edward E. Martins, Pucci & Martins, Hayward, for respondent Antonio Hinojoza.

TOBRINER, Justice.

Does Labor Code, section 5900, subdivision (b), providing that at any time within 60 days after the filing of an order the Industrial Accident Commission may on its own motion grant reconsideration of the matter, fix a jurisdictional time limit upon such action of the Commission? Although no case specifically decides the issue, we believe the language of the section and the statutory design permit no other conclusion than that the time limitation is jurisdictional.

On September 11, 1958, the applicant filed an application with the Industrial Accident Commission alleging that he had suffered an industrial injury while employed by the petitioner. At hearing held before the referee on December 15, 1958, March 9, 1959, and May 6, 1959, the testimony developed that in March 1958, applicant's feet began to pain him, principally his right foot. In April 1958, he noticed that he was suffering from athlete's foot. He stopped work on July 24, 1958. He was hospitalized in July of 1958, and again in August of 1958. Thereafter his right first toe was amputated because of a gangrenous ulceration.

The applicant suffered from a vascular disease either 'Buerger's disease' or an 'immersion foot syndrome'; he contended that this disease had been aggravated or caused by his employment. Applicant testified that he worked as a 'troughman' casting pipe. After starting work his feet and legs became soaking wet from splashing water and remained in that condition during the entire workday. Petitioner countered with the argument that the applicant had not sustained any injury arising out of, or in the course of, his employment, and that his disability resulted solely from a nonindustrial disease.

After submission of the case, the referee on May 15, 1959, filed and served his findings and order. The order adjudged that applicant take nothing by reason of his claim and the findings of fact stated that '2. Applicant did not sustain any injury arising out of or occurring in the course of his employment in March, 1958 or prior thereto. 3. The disability of which applicant complains was not proximately caused, or caused at all, by any injury arising out of or occurring in the course of his employment, or by his employment.'

The applicant took no action within the 20-day period prescribed for the filing of a petition for reconsideration. (Labor Code, §§ 5900, 5903.) On June 30, 1959, however, 45 days after the service of the findings and order, applicant filed a petition for reconsideration asking that, pursuant to Labor Code, section 5900, subdivision (b), the Commission reconsider the matter on its own motion. The Commission, however, failed to act within the 60-day period prescribed in the section. On July 17, 1959, 63 days after the filing of the findings and order, the Commission issued its order dismissing the petition for reconsideration and rendered an order granting reconsideration pursuant to Labor Code, section 5900, subdivision (b).

The Commission set down the case for further determination before a second referee who received additional testimony at hearings held on November 14, 1960, February 9, 1961, and April 26, 1961. At these hearings conflicting medical reports of Drs. Shaffer, Hine and Leeds were introduced.

Petitioner contends that the Commission did not arrange for the preparation, or certification of the transcript of the evidence introduced at the hearings of March 9, 1959, or April 26, 1961, and that on these dates its principal witness, Dr. Leeds, adduced material evidence on the issue of injury. The transcript of the testimony taken at the hearings of May 6, 1959, November 14, 1960, and February 9, 1961, had been so prepared and certified.

The panel issued a decision after reconsideration, which it filed on September 26, 1961. In this decision it found that the applicant had sustained an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. The panel ordered the matter to be returned to the calendar on all other issues. Petitioner thereupon brought this petition for writ of review.

We shall set out infra our reasons for deciding that (1) the Commission, in granting reconsideration on its own motion, after the expiration of the 60-day provision in section 5900, subdivision (b), of the Labor Code, exceeded its jurisdiction, (2) the Commission's ruling could not be regarded as a decision after reopening pursuant to Labor Code, section 5803, and (3) petitioner did not suffer a denial of due process because the Commission failed to read the testimony transcribed at the original hearing and at the hearing on reconsideration.

As to the first issue, the nature of the power of the Commission must primarily derive from the language of section 5900, subdivision (b). The section reads: 'At any time within 60 days after the filing of an order, decision, or award made by a commissioner or a referee and the accompanying report, the commission may, on its own motion, grant reconsideration.' Labor Code, section 5900, subdivision (a), provides that any person aggrieved may petition the Commission for reconsideration; section 5903 specifies that such petition be brought within 20 days.

As we have stated above, we believe that the provisions of the section are mandatory and jurisdictional; in reaching that conclusion we have been guided by the statutory design. As petitioner points out, the Legislature has provided in the Workmen's Compensation Act a procedure for reconsideration of its awards. (1 Hanna, The Law of Employee Injuries and Workmen's Compensation (1953), p. 128). Such reconsideration fulfills substantially the same function as the new trial in civil proceedings. Accordingly, Labor Code, section 5903 describes the specific grounds upon which such reconsideration may be sought; sections 5906, 5907, 5908 tell what action may be taken, and sections 5900, 5903, 5909 specify the times for seeking and granting reconsideration.

The finality of the rulings of the Commission in the absence of reconsideration is described in section 115 which provides in part that '[e]very finding, order, decision, or award made and filed by any commissioner or referee pursuant to such * * * hearing is the finding, order, decision or award of the commission unless reconsideration is had in accordance with the provisions of Article I, Chapter 7, Part 4, Division 4 of this code.' (Emphasis added.) The cases have held that upon the expiration of the time for reconsideration of review in the courts, the decisions of the Commission are final and conclusive as to the matters litigated by the parties. (Labor Code, § 5302. See French v. Rishell (1953), 40 Cal.2d 477, 480, 481, 254 P.2d 26; California-Western, etc., Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm. (1952), 39 Cal.2d 104, 107, 244 P.2d 912; Thaxter v. Finn (1918), 178 Cal. 270, 275, 173 P. 163.)

The statutory prescription of the period in which to apply for reconsideration and for the finality of the Commission's orders in the absence of such request has led the courts to rule that the Commission lacked the power to grant an untimely petition for reconsideration. Prior to the 1951 enactment of section 5900, subdivision (b), providing for reconsideration on the Commission's own motion, the court in Young v. Industrial Acc. Comm. (1944), 63 Cal.App.2d 286, 288-294, 146 P.2d 693 held that the Commission could not act upon a request for reconsideration filed after the lapse of the 20-day period fixed in Labor Code, sections 5900 (now § 5900, subd. (a)) and 5903, and that the applicant could not invoke the Commission's continuing jurisdiction to accomplish the same purpose. (See Kennedy v. Industrial Acc. Comm. (1920), 50 Cal.App. 184, 188, 195 P. 267; 1 Hanna, supra, pp. 134, 135.) In an analogous situation the courts have declared that the District Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate an order of the Commission upon a petition for review which had not been filed within the 30-day period prescribed in Labor Code, section 5950. (National Auto. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm. (1943), 58 Cal.App.2d 508, 509, 136 P.2d 815; North Pacific S. S. Co. v. Soley (1924), 193 Cal. 138, 140-141, 223 P. 462.)

The Commission has itself held that the time provisions as to reconsideration constituted jurisdictional limitations. In Pacheco v. Industrial Accident Commission (1959), 24 Calif.Comp.Cases 266, the Commission, in denying reconsideration as untimely, stated: "[W]e have always regarded the statutory requirements as being jurisdictional." The Commission has uniformly treated the time limitations of the section as mandatory. (See Sanders v. Industrial Accident Commission (1960), 25 Calif.Comp.Cases 152; Burdine v. Industrial Accident Commission (1947), 12 Calif.Comp.Cases 242; Hartman v. Industrial Accident Commission (1947), 12 Calif.Comp.Cases 5; Goodman v. J. C. Penney Company (1942), 7 Calif.Comp.Cases 185; Schumacher v. Industrial Accident Commission (1940), 5 Calif.Comp.Cases 248.) The commentators likewise have indicated that the 60-day provision conditions the power of the Commission upon reconsideration. (See, e. g., 1 Hanna, supra, pp. 134, 142; 2 Witkin, Summary of Calif. Law, pp. 1765-1766; 55 Cal.Jur.2d, § 321, p. 358.)

On the other hand, the Commission's citation of Peak v. Industrial Acc. Comm. (1947), 82 Cal.App.2d 926, 932, 187 P.2d 905, as authority for the proposition that section 5900, subdivision (b), should...