U.S. Postal Serv. v. City of Berkeley
| Decision Date | 12 January 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. C 16–04815 WHA,C 16–04815 WHA |
| Citation | 228 F.Supp.3d 963 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF BERKELEY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
Janine Castorina, United States Postal Service, Julia Alexandra Berman, United States Department of Justice, Washington DC, for Plaintiff.
Zachary Cowan, Berkeley City Attorney's Office, Berkeley, CA, for Defendant.
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS
In this action by the United States Postal Service to declare unlawful and enjoin the application of a zoning ordinance enacted by the City of Berkeley, the City moves to dismiss. The motion is DENIED .
The following facts are taken from the complaint. The USPS owns and operates the Berkeley Main Post Office at 2000 Allston Way in Berkeley, California. In 2012, the USPS decided to reduce costs by selling that post office and moving to a smaller location. From 2012 to 2013, the USPS solicited community engagement and public comment on its decision.
The Berkeley City Council opposed the planned sale. The council adopted a formal resolution of its opposition on March 5, 2013, and sent a letter conveying the same to the USPS on April 30, 2013. On July 18, 2013, the USPS issued a Final Determination affirming its decision. In October 2013, the USPS began marketing the post office for sale. From December 2013 to November 2014, in preparation for the sale, the USPS conferred with the City and other groups to negotiate safeguards for the post office's historic status. The USPS and the City were unable to reach agreement in these discussions.
On July 8, 2013, Councilmember Jesse Arreguín wrote a letter to the USPS that read in part (Dkt. No. 1 Exh. 2):
Discussing the proposed zoning change during a council meeting on January 28, 2014, Councilmember Susan Wengraf stated, "I am very much in favor of saving the Post Office," and Councilmember Max Anderson commented that "to not go ahead and pursue this overlay ... would be disarming ourselves in the middle of a battle" to "defend ... that building and the purposes for which it was originally designed." In a local newspaper, Mayor Tom Bates also stated,
On September 9, 2014, the council passed Berkeley Municipal Code Chapter 23E.98, Civic Center District Overlay (the "Overlay"), restricting nine parcels of land, including the post office, to civic or nonprofit uses. Prior to the Overlay, the affected areas were zoned to permit residential, retail, and other commercial uses. According to the USPS, the Overlay "eliminated virtually all commercially viable uses" of the post office (Dkt. No. 1 at 8). Moreover, the "practical effects of the [Overlay] have fallen only on the [post office], while commercial activity has continued in and around other parcels subject to the [Overlay]" (id. at 9).
On September 22, 2014, the USPS entered into an agreement to sell the post office to developer Hudson McDonald LLC. The Overlay went into effect on September 30, 2014, and the developer was unable to negotiate relief from its effects with the council. On November 5, 2014, the City also sued the USPS to enjoin the sale. City of Berkeley v. U.S.P.S. , No. 3:14–cv–04916–WHA (Case No. 14–4916). The developer terminated the sale agreement on December 3, 2014.
The USPS alleges the Overlay "rendered the [post office] unattractive to commercial developers," "depressed the market price [it] otherwise could yield," and "dissuaded the [USPS] from relisting [the post office] for sale," thereby "imped[ing] its efforts to carry out its responsibilities under the Postal Reorganization Act" (Dkt. No. 1 at 9–10). The USPS seeks declaratory and injunctive relief on the bases that the Overlay (1) violates the Supremacy Clause and (2) is preempted by the Postal Clause, Property Clause, and Postal Reorganization Act.
The City moves to dismiss, contending (1) the action is unripe, (2) the action is time-barred, and (3) the complaint fails to state a claim for relief because the Overlay has only an indirect effect on the USPS.
Ripeness has both a constitutional and a prudential component. Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n , 220 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). "The constitutional ripeness of a declaratory judgment action depends upon ‘whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.’ " United States v. Braren , 338 F.3d 971, 975 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co. , 312 U.S. 270, 273, 61 S.Ct. 510, 85 L.Ed. 826 (1941) ). The prudential component of ripeness, moreover, requires federal courts to consider "the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration." Wolfson v. Brammer , 616 F.3d 1045, 1060 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner , 387 U.S. 136, 149, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967), abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders , 430 U.S. 99, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977) ).
This action is ripe for adjudication. The facts alleged here show a "substantial controversy" between the parties because, according to the USPS, the Overlay effectively prevents the USPS from selling its post office in violation of the Supremacy Clause. This obstruction is active and ongoing since the USPS alleges that, despite its need to sell the post office, it is "dissuaded" from attempting to do so because the Overlay "eliminated virtually all commercially viable uses of the [post office]" (Dkt. No. 1 at 8–10). And, insofar as the USPS is unable to reduce costs by selling the post office as planned (id. at 3–4), withholding of court consideration would impose hardship on the USPS.
The City insists the action is unripe because the USPS "currently has no plans to sell the [post office]" (Dkt. No. 11 at 4–5). The City points out that the undersigned previously dismissed as moot the City's own lawsuit to enjoin the USPS's attempted sale in 2014 because (1) the developer terminated the sale agreement and (2) the USPS rescinded the 2013 final determination, such that any future decision to relocate will be a whole new process. Case No. 14–4916 (Dkt. No. 56 at 4). Since the USPS is not currently taking any steps to sell the post office, the City reasons, the instant action is unripe inasmuch as the City's prior lawsuit is moot (Dkt. No. 11 at 5–8).
The City's reasoning is flawed. Its prior lawsuit dealt with a specific attempted sale to Hudson McDonald that became moot because the developer cancelled the deal. In contrast, the broader controversy here concerns whether the Overlay frustrates any attempt by the USPS to sell the post office. These are fundamentally different questions. The gravamen of the USPS's complaint is precisely that the Overlay prevents any potential steps towards sale. The City would demand as a prerequisite for ripeness the very outcome it is accused of precluding. The USPS seeks redress, not for interference with any actual attempt to sell the post office, but for interference with its ability to even attempt to find a buyer (see Dkt. No. 20 at 8–12). Its claims for relief on that basis are ripe.*
The City in its motion argues that Section 65009(c)(1)(B) of the California Government Code, which imposes a 90–day statute of limitations for challenging a zoning ordinance, bars this action (Dkt. No. 11 at 9). This order does not address this contention because the City has since abandoned it, as confirmed by the City's counsel during oral argument.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). A claim is facially plausible when there are sufficient factual allegations to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the conduct alleged. A court "must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true" but is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Ibid. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ).
The USPS styles its first claim as anchored in the Supremacy Clause, contending "The Supremacy Clause prevents a municipality from regulating federal functions, even ... indirectly, through regulation of a third party" (Dkt. No. 20 at 17). Though the USPS does not identify it as such,...
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