U.S. Postal Service v. American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO

Decision Date12 January 1990
Docket NumberD,No. 88-15284,AFL-CI,88-15284
Citation893 F.2d 1117
Parties133 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2381, 114 Lab.Cas. P 11,810 UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AMERICAN POSTAL WORKERS UNION,efendant-Appellant, v. NATIONAL POST OFFICE MAIL HANDLERS, WATCHMEN, MESSENGERS AND GROUP LEADERS DIVISION OF THE LABORERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA,efendant-Cross- Claimant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Darryl J. Anderson, O'Donnell, Schwartz & Anderson, Washington, D.C., for defendant-appellant.

Kevin B. Rachel, Office of Labor Law, U.S. Postal Service, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff-appellee.

Orrin Baird, Connerton, Ray & Simon, Washington, D.C., for defendant-cross-claimant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.

Before NORRIS, THOMPSON and O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judges.

DAVID R. THOMPSON, Circuit Judge:

The American Postal Workers Union ("APWU") appeals the district court's decision ordering tripartite arbitration among the APWU, the United States Postal Service ("USPS"), and the National Post Office Mail Handlers, Watchmen, Messengers and Group Leaders Division of the Laborers' International Union of North America ("Mail Handlers"). This case presents a question of first impression: whether a district court may order parties to submit a dispute to tripartite arbitration despite their contractual agreements which provide only for bipartite arbitration. We hold that a district court can enter such an order and properly did so in this case.

FACTS

The APWU and the Mail Handlers represent postal employees. Until 1981, these two unions (and a third not involved in this case) bargained with the USPS collectively. Since 1981, however, the Mail Handlers have chosen to bargain separately.

The collective bargaining agreements between the USPS-APWU and the USPS-Mail Handlers are virtually identical in many respects. Both agreements contain broad provisions requiring that all disputes be submitted to arbitration. Formerly, when the unions negotiated as a unit, their The current dispute arose at the USPS' San Francisco Air Mail Facility when the USPS assigned work to employees under the Mail Handlers' jurisdiction. The APWU filed a grievance. It alleged that the work should have been assigned to members of its union according to Regional Instruction 399, "Mail Processing Work Assignment Guidelines," by which all three parties are bound. Following the grievance procedure, the USPS-APWU dispute was scheduled for arbitration. The Mail Handlers attempted to intervene in this arbitration. The arbitrator concluded that despite the Mail Handlers' obvious interest, they could not intervene because the USPS-APWU agreement did not permit such intervention.

single agreement contained a provision for tripartite arbitration to resolve disputes over which union had jurisdiction of a certain type of work. The present separate agreements do not contain such a tripartite arbitration provision.

On April 12, 1988, the USPS filed suit in district court against the APWU and the Mail Handlers to compel tripartite arbitration. The APWU filed an answer and asserted counterclaims against the USPS. The Mail Handlers filed an answer and asserted crossclaims and counterclaims against the USPS and the APWU seeking tripartite arbitration and a permanent injunction covering any future jurisdictional disputes. The parties moved for summary judgment. The court granted the USPS' motion for summary judgment and ordered tripartite arbitration. The Mail Handlers' request for a permanent injunction was denied. The court later amended its order and denied the APWU's summary judgment motion. The APWU appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291, and we affirm.

ANALYSIS
A. Finality of the Order Compelling Arbitration as to the Mail Handlers

The APWU contends that because the district court's order only specifically denied the Mail Handlers' request for a permanent injunction, the Mail Handlers' motion for summary judgment seeking tripartite arbitration was never ruled upon; therefore there is no final judgment compelling tripartite arbitration as to the Mail Handlers. We disagree. The district court clearly ordered the requested tripartite arbitration and specifically denied the Mail Handlers' request for a permanent injunction. The district court recognized the Mail Handlers' entire summary judgment motion: "defendant Mail Handlers moves for summary judgment on both its counterclaim against plaintiff and its cross-claim against APWU." (emphasis added). These claims were for tripartite arbitration.

In light of the district court's order compelling tripartite arbitration pursuant to the USPS' motion, it would be illogical to assume that the court considered and rejected the Mail Handlers' motion for the same relief. All parties had a clear understanding of the practical effects of the judgment, and no prejudice results from construing the judgment as a final judgment in regard to both parts of the Mail Handlers' motion. The judgment entered August 12, 1988 serves as a "final decision" reviewable by this court. See Alaska v. Andrus, 591 F.2d 537, 540 (9th Cir.1979) (order did not expressly reject party's motion, but served as final judgment for purpose of appeal); cf. Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 387, 98 S.Ct. 1117, 1121, 55 L.Ed.2d 357 (1978) (Court did not require order to be a separate document where the district court clearly evidenced its intent). We conclude that the order compelling tripartite arbitration is a final order as to the Mail Handlers, as well as to the USPS and the APWU.

B. Authority to Order Tripartite Arbitration
1. Applicability of Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185(a) (1982)

Section 1208(b) of the Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. Sec. 1208(b) (1982), grants district courts jurisdiction over suits for violation of contracts among the USPS and unions representing postal employees. Section 1209 provides that all consistent provisions of title 29, chapter 7, subchapter 11 apply. Thus, cases interpreting the nearly identical Labor-Management Relations Act section 301, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185(a) (1982), have been applied to determine the scope of a district court's authority in cases under the Postal Reorganization Act. See, e.g., American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 823 F.2d 466, 469 (11th Cir.1987); National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. United States Postal Serv., 590 F.2d 1171, 1174-75 (D.C.Cir.1978).

2. Contractual Nexus Required for Compulsory Arbitration

Despite a presumption for arbitration when a contract contains an arbitration clause, AT & T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 650, 106 S.Ct. 1415, 1419, 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986), a court can only compel arbitration pursuant to the parties' contract. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1352, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960) ("arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit"); Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 374, 94 S.Ct. 629, 635, 38 L.Ed.2d 583 (1974) ("No obligation to arbitrate a labor dispute arises solely by operation of law. The law compels a party to submit his grievance to arbitration only if he has contracted to do so."). For the district court to have the power to compel tripartite arbitration, a contractual nexus is required as to both (a) the parties and (b) the subject matter.

In the current dispute, all parties agree that the merits of the work jurisdiction dispute are covered by the arbitration provisions of both the USPS-APWU contract and the USPS-Mail Handlers contract. Thus, although separate contracts exist, the dispute will be arbitrated; the question is which parties will participate in the first round of arbitration.

The Supreme Court has been somewhat lenient in deciding which parties will be required to arbitrate. The Court has not required strict contractual privity. See, e.g., John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 84 S.Ct. 909, 11 L.Ed.2d 898 (1964) ("successor employer" bound to arbitrate under predecessor's agreement with union). Nevertheless, some contractual nexus must exist. See Laborers' Int'l Union v. W.W. Bennett Constr. Co., 686 F.2d 1267, 1274 (7th Cir.1982) ("Bennett "). In the current dispute, all parties are contractually obligated to arbitrate, albeit in bipartite proceedings. See id.

Only if the arbitrator is empowered to make binding interpretations of both agreements in the usual three-party jurisdictional dispute can he resolve the entire controversy as would the NLRB. At a minimum, this would require that each union be bound by an arbitration agreement with its employer which arguably covers work assignment disputes.

Id. at 1276. Tripartite arbitration is, in effect, a consolidation of two individual, consensual arbitrations. See id. at 1274. Here, the requisite contractual nexus is present: all of the parties have agreed to the arbitration of the merits of the current dispute.

3. Suitability of Tripartite Arbitration

Despite the existence of the requisite contractual nexus, the district court must examine other factors to ensure that tripartite arbitration is a suitable remedy for the actual case before it. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. American Recording & Broadcasting Ass'n, 414 F.2d 1326, 1329 (2d Cir.1969) ("CBS ") (although the district court had power to order tripartite arbitration because of the contractual nexus, there was still a question as to whether the power was properly exercised). These factors include (a) the nature of the relevant arbitration provisions, (b) the invocation of each arbitration provision by a party to the agreement, and (c) any procedural concerns surrounding...

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