U.S. v. $57,443.00.

Decision Date24 January 1999
Docket NumberNo. 97-1602-Civ-LENARD.,97-1602-Civ-LENARD.
Citation42 F.Supp.2d 1293
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. FIFTY SEVEN THOUSAND, FOUR HUNDRED AND FORTY-THREE DOLLARS ($57,443.00), Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

Peter S. Herrick, Miami, Florida, for defendant.

ORDER

TURNOFF, United States Magistrate Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on the United States's Motion for Summary Judgment (DE 15) and Claimant Luz Neyla-Dunlap's Motion to Dismiss (DE 17). For the reasons stated below, this Court will deny the government's Motion for Summary Judgment (DE 15), deny in part and grant in part the Claimant's Motion to Dismiss (DE 17), and enter a finding of probable cause in favor of the United States pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d).

Procedural Background

On May 20, 1997, the United States of America filed a Verified Complaint for civil forfeiture in rem against fifty-seven thousand four hundred and forty-three dollars in United States currency. (DE 1). The Verified Complaint alleges that the defendant currency is subject to forfeiture pursuant to three federal statutes: (1) 31 U.S.C. § 5317, which subjects to forfeiture any monetary instrument transported across the borders of the United States without filing a required report; (2) 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A), which subjects to forfeiture any monetary instrument used in money laundering activity (as that activity is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1956); and (3) 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6), which subjects to forfeiture any monetary instrument representing the proceeds of illegal narcotics activity (as that activity is defined in 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.).

On July 2, 1997, Luz Neyla-Dunlap filed a Verified Claim, Answer, and Counterclaim. (DE 8, 9).1 On April 2, 1998, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), all parties consented to proceed before a United States magistrate judge. (DE 11). By Order dated April 8, 1998, this matter was referred to the undersigned for all further proceedings. (DE 12).

On August 24, 1998, the United States moved for summary judgment, or, in the alternative, for partial summary judgment on the issue of probable cause. (DE 15). On September 14, 1998, Claimant Neyla-Dunlap filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule E(2) of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, as well as an Opposition to the government's Motion for Summary Judgment. (DE 17). On October 15, 1998, this Court held a hearing on the pending motions.

Factual Background

Prior to June 26, 1995 and as part of an ongoing narcotics and money laundering investigation, U.S. Customs agents learned that a known money launderer intended to deliver a large amount of U.S. currency to Adrianna Martinez. (DE 21 at 9-11).2 On June 26, 1995, Customs agents observed that individual meet with Ms. Martinez in a car parked at Miami-Dade Community College ("Miami-Dade"). (DE 18 at 41). Customs agents then followed Ms. Martinez and placed her under investigation for possible money laundering activity. (DE 15 at 4). Customs agents also staked out her home. (DE 18 at 6-11; DE 21 at 10). On June 27, 1995, the agents followed Ms. Martinez to work at Pardo International Freight Forwarders ("Pardo"). (DE 18 at 10-11).

After a period of surveillance, Customs agents entered Pardo, identified themselves to Ms. Martinez, and requested permission to search the premises. (DE 21 at 12-13). Pursuant to Ms. Martinez's written consent, agents searched the premises with the aid of a dog trained to detect the trace odor of illegal narcotics. (DE 1 at 2; DE 21 at 17-18). The agents discovered approximately nine thousand dollars in U.S. currency in a desk drawer in Ms. Martinez's office after the dog alerted to the money. (DE 1 at 3; DE 21 at 19-20). According to Martinez, earlier that morning she had brought the money from her home — an apartment shared with her mother and two brothers. (DE 21 at 22). Ms. Martinez told agents that she had received the money as part of her freight forwarding business, but was unable to produce any receipts at the time. (DE 21 at 22).

Ms. Martinez's motherClaimant Neyla-Dunlap — then arrived on the scene while federal officers were still present. (DE 1 at 2; DE 21 at 20). After identifying herself, Ms. Neyla-Dunlap stated that she was not employed by Pardo, but instead worked for a party-planning company. (DE 1 at 3). In response to questions, Ms. Neyla-Dunlap claimed that she did not have any large amounts of money, either on her person or at her home. (DE 1 at 3; DE 21 at 27). Ms. Neyla-Dunlap then stated that she had to leave to go to work and left the premises. (DE 1 at 3; DE 21 at 27).

As noted above, Customs agents had previously placed Ms. Neyla-Dunlap's apartment under surveillance, and, therefore, observed her enter that apartment shortly after leaving Pardo. (DE 18 at 6-7 & 12). Ms. Neyla-Dunlap emerged a few minutes later carrying a medium-sized box. (DE 18 at 14). She placed the box in her car and drove off. (DE 18 at 14-16). Customs agents then initiated a traffic stop, during which they asked for and received Ms. Neyla-Dunlap's consent to search her car. (DE 1 at 3-4; DE 18 at 28).

Agents discovered approximately fifty-five thousand dollars in U.S. Currency in the box, as well as two thousand additional dollars in Ms. Neyla-Dunlap's purse. (DE 1 at 3-4). The currency was bundled and sealed in air-tight freezer bags, most of it in denominations of ten dollars or less. (DE 1 at 3-4; DE 18 at 40). The agents did not find any narcotics in the vehicle or any evidence of other illegal activity. (DE 18 at 42).

Upon questioning, Ms. Neyla-Dunlap admitted that she had arranged for Ms. Martinez to pick up the money the previous day at Miami-Dade in response to a telephone call from an unidentified female. (DE 19 at 15). Ms. Martinez arranged to meet the woman at the Miami-Dade Registrar's Office. (DE 20 at 16). Ms. Martinez then accompanied the woman back to a car and received a bag which she did not open. (DE 20 at 16). Ms. Martinez placed the bag in her own car and drove home. (DE 20 at 16). Ms. Martinez did not ask for or receive a receipt or count the money — either at the parking lot or when she returned to her apartment. (DE 19 at 17; DE 20 at 16).

Ms. Neyla-Dunlap now alleges that the currency is hers and originated in Colombia, South America, from the sale of real property. (DE 8). A search of records maintained by the Department of the Treasury, however, did not produce any reports of international transactions in currency or monetary instruments filed by or on behalf of Luz Neyla-Dunlap at any time during the last ten years. (DE 15 at 5). In response, Ms. Neyla-Dunlap has produced documentation allegedly related to a sale of real property in Colombia. (DE 15 at 8). She also proffers both her own and her daughter's deposition testimony that the money was the result of a "currency-swap" arrangement. (DE 19; DE 20).

In particular, Ms. Neyla-Dunlap alleges that she placed the money from the sale of her Colombian property into a friend's bank account in Colombia, until such time as it was withdrawn and provided to a Colombian "money-broker"Jaime Salsado. (DE 19 at 9-14). Mr. Salsado then arranged for Ms. Neyla-Dunlap to receive an equivalent amount of U.S. currency in the United States by having Ms. Martinez go to the parking lot of Miami-Dade and pick up the money. (DE 20 at 16). Neither Ms. Martinez nor Ms. Neyla-Dunlap received any paperwork to document this "currency swap." (DE 19 at 17; DE 20 at 16).

I. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

Claimant Neyla-Dunlap raises two preliminary objections to the government's Motion for Summary Judgment. According to Ms. Neyla-Dunlap, the government: (1) unreasonably stopped and searched her vehicle in violation of the Fourth Amendment; and (2) unreasonably delayed in bringing the present action. (DE 17 at 7-8; DE 9 at 3). This Court, however, finds both arguments unpersuasive.

A. Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment attaches in all forfeiture proceedings. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 696, 85 S.Ct. 1246, 14 L.Ed.2d 170 (1965). Indeed, if a given search or seizure violates the Fourth Amendment, a court must generally suppress the resulting evidence pursuant to the Exclusionary Rule. Id.

Law enforcement agents may stop and search a vehicle without a warrant if they have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or other evidence of illegal activity. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-56, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925); United States v. Young, 38 F.3d 338, 340 (7th Cir.1994).3 Indeed, if officers have probable cause, a vehicle search may be "as thorough as a magistrate could authorize in a warrant `particularly describing the place to be searched.'" United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 800, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982) (citation omitted). Law enforcement officers have probable cause to search a vehicle if, under the totality of the circumstances, "including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983).

Considering the totality of the circumstances, this Court agrees with the government that its stop and search of Claimant's vehicle did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Customs agents had been conducting surveillance on Claimant's home since at least June 26, 1995. On that date, Ms. Martinez picked up a bag which Customs agents understood contained a large sum of money representing the proceeds of illegal narcotics activities. Indeed, the agents had been informed that the person delivering the currency to Ms. Martinez was a known money-launderer. Agents then followed Ms....

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