U.S. v. Young, 94-2113

• Decision Date: 19 October 1994
• Docket Number: No. 94-2113,94-2113
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Alexander YOUNG, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 338

38 F.3d 338

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Alexander YOUNG, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 94-2113.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Sept. 13, 1994.

Decided Oct. 19, 1994.

Bradley W. Murphy, Asst. U.S. Atty. (argued), Peoria, IL, for plaintiff-appellee.

Rodney R. Nordstrom (argued), Peoria, IL, for defendant-appellant.

Before LAY, ^* BAUER and WOOD, Jr., Circuit Judges.

LAY, Circuit Judge.

Alexander Young was indicted and convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g). The district court ¹ sentenced Young under the Sentencing Guidelines to fifty-seven months incarceration and two years supervised release. Young appeals his conviction, claiming (1) that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the firearm found within the motor vehicle he had been driving, and (2) that the court erred in denying his challenges to the jury array. Jurisdiction is vested in this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

Background

In the early morning hours of July 21, 1993, Young was driving south on I-155 in Tazewell County, Illinois, accompanied by three male passengers. At approximately 1:50 a.m., Deputy Tracy Lee Dickson of the Tazewell County Sheriff's Department stopped Young's car because it was exceeding the posted speed limit in a construction zone. Dickson took Young's license and obtained the names of the passengers. When asked, Young told Dickson that he was travelling from Peoria to Springfield to pick up his girlfriend.

Following a computer check of Young and his passengers, Dickson discovered that one passenger was wanted on a retail theft warrant and therefore arrested him. Although Dickson did not issue a ticket to Young, he asked if he could search the car after noticing that Young was unusually nervous. Young first gave his consent to the search but later withdrew it. Dickson did not search the vehicle, and Young drove off with the two remaining passengers.

While still on duty that morning, Dickson heard a radio bulletin over the Illinois State Police Emergency Radio Network (ISPERN) that the Springfield Police were reporting that Alexander Young had just committed a home invasion and an unlawful restraint, and possibly was armed with a handgun. Furthermore, the dispatch indicated Young possibly was driving back to Peoria in a white Toyota, which was the same type of vehicle Dickson had previously stopped. Realizing he had encountered Young earlier that morning, Dickson called ISPERN and reported Young's license plate number. Shortly thereafter, Dickson observed Young's automobile. As he followed the vehicle, he noticed the two passengers in the rear seat were turning around to look at him and then turning back to look forward while carrying on a conversation. With the assistance of another deputy, Dickson pulled over the automobile. The deputies determined Young was driving the vehicle, and a third passenger was now in the front seat of the car. This passenger, who was female, had blood covering her arms and legs. ² The deputies ordered all four people out of the car and took them into custody.

After placing Young and the others in custody, Dickson searched the vehicle's passenger compartment. He found no gun or contraband of any sort. Dickson then went back to his squad car and called for a tow truck. Thereafter, Dickson returned to Young's automobile. While surveying the vehicle, Dickson noticed that the speakers in the rear window dash had been pushed through. He estimated that the holes were approximately four to five inches wide and seven to eight inches long. He believed the holes were large enough to fit a handgun through and that they made the trunk accessible to the passengers sitting in the rear seat. Dickson then took the vehicle's keys, opened the trunk, and searched it. The search uncovered a Colt .380 handgun beneath a blanket located below the driver's side speaker hole. Dickson secured the weapon in his squad car and made another search, which he described as an inventory search pursuant to department policy. The later search revealed nothing.

After completing these searches, Dickson returned to his squad car, completed paperwork, and drove Young to the Tazewell County Sheriff's Department. During this time, Young told Dickson that he had gone to his girlfriend's home, been involved in a struggle with her there, and that the handgun belonged to him. Dickson claims these statements were not the result of questioning; rather, he asserts that the conversation was one-sided, and that he merely responded to Young's statements by nodding and saying "yes" and "uh-huh."

Young was later charged with possession of a firearm by a felon. Prior to trial, Young moved to quash the arrest and suppress evidence. He claimed that his arrest was without a warrant and without probable cause, and that the evidence seized in the search should be suppressed because the search was not made incident to a lawful arrest or with the consent of the defendant. Young also asserted that the court should suppress his subsequent statements because Dickson did not first give him his Miranda rights. The district court denied these motions.

Jury selection for Young's trial occurred on February 7, 1994. After the voir dire had begun, Young's counsel objected to the jury array because there was only one African-American on the panel. The Government responded, questioning the timeliness of this objection. The district court overruled the objection after defense counsel could not point to an unfair or unconstitutional local rule or empaneling procedure. After the jury was selected, defense counsel made a similar motion, which the district court again denied.

The jury trial went forward on February 7 and 8, 1994, and Young was found guilty of the indictment. Prior to sentencing, Young filed a written Motion for Mistrial and Stay of Proceedings. He claimed that local procedures for jury selection discriminated against minority participation because they had less access to transportation during inclement weather. Counsel also suggested that the circuit clerk failed to enforce jury duty in a proper manner, but admitted he had no evidence to support these theories. The district court denied the motion, rejecting defense counsel's arguments and request for an evidentiary hearing, and stating that the motion was untimely.

The Validity of the Search

The district court denied the motion to suppress the firearm on three grounds: (1) Dickson had probable cause to search the automobile on the basis that the automobile contained the fruits or instrumentalities of a crime; (2) the seizure of the handgun was proper because it was discovered in a search incident to a lawful arrest; and (3) the firearm would have been discovered, inevitably, during the inventory search of the vehicle. We need only consider one of these findings. We hold that Deputy Sheriff Dickson had probable cause to search the automobile, including the trunk, for guns or contraband used in furtherance of the crime.

In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-56, 45 S.Ct. 280, 285-86, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), the Supreme Court early recognized the "automobile exception" to the warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Under Carroll, a vehicle may be searched without a warrant if there is probable cause to believe the car contains contraband or evidence. Id. A search of an automobile based on probable cause lawfully extends to all parts of the vehicle in which contraband or evidence could be concealed, including closed compartments and trunks. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 570, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 1986, 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-24, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2170-73, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 47-50, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 1979-1981, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970). Probable cause to search exists if, given the totality of the circumstances, there is a "fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983).

We find the district court properly concluded that Deputy Sheriff Dickson had probable cause to search the trunk of the Young vehicle. The court determined the ISPERN dispatch stated that Young had committed an unlawful home invasion, had unlawfully seized a person, and that "possibly he was armed with a handgun." The presence of the blood-covered woman in the car, a possible victim of a home invasion and an unlawful restraint, and the fact Young was indeed heading back towards Peoria, corroborated the rest of the dispatch and strongly supported the accuracy of the entire ISPERN bulletin. These factors, combined with the holes in the back dash and the absence of a handgun in the passenger compartment, led Deputy Sheriff Dickson to believe there was a reasonable probability the trunk contained a gun or other evidence. We deem the court's findings in this regard not clearly erroneous. See United States v. Spears, 965 F.2d 262, 271-72 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 502, 121 L.Ed.2d 438 (1992) (stating that district courts' factual findings in warrantless search cases are to be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard).

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