U.S. v. Arriaza

Decision Date09 July 2009
Docket NumberNo. 1:09cr190.,1:09cr190.
Citation641 F.Supp.2d 526
PartiesUnited States of America v. Jaime Noel Ayala ARRIAZA.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia

Karen Servidea, U.S. Attorney Office, Alexandria, VA, for United States of America.

Todd M. Richman, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Alexandria, VA, for Jaime Noel Ayala Arriaza.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

T.S. ELLIS, III, District Judge.

At issue in this single-count prosecution for unlawful possession of a firearm by an illegal alien is whether the "automobile exception" to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement permits a warrantless search of a clearly operational vehicle seized during a lawful traffic stop and held at a privately owned impound lot where, as here, it is undisputed that the officers who conducted the search had probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained contraband—namely a firearm unlawfully in the arrestee's possession.

For the reasons stated below, the warrantless search at issue was permissible pursuant to the automobile exception because the impound-lot search in this case was supported by probable cause and was conducted on a readily mobile vehicle. Accordingly, defendant's motion to suppress the firearm found in his vehicle during that search must be denied.

I.1

Defendant Jaime Noel Ayala Arriaza is a Guatemalan citizen illegally present in the United States. In 1991, he entered the United States unlawfully, and in 1993, the immigration judge presiding over defendant's removal proceedings granted him permission to depart voluntarily from this country. Yet, defendant did not do so; instead, the record reflects that defendant has remained in the United States illegally since that time. On March 23, 2009, the date of his arrest and the search at issue, defendant lived with his wife2 at the couple's residence in Herndon, Virginia. Defendant and his wife were also registered owners of a 2002 blue Ford Taurus. The record reflects that because defendant's wife did not have a driver's license, defendant was the sole user of the vehicle and the only person with keys to the vehicle.

On March 23, 2009, defendant's wife called the Herndon Police Department ("HPD") to report a threat and to inform the police that defendant was in the country illegally. That same day, defendant's wife met with an HPD officer at the Herndon police station. Using an individual who had accompanied her as a translator, she told the officer that approximately two years earlier, defendant's mother had been killed in an accident while walking on a street in Fairfax County, Virginia. She further explained that defendant, who had been ordered removed from the United States, had recently returned to their residence in Herndon with a firearm. She also told the HPD officer that defendant had told her that before he was removed he was going to kill the person who killed his mother. Defendant's wife further stated to the HPD officer that she believed her husband was dangerous and that he had already driven through the neighborhood of the person involved in the accident with his mother. Finally, defendant's wife told the HPD officer that she thought defendant kept the firearm in his car.

After the meeting, the HPD officer confirmed, through law enforcement databases, that defendant's mother had, in fact, been killed in a pedestrian accident in Fairfax County. The HPD officer also confirmed, through another officer's communications with Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") Special Agent Brendan Shelley, that defendant was an illegal alien who had been granted voluntary departure in 1993. Thereafter, Special Agent Shelley, who testified at the suppression hearing in this matter, and an HPD officer began surveillance of defendant's residence.

At approximately 6:00 p.m. on March 23, 2009, Special Agent Shelley and the other officer conducting surveillance observed a male individual matching defendant's description leaving defendant's residence in a 2002 blue Ford Taurus, which law enforcement databases confirmed was the vehicle registered to defendant and his wife. Special Agent Shelley and the other officer then followed the vehicle and observed it changing lanes without using a turn signal, at which point the officers initiated a traffic stop in or about the 200 block of Elden Street, a heavily traveled road in Herndon. After identifying defendant as the driver of the vehicle, the officers placed him under arrest as an alien illegally in the United States. Special Agent Shelley, who is bilingual, then properly advised defendant of his Miranda rights in both English and Spanish, and defendant was transported to the Herndon police station.3 Defendant then agreed to answer questions without an attorney present and admitted that he was unlawfully in the United States. In addition, defendant denied owning a firearm and signed a written form consenting to a search of his residence.

Meanwhile, as defendant was being arrested and transported to the police station, other HPD officers arrived at the 200 block of Elden Street to assist in the traffic stop. One of those officers, HPD Officer Justin Dyer, testified at the suppression hearing in this matter that he was asked to conduct an on-scene inventory search of defendant's vehicle, which was to be towed to an impound lot.4 Officer Dyer testified that he did so pursuant to HPD protocol for such searches, which protocol includes filling out a standardized form with the number "6143" written at the top and listing on that form any valuable items found in readily visible areas of the vehicle. Officer Dyer completed a 6143 form at the scene, and that form, which is included in this record, lists several items found in defendant's vehicle during the roadside search, including a machete and various other tools and effects. In addition to inventorying the items found, the 6143 form also noted (i) that the vehicle was impounded at 6:23 p.m. as a result of defendant's arrest, (ii) that the vehicle was towed by a towing company called "Henry's," and (iii) that the vehicle "may be released to owner upon proof of ownership and payment of towing and storage tees." See Def's Supplemental Mem. in Supp. (Docket No. 27), Ex. I.5 Although Officer Dyer did not find any firearms in the course of the on-scene inventory search (and thus did not list any firearms on the 6143 form), he testified that he was unable to complete the inventory search because he was nearly struck on three occasions by vehicles traveling down Elden Street. The record reflects that at some point after Officer Dyer completed the 6143 form, defendant's vehicle was towed by "Henry's" to an impound lot in Sterling, Virginia. Officer Dyer testified that in accordance with the customary procedure for such impoundments, the vehicle's keys were turned over to the representative from the towing company at that time.

After leaving the scene of the traffic stop, Officer Dyer met with Special Agent Shelley and another HPD officer, and the three returned to defendant's residence to search for the firearm previously mentioned by defendant's wife. In addition to defendant's consent form, which defendant had signed at the police station, the officers also obtained defendant's wife's consent to search the residence. The officers did not locate any firearm in the residence, and when they advised defendant's wife of this fact, she insisted that the firearm was in the impounded Ford Taurus.6 At that point—at or around 8:30 p.m., still on March 23, 2009—Special Agent Shelley and Officer Dyer left defendant's residence and drove to the impound lot in Sterling, Virginia.

Officer Dyer testified that the privately owned impound lot in question was surrounded by a fence but was not locked when he and Special Agent Shelley arrived. The record reflects that on arriving at the lot, the officers obtained the vehicle's keys from the lot's operators. Officer Dyer further testified that although he and Special Agent Shelley had to weave through several fences to get to defendant's vehicle, the vehicle was positioned in a location where it would be possible to start the vehicle (either with keys or by hot-wiring it) and to drive it out of the impound lot.7 On reaching the vehicle, Officer Dyer began to search the vehicle's trunk, and he observed that a portion of the trunk's side interior carpeting had been pulled loose from the vehicle's metal frame such that it was sitting open. Officer Dyer testified that he looked in the gap between the carpeting and metal frame and observed a clear plastic Ziplock bag containing a square box made of heavy cardboard. Officer Dyer further testified that on finding the box, he called out to Special Agent Shelley, indicating that he had found a box that may contain the firearm. Officer Dyer testified that he then removed the box from its resting area and placed it in the middle of the trunk, at which point he noticed that the box had a caliber written on it, further indicating that it may contain a firearm. Special Agent Shelley corroborated this testimony, indicating that he recalled seeing the word "gun" written on the box. The officers then opened the box, which was unlocked, and discovered a semiautomatic pistol and ammunition,8 which they photographed and took into police custody.

Both Officer Dyer and Special Agent Shelley testified that their intention in searching defendant's vehicle at the impound lot was to discover the firearm that defendant's wife insisted was located in the vehicle. Although Officer Dyer also testified that he intended to continue at the impound lot the roadside inventory search he said he was unable to complete at the arrest scene,9 the record reflects that neither Officer Dyer nor Special Agent Shelley followed inventory-search procedures at the impound lot. Moreover, neither officer completed an additional or supplementary 6143 form,10 nor did either officer recall discovering any items other than...

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2 cases
  • State v. Snapp
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • April 5, 2012
    ...an automobile's mobility" (citing Thornton, 541 U.S. at 631, 124 S.Ct. 2127 (Scalia, J., concurring))); see also United States v. Arriaza, 641 F.Supp.2d 526, 535 (E.D.Va.2009) (explaining that same considerations as underpin the automobile exception likely underpin the Thornton exception). ......
  • United States v. Thompson
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • October 1, 2014
    ...a police report can provide an officer with probable cause for the warrantless search of an automobile. See United States v. Arriaza, 641 F. Supp. 2d 526, 527 (E.D. Va. 2009) aff'd, 401 F. App'x 810 (4th Cir. 2010). In Arriaza, the police based their warrantless search of the defendant's ca......

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