State v. Snapp

Decision Date05 April 2012
Docket NumberNos. 84223–0,84569–7.,s. 84223–0
CourtWashington Supreme Court
Parties STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Daniel Gerald SNAPP, Petitioner. State of Washington, Respondent, v. Roger Sinclair Wright, Petitioner.

Lila Jane Silverstein, Washington Appellate Project, Richard Alan Hansen, Cooper David Offenbecher, Allen, Hansen & Maybrown P.S., Seattle, WA, for Petitioner.

Daniel Gerald Snapp, Littlerock, WA, pro se.

Stephen Paul Hobbs, Office of the Prosecuting Attorney, Prosecuting Atty King County, King Co. Pros./App. Unit Supervisor, James Morrissey Whisman, King County Prosecutor's Office, Seattle, WA, Stephen D. Trinen, Pierce County Prosecutors Ofc., Tacoma, WA, for Respondent.

Sheryl Gordon McCloud, Law Offices of Sheryl Gordon McCloud, Seattle, WA, amicus counsel for Washington Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

Seth Aaron Fine, Attorney at Law, Snohomish Co. Pros. Ofc., Everett, WA, Pamela Beth Loginsky, Washington Assoc. of Prosecuting Atty., Olympia, WA, amicus counsel for Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorney.

Douglas B. Klunder, Attorney at Law, Seattle, WA, amicus counsel for ACLU.

MADSEN, C.J.

¶ 1 In Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009), the United States Supreme Court held that a warrantless automobile search incident to arrest of a recent occupant of the vehicle is proper under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution only (1) when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or (2) when it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle. The first of these exceptions to the warrant requirement mirrors the vehicle search-incident-to-arrest exception under article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution. See State v. Patton, 167 Wash.2d 379, 219 P.3d 651 (2009) ; State v. Buelna Valdez, 167 Wash.2d 761, 224 P.3d 751 (2009).

¶ 2 In the consolidated cases before us, the issue we must decide is whether an equivalent to Gant 's second exception, referred to here as the Thornton1 exception, applies under article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution. We conclude that no such exception is permissible under article I, section 7. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals in both cases, reverse the defendants' convictions, and remand these cases for further proceedings consistent with our decision herein.

FACTS
State v. Snapp

¶ 3 On July 22, 2006, about 8:00 a.m., Trooper Keith Pigott saw a blue Ford Escort that was occupied by driver Daniel Snapp and passenger Angela Mae Wilcox. The trooper noticed two air fresheners hanging from the Escort's rearview mirror, which he believed blocked the driver's view. The trooper pulled his vehicle up next to the Escort and saw that the driver's seat belt appeared to be patched together with a blue carabiner. In his opinion, the carabiner was insufficient and the seat belt was defective.

¶ 4 Trooper Pigott dropped back behind the Escort, activated his emergency lights, and pulled the car over. As Mr. Snapp turned into a parking lot, Trooper Pigott saw Snapp lean forward and dip his right shoulder, as if he was placing something under the seat. Trooper Pigott called for backup.

¶ 5 When Pigott approached the driver's side of Snapp's car, Pigott told Snapp why he was stopped. Trooper Pigott asked what Snapp hid as he pulled into the parking lot and Mr. Snapp answered that he was reaching for a cigarette. The trooper asked for identification, registration, and proof of insurance. Mr. Snapp identified himself using a Department of Corrections (DOC) inmate card and said he did not have a driver's license.

¶ 6 Mr. Snapp quickly opened and closed the glovebox to retrieve the registration form. While the glovebox was open, Trooper Pigott believed he saw a "baggie" of what he suspected was methamphetamine. Trooper Pigott's observation of Mr. Snapp led him to believe that Snapp was under the influence of a stimulant.

¶ 7 Trooper Pigott asked Snapp if he had any weapons and Snapp produced a knife from his pants pocket. Pigott then asked Mr. Snapp to exit the car to perform sobriety tests, and Snapp agreed to perform the tests. Pigott concluded that while Snapp might be under the influence to some degree, he was not impaired to the level that would justify an arrest for driving while under the influence.

¶ 8 Pigott asked Snapp whether there was "meth" in the glovebox. Mr. Snapp said that there was no "meth" but there was a "meth" pipe in the car. The trooper handcuffed Snapp and placed him in the back of his patrol car. When she was asked what was in the car, Ms. Wilcox said that there was marijuana in her purse and that Snapp had hidden a meth pipe. Officer Pigott retrieved the meth pipe in the area where he had seen Mr. Snapp make the movement that Snapp described as reaching for a cigarette.

¶ 9 A records check revealed that Mr. Snapp had an outstanding no-bail arrest warrant for escape from the DOC and that Snapp's driver's license had been revoked. He was arrested on the warrant for driving while his license was revoked and for drug paraphernalia. Ms. Wilcox, who was arrested for possession of marijuana, was placed in the patrol car of Trooper Ames, called in as backup.

¶ 10 Trooper Pigott searched the Escort incident to Snapp's arrest. He found an accordion folder that contained papers and items with peoples' identities and a CD case that contained identification cards and credit cards, which Trooper Pigott concluded were evidence of identity theft. Snapp also had credit cards in his wallet that did not belong to him. Pigott noticed that the backseat of the car was folded down and he could see that there were a large number of items in the trunk. He stopped the search and had the car impounded. Later, a search warrant was obtained for the Escort's trunk.

¶ 11 On October 31, 2006, the State charged Mr. Snapp with 21 counts of second degree identity theft and 1 count of first degree identity theft. Snapp moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the warrantless search, arguing that both the stop and the search were unlawful. The trial court denied the motion. In its findings of fact resolving disputed facts, the trial court found that the trooper's description of the carabiner was credible and that Trooper Pigott had probable cause to stop the car and to arrest Snapp on the outstanding escape warrant, for driving while his license was suspended, and for the drug paraphernalia. The court concluded that the search of the vehicle was a valid search incident to arrest.

¶ 12 The State filed an amended information charging Snapp with six counts of second degree identity theft and Snapp entered an AlfordNewton plea,2 pleading guilty to all six counts but with a reservation of his right to appeal the denial of his CrR 3.6 motion to suppress. He appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals held that Trooper Pigott lawfully arrested Snapp for use of drug paraphernalia and then searched the vehicle for evidence related to this crime of arrest. Therefore, the court concluded, under Gant 's Thornton exception the warrantless search was lawful. State v. Snapp, 153 Wash.App. 485, 219 P.3d 971 (2009).

¶ 13 Acting pro se, Snapp sought discretionary review by this court, arguing that under Patton and Valdez the search violated article I, section 7. We granted the petition for discretionary review and appointed counsel for Snapp.

State v. Wright

¶ 14 On November 29, 2006, Seattle police officer Chris Gregorio was on routine patrol driving northbound on Waters Avenue South approaching the intersection with South Roxbury Street, in a neighborhood the officer described as a "hot spot" known for "burglaries and car prowls." Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) at 7–8, 32–33. At 4:45 p.m., as he approached Roxbury, he saw a car one block away on a parallel street, 59th Avenue South, driving north and beginning to turn eastbound on Roxbury without headlights, though it was dark out. Although the vehicle began the turn heading toward the patrol car, it stopped about midturn, backed onto 59th Avenue South, and then turned and headed westbound on Roxbury, moving away from the patrol car.

¶ 15 Gregorio immediately pulled in behind the vehicle and stopped it because the driver was driving without headlights.3 As he was making the stop, he asked that another officer also respond to the scene.4 Officer Gregorio then approached Roger Wright, the sole occupant, and noticed a strong odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle.

¶ 16 Officer Gregorio asked Mr. Wright for his driver's license, registration, and proof of insurance and told him why he had stopped him. At some point in his conversation with Wright, Gregorio indicated that the area was a hot spot for stolen cars, burglaries, and vehicle prowls. The officer noticed that Wright was extremely nervous and reluctant to open the glove box and, when he did, Gregorio noticed a large roll of money.

¶ 17 Gregorio arrested Wright and passed him off to Officer Larned, the backup officer who had arrived on the scene shortly after Gregorio had initiated contact with Wright. Wright was placed in the back of a patrol car and read his Miranda5 rights, which he waived. Officer Gregorio questioned Mr. Wright about the odor of marijuana in the car. Wright was reluctant to answer questions about marijuana but eventually admitted he had been smoking marijuana earlier. Officer Gregorio testified that all Wright would say was that he was smoking it. Realizing that the conversation was not going any further, Gregorio requested a K–9 unit.

¶ 18 When it arrived about 20 minutes later, a dog uncovered two baggies of marijuana, $1,300 in cash, and a prescription bottle of Oxycodone in Wright's name in the vehicle. The dog then found two additional baggies of marijuana and a scale in the backseat. Based upon this...

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