U.S. v. Ayres, s. 83-1201

• Decision Date: 19 January 1984
• Docket Number: 83-1215,Nos. 83-1201,s. 83-1201
• Citation: 725 F.2d 806
• Parties: 14 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1774 UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Robert M. AYRES, Defendant, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Nicolo Pirri ARDIZZONE and Frank Termini, Defendants, Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 806

725 F.2d 806

14 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1774

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Robert M. AYRES, Defendant, Appellant.

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Nicolo Pirri ARDIZZONE and Frank Termini, Defendants, Appellants.

Nos. 83-1201, 83-1215.

United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.

Argued Nov. 9, 1983.

Decided Jan. 19, 1984.

Judith H. Mizner, Boston, Mass., with whom Gail S. Strassfeld, Susan P. Sturm, and Silverglate, Gertner, Baker & Fine, Boston, Mass., were on brief, for Robert M. Ayres.

William A. Brown, Boston, Mass., with whom Brown & Prince, Boston, Mass., was on brief, for Nicolo Pirri Ardizzone.

Barry P. Wilson, Boston, Mass., on brief, for Frank Termini.

Mervyn Hamburg, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., with whom Lincoln C. Almond, U.S. Atty., Providence, R.I., and James E. O'Neil, Asst. U.S. Atty., Boston, Mass., were on brief, for appellee.

Before CAMPBELL, Chief Judge, ROSENN, ^* Senior Circuit Judge, and BREYER, Circuit Judge.

ROSENN, Senior Circuit Judge.

The defendants, Frank Termini, Nicolo P. Ardizzone, and Robert M. Ayres, were tried to a jury in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island and convicted on drug-related charges ¹ arising out of the smuggling of 8,785 pounds of marijuana. Following the imposition of sentence, each of the defendants appealed. We affirm.

I.

In the summer of 1982, the Coast Guard received information relating to the smuggling of marijuana off the shore of Rhode Island. From late July through early August of 1982, the Coast Guard had the sailing vessel Fiesta under surveillance. On the evening of August 9, 1982, the Coast Guard moved to intercept it when it was one to two miles off Watch Hill, Rhode Island. The Coast Guard was assisted on land by the Drug Enforcement Agency's (DEA) Rhode Island Task Force. At 8:27 P.M., the Coast Guard boarded the Fiesta. They found two men, defendants Termini and Ardizzone, on board. The leader of the boarding party, Chief Petty Officer Gibson, ascertained upon inquiry that the vessel had no registration documents aboard. One officer smelled marijuana and observed numerous bales on the space below deck that he believed contained marijuana. The vessel contained 221 bales of marijuana weighing 8,785 pounds. The officers also found navigational charts suggesting that the boat had traveled outside United States territorial waters.

In the meantime, the task force took positions onshore to apprehend the intended recipients of the marijuana. At approximately 7:25 P.M., state officers Phelps and DiCarlo observed a truck, which was towing a white speedboat ² about thirty feet in length on a trailer, turn onto the Quonochontaug Breachway. Federal agents met the state officers, passed along information received from the Coast Guard, and gave surveillance assignments. They assigned Phelps to the breachway area where he observed the truck and the trailer that he had seen earlier. The speedboat was no longer there. From his observation point, agent Furtado saw the speedboat go out to sea between 7:45 and 8:00 P.M. The agents communicated their observations to each other by radio.

A half hour later, a coast guard cutter illuminated the Fiesta now less than two miles from shore. Within seconds, Agent Furtado, who had been observing the Fiesta through binoculars, saw the speedboat turn and head directly back to shore. He saw it travel along the coast at a high rate of speed without using its running lights and ultimately enter the Quonochontaug Breachway. Phelps and DiCarlo left their positions and headed for the beach. By the time they reached it, the speedboat had already been lifted from the water to the trailer and the truck was departing. The officers blocked the truck's path. The truck driver opened the cab door and fled, pursued by DiCarlo. Phelps ordered the passenger, defendant Ayres, to lie face down on the ground. Phelps handcuffed him, stood over him with a rifle, and gave him his Miranda warnings. In response to questioning by Phelps, Ayres made incriminating statements. Other agents arrived at the scene and searched the truck. They found two bags of marijuana in a storage area behind the driver's seat and a small vial of cocaine in a door pocket of the truck on the driver's side. The speedboat contained a box of tools. Phelps turned Ayres over to the Charlestown Police Department.

On the way to the Charlestown police station, Ayres was again advised of his rights. At the station, Ayres was placed in a holding cell and once more administered Miranda warnings. Deputy Marshal Thomas then questioned Ayres and Ayres made further incriminating statements. Thomas testified that Ayres told him that he was involved in a smuggling operation. Ayres also stated that he left his house that night to meet the boat. Defendants Termini and Ardizzone also made statements subsequent to their arrest and receipt of Miranda warnings. Termini admitted that he was engaged in a smuggling operation.

On appeal, the defendants raise a number of issues, the principal one relating to the failure of the trial judge to suppress statements made by defendant Ayres at the Charlestown police station. The other issues relate to evidentiary rulings by the trial judge, alleged violations of his sequestration order, and the denial of defendants' motion for a mistrial based on the jury's view of defendants Termini and Ardizzone in handcuffs while in the custody of marshals.

II.

Ayres argues that the trial court should have suppressed his statements in which he admitted involvement in the smuggling operation. At trial, the court did order that testimony about incriminating statements made by Ayres at the breachway be stricken because the comments were made while Ayres was handcuffed and a police officer stood over him with a rifle. The judge left it to the jury to decide whether the subsequent statements made by Ayres at the police station were voluntary. Ayres contends that these statements also should have been excluded as a product of an arrest made without probable cause. Ayres further argues that his statements at the police station were the unattenuated taint of his prior involuntary statements at the breachway.

We turn first to Ayres's contention that he was arrested without probable cause. A warrantless arrest is constitutionally valid if "at the moment the arrest was made, the officers had probable cause to make it--whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [arrestee] had committed or was committing an offense." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964). Whether there is probable cause for a warrantless arrest is determined under an objective standard, not by inquiry into the officers' presumed motives. United States v. McCambridge, 551 F.2d 865, 870 (1st Cir.1977). To sustain a warrantless arrest, the Government is not required to show that the arresting officer had "the quantum of proof necessary to convict." United States v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, 1128 (1st Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 958, 99 S.Ct. 1499, 59 L.Ed.2d 771 (1979). Probable cause "is a practical, nontechnical conception" offering an acceptable compromise between competing societal interests in protecting citizens on the one hand from abusive interferences with privacy and unfounded charges of crime and on the other hand in recognizing the necessity to afford "fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community's protection." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949).

In this case, the district court concluded that the facts available to the agents, when viewed in their entirety, sufficiently provided probable cause to arrest. We agree. At the time of Ayres's arrest, ³ the state officers and federal agents, operating together and in communication with each other, had observed the trailer and speedboat approach the breachway. Agents then saw the speedboat go out toward the Fiesta, and upon its illumination, turn about and speed for shore. They saw the speedboat as it proceeded rapidly along the shore without using its running lights. By the time they reached it at the breachway, it already had been removed from the water and loaded onto the truck, and the truck and its occupants were making a hurried departure. At this point, the officers knew that the Fiesta had a large quantity of marijuana aboard. Under such circumstances, the retreat of the speedboat from the marijuana-laden Fiesta and the obvious flight of its occupants with the truck, trailer, and speedboat were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the truck's occupants were involved in the smuggling operations.

Ayres also maintains that his statements at the police station were the unattenuated taint of his involuntary statements at the breachway. A statement made after effective Miranda warnings are provided may not be admissible if it is the fruit of an inadmissible prior statement. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 605, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2262, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975). The court in Brown noted that several factors are relevant in determining whether a confession is a product of free will. Provision of Miranda warnings, although not dispositive, is an "important factor," as are "[t]he temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances ... and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct." Id. at 603-04, 95 S.Ct. at 2261-62.

In this case, the district court ruled that it was unnecessary for the officer to hold a rifle over Ayres after he had already been handcuffed. These circumstances attending Ayres's statements at the breachway led the trial court to suppress the statements as involuntary. The court also ruled that the subsequent police actions, removing...