Belton v. Blaisdell

Decision Date02 April 2008
Docket NumberCivil No. 04-cv-270.
Citation2008 DNH 070,559 F.Supp.2d 128
PartiesAllen T. BELTON v. Larry BLAISDELL, Acting Warden, Northern Correctional Facility, New Hampshire State Prison.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of New Hampshire

Allen T. Belton, Berlin, NH, pro se.

Susan P. McGinnis, NH Attorney General's Office, Concord, NH, for New Hampshire State Prison.

ORDER

JOSEPH N. LAPLANTE, District Judge.

The pro se petitioner, Allen T. Belton, seeks habeas corpus relief from his state conviction for robbery, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and other constitutional infirmities attendant to those proceedings. After reviewing the petition, the magistrate judge recommended that Belton be allowed to proceed on 12 of the 14 claims identified in the petition.

The respondent, the acting Warden of the Northern Correctional Facility of the New Hampshire State Prison ("the Warden"), has since moved for summary judgment on a number of Belton's claims on the grounds that (1) they are procedurally defaulted because he failed to raise them in his direct appeal from his conviction and (2) they are without merit in any event. Belton objects, arguing that no procedural default applies but, even if it does, it is excused by the doctrines of cause and prejudice and actual innocence. He also argues that his claims support habeas relief.

This court has jurisdiction over Belton's petition under 42 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") in particular. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (habeas relief for state prisoners). For the reasons stated below, the court grants the Warden's motion for summary judgment, except as to claims 2B-2J of Belton's ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

BACKGROUND

Belton was convicted by a jury in the New Hampshire Superior Court of robbing a bank. He was sentenced to a prison term of 10 to 20 years. Before trial, Belton filed motions to suppress the confession he allegedly gave on the day following the robbery, as well as other statements and physical evidence previously obtained by the police. After an evidentiary hearing, the superior court suppressed certain statements and evidence, but not the confession. New Mampshire v. Belton, No. 01-155, slip op. at 16-17 (N.H.Super.Ct. Nov. 9, 2001) ("Suppression Order").1 Belton appealed his conviction to the New Hampshire Supreme Court, which affirmed. State v. Belton, 150 N.H. 741, 846 A.2d 526 (2004) ("Direct Appeal Opinion").

Under AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), this court must accept the facts found by the state courts unless Belton can demonstrate otherwise by clear and convincing evidence. McCambridge v. Hall, 303 F.3d 24, 25 (1st Cir.2002) (en banc). Because he has not satisfied this burden, as discussed infra, this court surmises the relevant facts from the written order of the superior court denying Belton's motion to suppress and the opinion by the state supreme court affirming his conviction, supplementing with facts gleaned from the state court record where necessary. See id.

The First Essex National Bank in Salem, New Hampshire was robbed at around 9 a.m. on November 14, 2000, by a perpetrator who claimed he had a gun and threatened to shoot the bank's employees. Direct Appeal Opinion, 150 N.H. at 742, 846 A.2d 526. Witnesses described the robber to police as a dark-skinned male wearing white sneakers, a jogging suit, a baseball cap, and a nylon mask, and said he had run in the direction of bordering Methuen, Massachusetts. Suppression Order at 3. Believing that Belton fit this description, a police officer — previously acquainted with both Belton's appearance and his criminal record — headed to Belton's Methuen residence. Id. When the officer arrived there, he encountered Belton standing in the yard, and handcuffed him. Id. at 4. The officer then began questioning Belton about his whereabouts earlier that morning. Id.

After the arrival of another officer, Belton was informed of the robbery, but denied any involvement. Id. He also allowed the police to search his home, where they seized a pair of white sneakers. Id. As additional law enforcement personnel appeared, the police continued to question Belton, who generally continued to proclaim his innocence. Id. Belton then took the officers up on their suggestion that he accompany them to the station, where he was taken in the back of a police cruiser, still handcuffed. Id. In the meantime, a police dog picked up a scent along railroad tracks near where the fleeing suspect had been seen by witnesses. The dog followed the scent to a wooded area — where a hat, jacket, and gloves matching the robber's were found — then to the bank and eventually to Belton's home.

Belton's handcuffs were removed after his arrival at the station, when he was placed in an interview room. Two officers proceeded to question him about his whereabouts during the robbery, in particular his claim that he had been out jogging that morning. After telling Belton that the robber's clothing had been discovered, the officers asked him whether he would be willing to try it on — Belton declined — and informed him of their intention to ask his co-workers whether they had ever seen him wearing it. Expressing concern that he was incriminating himself, Belton asked whether he was free to go; the officers confirmed that he was. Suppression Order at 4. Belton, who had not been advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), was then permitted to leave. Suppression Order at 5.

Some fifteen minutes later, however, Belton was again taken into custody, by way of a warrantless arrest based on evidence independent of the preceding search and seizure, viz., the track followed by the police dog. Id. He appeared before a judge in Massachusetts the next morning, when he was arraigned on a charge of being a fugitive from justice, i.e., fleeing into Massachusetts after the robbery in New Hampshire. Id. at 10. With the advice of an attorney, Belton waived extradition to New Hampshire. Direct Appeal Opinion, 150 N.H. at 748-49, 846 A.2d 526.

While awaiting custodial transportation from the court to the Salem Police Department, Belton said he wanted to speak with the detective he had been talking to the previous night, Mark Sambataro. Suppression Order at 10-11. Sambataro, apprised of this request, visited Belton after he had been placed in a holding cell at the department. Id. at 13-14. Using a written form, id. at 5, Sambataro then "carefully reviewed" the Miranda warnings with Belton, who indicated his understanding and waiver of those rights by initialing and signing the form. Id. at 11.

Belton inquired about the evidence the police had linking him to the robbery. Id. In response, Sambataro claimed — falsely — that clothing discovered near the crime scene contained DNA matching Belton's.2 Id. Sambataro added that a number of witnesses had seen Belton at different points along his escape from the bank. But, Sambataro said, the money had yet to be discovered. Belton challenged this last point, arguing that if the police had found his clothing, then they had to have found the money as well. After a cigarette break, Belton announced that he was ready to talk about where he hid the money. He promptly confessed to taking the money from the bank before discarding it behind a nearby store when the accompanying dye pack exploded. Belton also asked Sambataro about making a deal; the detective replied that he would talk to the prosecutor on Belton's behalf. Sambataro made notes of this conversation, but, in accordance with his standard practice, destroyed them when he incorporated them into his police report on the incident.

After confessing, Belton, at his own suggestion, accompanied the police on a trip in a cruiser to retrieve the money. Id. Though it was never recovered, Belton made additional inculpatory statements during the trip, as well as an offer to plead guilty on condition that he serve the sentence in federal (as opposed to state) prison. Id. at 11-12.

Belton appeared to get that chance when he was indicted in this court on one count of federal bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). United States v. Belton, No. 01-00009 (Feb. 7, 2001). But the United States Attorney soon filed a motion to dismiss the indictment without prejudice, which was granted. Id In a call to defense counsel, the responsible Assistant United States Attorney explained that "he was dismissing the case because the defendant was cuffed at his home without probable cause and that the evidence that was derived from that arrest tainted the rest of the case." Memo from Bjorn Lange, Federal Defender, to file (Feb. 27, 2001). Belton was nevertheless subsequently indicted by a state grand jury on one count of robbery in violation of N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 636:1.3

Belton, as previously noted, filed pretrial motions to suppress the confession, in addition to the statements he made to police and the sneakers seized from his home on the preceding day, on the grounds that (1) they were the fruits of his illegal arrest on that day and (2) the confession and statements were obtained in violation of Miranda. The superior court ruled that, while the policeman who first encountered Belton at his home had acted out of a legitimate concern for officer safety in handcuffing Belton, that concern dissipated after other officers had arrived on the scene and Belton was found to be unarmed, transforming the continued use of restraints into an unlawful arrest and coercing the consent Belton gave to a search of his home.4 Suppression Order at 7-10. The superior court also ruled, however, that Belton had validly waived his Miranda rights before confessing to Sambataro the next day, id. at 14, and that the confession had been voluntarily given despite the unlawful arrest the day...

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    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Federal Criminal Practice
    • April 30, 2022
    ...because officer was not seeking to determine what was happening but rather what had happened); see, e.g., Belton v. Blaisdell, 559 F. Supp. 2d 128, 156-57 (D.N.H. 2008) (statement to police is non-testimonial if the primary purpose of the statement is to meet an ongoing emergency); United S......

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