U.S. v. Baird
| Decision Date | 24 June 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 87-3050,87-3050 |
| Citation | 271 U.S.App.D.C. 121,851 F.2d 376 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. David P. BAIRD. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (D.C. Criminal No. 87-0076-01).
Elizabeth H. Danello, Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, D.C., with whom Joseph E. diGenova, U.S. Atty. at the time the brief was filed, and Michael W. Farrell, Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for appellant.
David Kagan-Kans, Madison, Wis., (appointed by this court), for appellee.
Before EDWARDS, BUCKLEY, and SENTELLE, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge BUCKLEY.
The United States appeals a district court order suppressing evidence obtained from appellee, a U.S. Coast Guard officer, during an interview with a Department of Transportation investigator. The court held that because of the element of military compulsion surrounding the interview, it constituted a custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings. The court also held that the confession was involuntary considering the totality of the circumstances of the interview. Because we find that the circumstances did not rise to the level of custodial or coercive interrogation, we reverse and remand.
David Baird is a lieutenant commander in the United States Coast Guard Reserve. He has been charged under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 203(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) with receiving compensation, while on active duty, from a private corporation in exchange for his assistance in obtaining a contract from the Coast Guard. In the course of an interview, Baird made compromising statements that the district court ordered suppressed after an evidentiary hearing.
As the Department of Transportation ("DOT" or "Department") has jurisdiction over the Coast Guard, the investigation was conducted by the Department's Office of the Inspector General ("OIG"). An investigator from one of OIG's regional offices, Special Agent Jonathan Armenta, was directed to interview Baird. Armenta decided to do so at the Coast Guard base in New Orleans, Louisiana, to which Baird was assigned.
The relevant facts, as summarized in the district court's opinion, are as follows. On the day of the interview, Armenta contacted the District Commanding Officer, Commander Schaeffer, in order to arrange for the interview. Armenta informed Schaeffer that he wished to interview Baird in connection with an official investigation into Baird's activities. Schaeffer telephoned Baird's immediate superior and directed him to tell Baird to go to an unoccupied office. Armenta and Schaeffer proceeded to the office and were awaiting Baird when he arrived.
At the suppression hearing, Agent Armenta provided the following description of Commander Schaeffer's participation in the interview:
Q. [by the Assistant U.S. Attorney] Tell us everything you recall that the Commanding Officer [Schaeffer] said to David Baird, from the time David Baird came into the room to the time that the Commanding Officer left.
A. [by Armenta] After the introduction--
Q. Tell us the introduction. The introduction--
A. "Special Agent John Armenta, this is Lt. Commander David Baird." We shook hands, said "How are you," and Commanding Officer Schaeffer said, "Special Agent Armenta here has a few questions to ask you."
And after that [Schaeffer] asked me, "Do you need me for anything else?"
....
Q. "Do you need me for anything else?"
A. "Do you need me for anything else?" I said "No." "You want me to stay in the interview?" I said "No, this is going to be a one-to-one interview."
He said, And that's all. He just left.
Transcript of Suppression Hearing ("Tr.") at 39-40. No other witnesses testified at the suppression hearing about the facts surrounding Schaeffer's participation in the interview. In reviewing this testimony, the district court noted that, aside from the introduction, Schaeffer addressed all of his remarks solely to Armenta.
After Schaeffer left, Armenta began by advising Baird of the purpose of the interview. At the same time, he stated "that the interview was going to be voluntary," and that Baird "was free to go whenever he wanted to." Tr. at 10. Baird stayed and made statements giving rise to the charge.
At the outset of its opinion denying reconsideration of its decision to suppress Baird's admission, the district court noted that
[t]he prosecution may not use in its case-in-chief statements stemming from custodial interrogations of the defendant that result from any type of government coercion sufficient to deprive the accused of his freedom to exercise his constitutional right to silence.
United States v. Baird, Cr. No. 87-76, Opinion denying recons. at 2 (D.D.C. Aug. 19, 1987) ("Opinion").
The court found that the circumstances surrounding the interview had given rise to a custodial interrogation requiring that Baird be given Miranda warnings. It also found that the situation would cause a reasonable military officer to feel coerced by " 'subtle pressure created by rank or duty' " to cooperate with Armenta. Opinion at 5 (quoting United States v. Kruempelman, 21 M.J. 725, 726 (A.C.M.R.1985)).
The court also observed that it was because of these "pressures exerted by the chain of command, and by a military officer's conditioning to follow all but the most obviously illegal orders," that the Uniform Code of Military Justice ("U.C.M.J.") establishes special protection for military suspects. Opinion at 5 & n. 3. Thus Article 31 of the U.C.M.J. requires that Miranda -type warnings be given whenever a military suspect is interrogated during a military investigation, whether the suspect is in custody or not. U.C.M.J. Article 31(b), 10 U.S.C. Sec. 831(b) (1982). If such a warning is not given, the evidence obtained is excluded from any court-martial proceeding. U.C.M.J. Article 31(d).
Because of these special factors, as amplified and interpreted by appellee's expert witness on military law, Commander Thomas W. Snook, U.S.C.G., the court decided that Armenta "use[d] the chain-of-command to produce the defendant and implicitly inform him of what was expected from this junior officer in the 'interview.' " Accordingly, it found "both the 'custody' that gives rise to the need for Miranda warnings and the 'coercion' that prevents prosecutorial use of a suspect's incriminating statements." Opinion at 7. The court specifically rejected the notion that Armenta's assurances to Baird that the interview was voluntary, and that he was free to leave, were in themselves sufficient to negate his Commanding Officer's implicit order to cooperate with the investigation. Id. at 7-8.
On appeal, both parties focus on the district court's findings regarding custody and coerciveness; and in supplemental briefs requested by the court, they examine the possible application of Article 31 and its exclusionary rule.
Although, in its decision, the district court combined the issues of custody and coercion, we will address them separately. First we consider the standard by which we review the district court's determinations of custody and coercion. We then examine each of the issues in turn, and find neither the custody nor the coercion required to support a suppression order. As no military investigation occurred, we find the Article 31 exclusionary rule inapplicable to this case.
In this case, the facts and circumstances surrounding Armenta's interview of Baird are not in dispute. The question is whether those facts support the court's determination that Baird was effectively in custody. This is a legal question that we review de novo. See United States v. Robinson, 533 F.2d 578, 580 (D.C.Cir.1976) (en banc).
As the Supreme Court recently confirmed in Miller v. Fenton, "the ultimate issue of 'voluntariness' is a legal question requiring independent federal determination." 474 U.S. 104, 110, 106 S.Ct. 445, 450, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985). The Court acknowledges that findings concerning "subsidiary questions, such as the length and circumstances of the interrogation," are conclusive "if fairly supported in the record"; but having said this, the court reaffirms that
once such underlying factual issues have been resolved, and the moment comes for determining whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the confession was obtained in a manner consistent with the Constitution, the state-court judge is not in an appreciably better position than the federal habeas court to make that determination.
Although Miller involved an appeal from a state-court finding in a federal habeas corpus proceeding rather than, as in this case, an appeal from the decision by a federal district court to suppress a confession, the Miller rule clearly applies to this case. Thus we review the issue of voluntariness de novo.
The Supreme Court has provided the following test for determining when custody exists of the kind requiring Miranda warnings: "[T]he ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest." California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 3520, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 714, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977)).
Beheler involved an accused who voluntarily accompanied the police to the station house after the police had found a murder weapon in his yard. The police informed him he was not under arrest, and Miranda warnings were not given. Beheler was emotionally upset, had been drinking, and talked to the police about the murder for thirty minutes. Five days later he was arrested, given...
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