U.S. v. Barfield, 03-14077.

• Decision Date: 14 January 2005
• Docket Number: No. 03-14077.,03-14077.
• Citation: 396 F.3d 1144
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Pamela BARFIELD, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

396 F.3d 1144

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Pamela BARFIELD, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 03-14077.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

January 14, 2005.

Lynn Palmer Bailey, R. Fletcher Peacock (Fed. Pub. Def.), Fed. Pub. Defender's Office, Jacksonville, FL, for Defendant-Appellant.

David Paul Rhodes, Tamra Phipps, Tampa, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Before BLACK, RONEY and ALARCON^*, Circuit Judges.

BLACK, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal, Defendant-Appellant Pamela Barfield challenges the district court's decision to enforce her federal sentence. In January 1995, the district court agreed, upon Barfield's motion, to defer temporarily execution of her sentence for possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute. No action was taken to execute Barfield's sentence for more than eight years. After a hearing in the summer of 2003, the district court lifted the stay of execution. Barfield argues the district court erred in lifting the stay because: (1) she was entitled to credit against her sentence the eight years she spent at liberty; (2) incarceration after such a delay violates her due process rights under the Fifth Amendment; and (3) the doctrine of laches precludes the Government from enforcing her sentence. We disagree and conclude the district court did not err in enforcing Barfield's sentence.

I. BACKGROUND

On March 1, 1994, Barfield was found in possession of 1.2 kilograms of cocaine base commonly known as "crack." Soon after her arrest, Barfield admitted she was working as a drug courier and agreed to cooperate with law enforcement. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Barfield pled guilty to possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).

On December 9, 1994, the district court conducted a sentencing hearing. Barfield faced a sentencing range of 108 to 135 months' imprisonment. In sentencing, the district court departed downward 12 levels and imposed a 30-month sentence because, among other reasons, Barfield had cooperated with the Government and had been diagnosed as HIV-positive. The district court also imposed a five-year period of supervised release.

Less than one month after sentencing, on January 6, 1995, Barfield filed a motion to defer execution of her sentence for six months. In the motion, Barfield claimed her physician informed her that she had "fully contracted the AIDS syndrome" and had approximately six months to live. The motion further stated Barfield had "two minor children who will have a brief opportunity over the next half a year to have any relationship, bonding or memories of their maternal parent." Barfield attached a laboratory report to the motion, which indicated only that Barfield was HIV-positive.

The district court granted the motion on the same day it was filed. In granting the motion, the district court noted the Government's response was not yet due. The court explained it would "preserve the status quo" and defer execution of Barfield's sentence until her motion could be "judicially considered in light of the Government's response." The Government, however, never filed a response to Barfield's motion.

The issue of Barfield's unserved sentence resurfaced several years later. In late 2002, the Government received a letter from Barfield's former boyfriend, who alleged she was "in good health" and was perpetrating a fraud on the Government. The matter was then turned over to an investigative agency, presumably to determine the legitimacy of the claims.

On June 6, 2003, the district court, acting sua sponte, ordered Barfield to appear before it and show cause for why the 1995 order deferring execution of her sentence should not be set aside. At the show-cause hearing, she presented two arguments for why the Government could not, after an eight-year delay, enforce her sentence. First, Barfield argued she was entitled to credit the eight years she spent at liberty against her sentence. Second, she argued incarcerating her after such a delay violates her due process rights.

Barfield claimed she was entitled to credit against her sentence because the Government was negligent in failing to enforce the sentence for more than eight years. According to Barfield, she was not responsible for the delay because her 1995 motion only requested her sentence to be deferred for six months.

Barfield also asserted that since 1995, she regularly reported to Pretrial Services and informed it of any changes in her health. In her written response to the show-cause order, Barfield attached several letters from her doctors. One letter suggested Barfield's life expectancy had improved. This letter stated that as of September 3, 1997, Barfield had contracted AIDS and had a life expectancy of approximately five years. None of these letters, however, confirmed Barfield's claim that in January 1995 — when she filed the motion to defer her sentence — she had AIDS and only 6 months to live. Furthermore, Barfield's attorney told the district court she had not seen any medical records demonstrating that in late 1994 or early 1995, Barfield had a life expectancy of six months.

In explaining its delay, the Government stated it was operating under the assumption that Barfield's death was imminent. According to the Government, it was trying to benefit Barfield by delaying enforcement of her sentence. At the district court hearing, Barfield's attorney stated she "did not doubt that the [G]overnment's inaction over the last eight-and-a-half years was nothing other than out of the goodness of [its] heart[ ]." Defense counsel also thanked the Government for its "benevolence and compassion in this matter."

The district court rejected both of Barfield's arguments and lifted the stay of execution on her sentence. The court ordered Barfield to self-surrender to the Bureau of Prisons on August 11, 2003. She complied with the court's order and has remained incarcerated. This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Barfield raises several arguments. First, she argues the district court erred in refusing to grant credit toward her sentence for the eight years she spent at liberty.¹ Second, Barfield claims incarcerating her after an eight-year delay constitutes a due process violation under the theories of "waiver of jurisdiction" and estoppel. Finally, Barfield argues the equitable doctrine of laches precludes the Government from enforcing her sentence. We address each argument in turn.

A. Credit for Time at Liberty

Barfield argues she is entitled to credit for the time she spent at liberty while the execution of her sentence was delayed. Whether she may obtain credit for the time at liberty is a question of law we review de novo. See Whitley v. United States, 170 F.3d 1061, 1068 (11th Cir.1999).

This Court's prior precedent sets out the general rule that a delay in the commencement of a sentence does not, by itself, constitute service of that sentence. See, e.g., Scott v. United States, 434 F.2d 11, 23 (5th Cir.1970) ("This Court holds that the mere lapse of time that occurred here [27 months], without petitioner undergoing any actual imprisonment to which he was sentenced ... does not constitute service of that sentence, and this sentence remains subject to be executed, notwithstanding the delay in executing it."); United States ex rel. Mayer v. Loisel, 25 F.2d 300, 301 (5th Cir.1928) ("Mere lapse of time without the appellant undergoing the imprisonment to which she was sentenced did not constitute service of the sentence, which remained subject to be enforced....").² This prior precedent compels us to conclude a convicted person, like Barfield, who has yet to serve any part of her sentence, is not entitled to credit for time spent erroneously at liberty when there is merely a delay in executing her sentence.³ A delayed sentence, like Barfield's, is still subject to be executed.⁴ Scott, 434 F.2d at 23; Mayer, 25 F.2d at 301.

In Leggett v. Fleming, 380 F.3d 232 (5th Cir.2004), the Fifth Circuit reached the same conclusion as we do here. Leggett similarly relied on Scott and Mayer — precedent binding our Court as well as the Fifth Circuit — in holding prisoners cannot receive credit for time at liberty when their sentences have only been delayed.⁵ Id. at 234-35.

Accordingly, we hold Barfield is not entitled to credit against her sentence for the time she spent erroneously at liberty.⁶

B. Waiver and Estoppel

Barfield also claims her due process rights were violated under theories of waiver of jurisdiction and estoppel. She argues the Government, through its inaction over the last eight years, has waived its jurisdiction over her. Without such jurisdiction, Barfield contends the Government violated her due process rights when it incarcerated her in 2003. Alternatively, she claims the Government is estopped from enforcing her sentence after the eight-year delay. Whether or not the waiver and estoppel theories apply in this case are questions of law, which we review de novo. See Whitley v. United States, 170 F.3d 1061, 1068 (11th Cir.1999).

1. Waiver of Jurisdiction

Citing the waiver of jurisdiction theory, Barfield argues her incarceration violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. This Court has held a delay in the execution of a sentence can, under certain circumstances, amount to a due process violation under the waiver of jurisdiction theory. See Piper v. Estelle, 485 F.2d 245 (5th Cir.1973); Shields v. Beto, 370 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir.1967); see also Mobley v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1495, 1496-97 (11th Cir.1987) (citing the Piper case).

The waiver of jurisdiction theory is premised on the constitutional protection against arbitrary and capricious official action. See Camper v. Norris, 36 F.3d 782, 784 (8th Cir.1994); Mobley, 823 F.2d at 1496. The theory is commonly traced to our decision in Shields. In Shields, we held the state's...