U.S. v. Bauer, 90-1840

Decision Date10 February 1992
Docket NumberNo. 90-1840,90-1840
Citation956 F.2d 693
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Frederick W. BAUER, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

John W. Vaudreuil, Asst. U.S. Atty. (argued), Patrick J. Fiedler, U.S. Atty., Madison, Wis., for U.S.

Katherine M. Lunsford (argued), Foley & Lardner, Madison, Wis., Thomas L. Shriner, Jr., Foley & Lardner, Milwaukee, Wis., for Frederick W. Bauer.

Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and MANION, Circuit Judges.

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge.

Frederick Bauer represented himself at trial--poorly. He was convicted on drug charges and sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment. He contends that appointed counsel would have been a boost; the obstacle is the court's finding that Bauer could have afforded a lawyer.

In 1987 Bauer sent to a lender a financial statement showing about $400,000 in net assets. Late in 1988 Bauer gave the probation office in another case a financial statement showing $500,000 in net assets. Bauer concedes that both statements were correct. In this case, however, Bauer submitted an affidavit stating that he no longer has the assets (currency, gold, jewels, and coins) that he had listed on the financial statements, that accounts receivable had become worthless, and that the tax collector has priority in what remains. A magistrate judge held a hearing to determine whether, in the language of the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b) Bauer was "financially unable to obtain counsel".

What happened to the assets? Bauer related that they were no longer in his "immediate reach" and were not "fluid". They had been sold in "[d]ifferent places" to "different people". What of his bank accounts? These were in "different places. California and Wisconsin and Minneapolis." Which banks? "I don't know." Where were his financial records? They were stored in "[d]ifferent places in California and Wisconsin". Who had them? "Different people". Would Bauer authorize the government to look at these records? He would think about it. The magistrate judge concluded that Bauer could retain counsel if he wanted and that his testimony was "ambiguous, evasive and in many respects completely incredible."

Following up on this hearing, the prosecutor sent Bauer forms that would authorize the custodians to reveal his financial records. The forms were never executed. Later the prosecutor proffered the results of an investigation by the FBI; an agent concluded that Bauer had traceable assets of $544,000. The district judge approved the magistrate judge's conclusion that Bauer could afford counsel. Protesting that he could not, Bauer represented himself at trial.

We appointed counsel to represent Bauer on appeal. His principal argument is that because of the asymmetric costs of error, courts should appoint counsel whenever a defendant claims to be unable to afford a lawyer. An error in appointing counsel costs the government a pittance; an error in denying the request for counsel may cost the accused many years in prison. Under a regime of appointment on request, the defendant always receives his constitutional and statutory entitlements if, as he contends, he cannot afford counsel. If the prosecutor is right in believing that the defendant has assets, the United States will be able to seize them in recompense for the outlay to the lawyer. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(f). No costs of error, and none of the wrangling that accompanies cases such as this.

As an original matter appointment of counsel on request has some attractions, although the balance is not so lopsided as Bauer supposes. Defendants may hide their assets, as the prosecutor believes Bauer has done--to avoid paying the $250,000 fine and back taxes if not to reduce the expense of legal representation. When the assets vanish, the accused receives the benefit of counsel while thwarting the government's effort to collect. At all events, this is not an original matter. The Criminal Justice Act governs. It provides for the appointment of counsel when the judge is "satisfied after appropriate inquiry that the person is financially unable to obtain counsel". 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b). It is not enough to claim inability to hire a lawyer and back up the claim with an affidavit; the statute provides for "appropriate inquiry" into the veracity of that claim. "The burden of proving inadequate financial means ... lies with the defendant." United States v. Sarsoun, 834 F.2d 1358, 1361 (7th Cir.1987). A decision adverse to the defendant "will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous." Id. at 1362. See also United States v. Binder, 794 F.2d 1195, 1201 (7th Cir.1986). The decision adverse to Bauer is not clearly erroneous; the magistrate judge listened to Bauer but did not believe him, and Bauer's failure to authorize a review of his financial records speaks loudly. 1 Surely the sixth amendment does not forbid examination of a defendant's financial status, so we may not disregard the statutory approach.

Bauer's fallback position is that he was entitled to a lawyer at public expense during the hearing convened to inquire into his assets. Without the assistance of a lawyer, the argument goes, how could Bauer establish his entitlement to one? This is a variation of the automatic-appointment position. 2 Under the Criminal Justice Act, the public fisc need not contribute one penny unless the accused first establishes that he cannot afford counsel. Nothing in the statute directs the Treasury to assist the accused in making this demonstration. Our experience is that district judges often appoint lawyers for persons accused of lucrative frauds and drug deals, persons who likely have assets squirreled away. Any bias in the process now used to evaluate requests for counsel runs dramatically in favor of defendants. There is no statutory warrant for procedures that...

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  • Fischetti v. Johnson
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • September 22, 2004
    ...law to require defendants to go to trial unrepresented when they have failed to hire counsel within a reasonable time, United States v. Bauer, 956 F.2d 693 (7th Cir.1992); United States v. Mitchell, 777 F.2d 248 (5th Cir.1985), or have abused counsel, United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322 (1......
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    ...law to require defendants to go to trial unrepresented when they have failed to hire counsel within a reasonable time, United States v. Bauer, 956 F.2d 693 (7th Cir.1992); United States v. Mitchell, 777 F.2d 248 (5th Id. at 146, 152 (emphasis added). Our colleague writing in dissent correct......
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    ...States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 250 (3d Cir.1998) ; United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322, 324–25 (11th Cir.1995) ; United States v. Bauer, 956 F.2d 693, 695 (7th Cir.1992). In Cummings, the defendant repeatedly refused to cooperate with various court-appointed attorneys, constantly complai......
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    ...at 237-38, 93 S.Ct. 2041.Some federal courts have held that even the right to counsel may be "waive[d] by conduct." United States v. Bauer, 956 F.2d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 1992). The Seventh Circuit in Bauer held that a defendant waived his right to counsel when he insisted upon appointed couns......
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