U.S. v. Berndt, s. 95-3503
| Decision Date | 31 July 1996 |
| Docket Number | 95-3938,Nos. 95-3503,s. 95-3503 |
| Citation | 86 F.3d 803 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Steven Paul BERNDT, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. David John ASMUSSEN, Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Thomas M. Keller, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, argued for Berndt and John Allen Heisler, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, argued for Asmussen.
Karen E. Schreier, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, argued for appellee.
Before MURPHY, Circuit Judge, ROSS, Senior Circuit Judge, and VAN SICKLE, * Senior District Judge.
Steven Paul Berndt and David John Asmussen appeal various aspects of their convictions and sentencing. Asmussen contends that the evidence was insufficient to convict him, the district court 1 erred by imposing a two-level Guidelines enhancement for obstruction of justice, and that the district court miscalculated the amount of the loss to the victims for sentencing purposes. Berndt claims the district court erred by imposing a fine and restitution against him. We affirm the convictions and sentences.
This case involves a conspiracy between the defendants arising out of a used car dealership owned by Berndt in Brandt, South Dakota. Between August, 1992 and February, 1994, the defendants systematically purchased high-mileage, late-model cars, altered their odometers, forged the title and registration documents to show the altered mileage, and resold the cars to unsuspecting buyers.
On February 16, 1995, a 117-count indictment was filed against Berndt and Asmussen for mail fraud, conspiracy to tamper with odometers, odometer tampering, and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1342 and 15 U.S.C. §§ 1986, 1984, and 1990(c). On May 8, 1995, Berndt pled guilty to one count of conspiracy, one count of mail fraud, and one count of odometer tampering. Berndt was sentenced on September 18, 1995 to 36 months in prison, ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $68,950, and fined $30,000.
The preceding indictment was dismissed against Asmussen and a 56-count superseding indictment was filed on July 14, 1995, charging Asmussen with the same crimes as above. Asmussen pled not guilty to all charges. A jury found him guilty of 54 of the 56 counts on August 10, 1995. On October 30, 1995, the district court sentenced Asmussen to 37 months in jail and ordered him to pay $45,051 in restitution. Both defendants filed timely appeals to their convictions and sentences.
Defendant Berndt appeals the imposition of a $30,000 fine against him. During his plea bargain with the government, the defendant agreed to make restitution in the amount of $20,000 and to sign over title to the government of three vehicles which were worth approximately $19,000. The possibility of a fine was not discussed. According to the presentence report, Berndt possesses a negative net worth of -$95,255.00 with a net monthly cash flow of $440.00.
The government alleged that Berndt was hiding assets and overstating his debts. Specifically, the government disputed the defendant's claims that he owed a friend, Scott Keller, $50,000 and his grandfather $10,000 in business loans. The government also believed that the defendant transferred almost $25,000 worth of assets to Keller and hid $30,000 in his attic. The government contended that the total amount of undisclosed assets was $78,950.
The Sentencing Guidelines provide that the district court shall impose a fine "in all cases, except where the defendant establishes that he is unable to pay and is not likely to become able to pay any fine." U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(a). In determining the amount of the fine, the court "shall" consider seven factors. 2 18 U.S.C. § 3572, U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2. Since the word "shall" is present in both the Guidelines and the Code, the district court must take into account these factors or at least the factors relevant to the particular case before it. United States v. Young, 66 F.3d 830, 838 (7th Cir.1995); United States v. Hyppolite, 65 F.3d 1151, 1159 (4th Cir.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 1558, 134 L.Ed.2d 659 (1996). The district court need not provide detailed findings under each of the factors listed above, but must provide enough information on the record to show that it considered the factors above so that the appellate court can engage in meaningful review. United States v. Bauer, 19 F.3d 409, 413 (8th Cir.1994); United States v. Miller, 995 F.2d 865, 869 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, Patterson v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 618, 126 L.Ed.2d 583 (1993).
A district court's imposition of a fine and the determination of the amount of the fine will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous. Miller, 995 F.2d at 868-69. See United States v. Turner, 975 F.2d 490, 498 (8th Cir.1992), cert. denied, Dowdy v. United States, 506 U.S. 1082, 113 S.Ct. 1053, 122 L.Ed.2d 360 (1993). It is incorrect for a court to impose a fine that the defendant has little chance of paying. United States v. Granados, 962 F.2d 767, 774 (8th Cir.1992). See U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(a). The defendant has the burden of proving that he cannot pay the fine. Young, 66 F.3d at 839; Hyppolite, 65 F.3d at 1159.
We find that the district court did not commit clear error and affirm the imposition of the fine. The district court determined that the defendant's offense level was 19. The guidelines authorize a fine between $6,000 and $60,000 for that offense level. U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(c)(3). The $30,000 fine is within that range.
Furthermore, there is substantial evidence that the defendant attempted to conceal assets from the government for the purpose of reducing the amount of fine he would be required to pay. The debts that the defendant claims are also suspect. The notes to the Guidelines provide that "[t]he existence of income or assets that the defendant failed to disclose may justify a larger fine than that which otherwise would be warranted under § 5E1.2." U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2, comment(n.6). The defendant has also not met his burden of demonstrating he will be unable to pay the fine. Thus, we cannot say that the imposition of the fine was clearly erroneous.
Therefore, the fine imposed in the amount of $30,000 against defendant Berndt is upheld.
The district court ordered defendant Berndt to pay $68,950 in restitution for his fraud. The defendant claims that this amount is too high considering his limited financial resources.
The District Court may order the offender to make restitution. 18 U.S.C. § 3663; U.S.S.G. § 5E1.1. The trial court must make a determination of the defendant's ability to pay. United States v. Mitchell, 893 F.2d 935, 936 (8th Cir.1990). In determining restitution, the court shall consider the amount of loss sustained by any victim as a result of the offense, the financial resources of the defendant, the financial needs and earning ability of the defendant, and any other factors the court deems appropriate. 18 U.S.C. § 3664. Courts are encouraged to make specific findings of fact regarding these factors, especially in reference to the defendant's ability to pay a restitution order. United States v. Owens, 901 F.2d 1457, 1459-60 (8th Cir.1990). That the defendant pled guilty and did not object to his sentence at the hearing reduces the importance of the judge making specific findings of fact about the above criteria. See United States v. Bartsh, 985 F.2d 930, 933 (8th Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1204, 127 L.Ed.2d 551 (1994); United States v. Osborn, 58 F.3d 387, 388-89 (8th Cir.1995). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3) ().
An order of restitution is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. See Osborn, 58 F.3d at 388. The burden of demonstrating the loss of the victims is on the government while the burden of demonstrating the financial resources of the defendant is on the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d). Restitution is not mandatory, Owens, 901 F.2d at 1458, but district courts have wide discretion in ordering restitution. Bartsh, 985 F.2d at 933 (8th Cir.1993). A court may impose restitution even if the defendant is indigent at the time of sentencing. United States v. Manzer, 69 F.3d 222, 229 (8th Cir.1995); Owens, 901 F.2d at 1459.
The restitution order in the amount of $68,950 is only about half of the loss sustained by these victims of odometer tampering. The district court competently reviewed the financial resources of the defendant and his ability to pay. Because the order of restitution was fair and not clearly erroneous, it must be upheld.
Defendant Asmussen claims that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of 25 counts of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341; one count of conspiracy to tamper with odometers, 15 U.S.C. § 1986, recodified at, 49 U.S.C. § 32703(4); and 28 counts of odometer tampering, 15 U.S.C. § 1984, recodified at, 49 U.S.C. § 32703(2). He contends that the jury based its decision on the testimony of his co-conspirator, Berndt, who defendant Asmussen claims is untrustworthy.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence after a conviction, this court must examine it in the light most favorable to the government, giving it the benefit of all reasonable inferences, and can reverse only if this court concludes that a reasonable fact-finder could not have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Matra, 841 F.2d 837, 840 (8th Cir.1988) (citations omitted).
To sustain a charge of mail fraud, the government need only prove the existence of a scheme to defraud and the use of the mails for the purpose of executing the scheme. Manzer, 69 F.3d at 226. Intent is an essential element of...
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