U.S. v. Brookins
| Citation | 228 F.Supp.2d 732 |
| Decision Date | 23 October 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. CRIM.A.2:02CR153.,CRIM.A.2:02CR153. |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, v. Ronald Lee BROOKINS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
Larry Mark Dash, Office of Federal Public Defender, Norfolk, VA, for Defendant.
Sherrie S. Capotosto, U.S. Atty's Office, Norfolk, VA, Fernando Groene, U.S. Atty's Office, Norfolk, VA, for U.S.
This matter is before the Court on Ronald Lee Brookins' ("Defendant") Motion # 1 for Suppression of Evidence obtained as a result of a search of Defendant's vehicle by members of the Suffolk Police Department on February 20, 2001. On October 2, 2002, the Court entered an Oral Order granting Defendant's motion to suppress. This Memorandum Opinion and Order sets forth the Court's reasons for granting Defendant's motion to suppress.
On February 20, 2001, at approximately 3:00 p.m., five members of the Suffolk Police Department's Special Investigation Unit were driving an unmarked police vehicle1 on East Washington Street in Suffolk when they noticed Defendant's car backed into a driveway. Officers recognized the vehicle as belonging to Defendant, who has been convicted for drug offenses, and was the subject of an ongoing narcotics investigation. Defendant drove a gold Ford Expedition ("the vehicle") with Virginia license plates that read "OPTIMA." One of the officers had recently received reliable confidential informant information that Defendant frequently made trips to East Washington Street and Feeny Avenue to deliver narcotics.
The officers drove past Defendant's vehicle, and saw Defendant and at least one other person, later identified as Benny Harvey ("Harvey"), standing in the open doorway of the vehicle, and Defendant's wife sitting in the backseat.2 The officers drove down the street and pulled into a driveway so they could turn around and drive past the Defendant one more time. As they pulled into the driveway, at least two officers witnessed Defendant reach into the vehicle, and hand Harvey a clear plastic sandwich bag containing suspected narcotics. Both Harvey and Defendant immediately walked away from the vehicle "at a fast pace," according to the officers. Two of the officers followed Harvey on foot and saw him discard the plastic bag. They recovered the bag, which contained 26 small separately packaged rocks of suspected crack cocaine. Harvey was arrested and searched; officers recovered a 2-way Radio Shack radio on his person. Defendant was found several minutes later in the parking lot of a nearby grocery store and also placed under arrest.
However, although at least one officer remained in the unmarked police vehicle and did not pursue either the Defendant or Harvey, none of the officers attempted to prevent Defendant's wife or the vehicle from leaving.3 Therefore, Defendant's wife drove away in the vehicle "at a high rate of speed," according to the officers' testimony. The officers lost sight of the vehicle, but found it roughly fifteen minutes later parked in the driveway of Defendant's mother-in-law's house at 911 Battery Avenue in Suffolk. At the house, officers spoke to Defendant's wife, and she agreed to accompany them to the station house. One of the officers obtained the keys from Defendant's wife, and conducted a cursory search of the vehicle while it was still parked in the driveway. The officers testified that they did not seek consent from Defendant's wife to search the vehicle. Two additional Suffolk Police department vehicles reported to the residence at 911 Battery Avenue.
The officers then took Defendant's wife to the police station where they questioned her. She was not placed under arrest or charged with any offense. One of the officers drove the vehicle to the police station where it was immediately searched. They recovered electronic scales and a Radio shack 2-way radio in the center console, aluminum foil in the driver's side rear compartment, Defendant's wallet containing his driver's license and social security card in a compartment below the steering wheel, and the vehicle registration in Defendant's name and a box of razor blades in the glove box.
On July 31, 2002, Defendant was indicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia for unlawfully, knowingly and intentionally distributing in excess of five grams or more of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine base, commonly known as "crack," a schedule II narcotic controlled substance, a violation of Title 21, United States Code Section 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(iii) and Title 18, United States Code, Section 2. On September 9, 2002, Defendant filed his Motion # 1 for Suppression of Evidence. On September 20, 2002, the Government filed its response to Defendant's motion to suppress. On October 2, 2002, the Court heard argument on the matter. The Court stated its findings of fact and conclusion of law on the record and granted Defendant's motion to suppress. On October 10, 2002, the United States filed a motion for reconsideration offering an alternative basis for the Court to uphold the warrantless search, specifically, that the vehicle was subject to forfeiture because it was used to facilitate a drug transaction. The motion for reconsideration is DENIED and this Memorandum Opinion and Order supercedes the Court's October 2, 2002 ruling from the bench.
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Supreme Court has generally interpreted the Fourth Amendment's requirement that every search or seizure be reasonable to mean that an arrest or search must be based on probable cause and executed pursuant to a warrant. See Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). It is well settled that a search conducted without a warrant is per se unreasonable unless a valid exception to the warrant requirement exists. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). The Government argues that the search was valid because it was incident to a lawful arrest, or alternatively, permissible under the "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement.
The Supreme Court has established that when a person is lawfully arrested, the police may, without a warrant, contemporaneously search the person accused for weapons or "the fruits or...implements used to commit the crime" and the immediately surrounding area. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367, 84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Ed.2d 777 (1964); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 764, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981); United States v. Milton, 52 F.3d 78, 80 ( 4th Cir.1995). Such searches have been considered valid because of "the need to seize weapons and other things which might be used to assault an officer or effect an escape, as well as by the need to prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime." Preston, 376 U.S. at 367, 84 S.Ct. 881; Belton, 453 U.S. at 457, 101 S.Ct. 2860; Chimel, 395 U.S. at 764, 89 S.Ct. 2034. Thus, the Supreme Court had held that when a lawful custodial arrest of an occupant of a vehicle has been made, then as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, the passenger compartment of the vehicle may also be searched. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460, 101 S.Ct. 2860; Milton, 52 F.3d at 80. However, this exemption from the warrant requirement is limited to the exigencies of the circumstances and to things under the accused's immediate control. Id; Preston, 376 U.S. at 366, 84 S.Ct. 881.
The search and seizure of Defendant's car is clearly not justified as a search incident to valid arrest, as asserted by the Government. Testimony of three Suffolk Police officers as well as the statement of facts in the Government's brief clearly indicate that Defendant was arrested in the parking lot of a nearby grocery store, several minutes after leaving his vehicle. The vehicle was no longer in Defendant's immediate control and therefore, there existed no likelihood that he could obtain a weapon from the vehicle, destroy evidence of a crime, or use the vehicle to escape. However, even if the officers were entitled to search the car incident to Defendant's arrest,4 officers not only failed to conduct the search at the scene of the arrest, but they also allowed the vehicle to depart the scene. Thus, all rationale for an immediate warrantless search incident to arrest, such as the preservation of evidence, vanished once police lost sight of the vehicle. When a search is "remote in time or place from the arrest," the search is no longer incident to arrest and a warrant must first be obtained. Preston, 376 U.S. at 367, 84 S.Ct. 881; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 457, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). Testimony of the officers also indicated that Defendant's wife was never arrested or charged at the residence or later at the station house. Therefore, because this search occurred at a significantly later time, away from the area of the arrest, it was not a search incident to valid arrest.5
Another well-established exception to the warrant requirement is the automobile exception. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974); United States v. Bullock, 94 F.3d 896, 899 (4th Cir.1996). In general, there are two factors responsible for this different treatment of vehicles: "(i) the mobility of vehicles often makes it impracticable to obtain a search warrant in advance of the search; and (ii) in the Fourth Amendment hierarchy of values, vehicles are not deemed to merit as much protection as premises." WAYNE R....
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Lum v. Donohue
...required a warrant in this case of a seizure on private property, White, 526 U.S. at 565, 119 S.Ct. 1555; United States v. Brookins, 228 F.Supp.2d 732, 742 (E.D.Va.2002) (interpreting the White holding, supra, to apply only where the motor vehicle is seized in a public place), nonetheless, ......