U.S. v. Brown

Decision Date22 September 1999
Docket NumberNo. 98-CR-80923.,98-CR-80923.
Citation69 F.Supp.2d 925
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Johnny Lee BROWN, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

Mark Osler, Asst. U.S. Attorney, Detroit, MI, for Plaintiff.

David Tholen, Federal Defender, Detroit, MI, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OF WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND TO DISMISS COUNT II OF INDICTMENT

ROSEN, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant Johnny Lee Brown was indicted on November 5, 1998 on two counts of felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Count I charges Defendant with possessing a Lorcin pistol on May 1, 1997, while Count II charges him with possessing two rifles and a shotgun on October 23, 1998. Defendant previously was convicted in Michigan state court of receiving stolen property in violation of Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.535 and possession of a stolen motor vehicle in violation of Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.254, offenses for which he received a 5-10 year sentence. The State of Michigan terminated his parole on August 1, 1994.

Two motions presently are pending before the Court: (1) Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence of Warrantless Search filed on February 17, 1999; and (2) Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count II of Indictment filed on March 8, 1999. In the first of these motions, Defendant asks the Court to suppress the three firearms seized on October 23, 1998 — the weapons forming the basis of Count II of the Indictment — on the ground that the guns were seized during an invalid protective sweep conducted before Defendant consented to a search of his residence. In the latter motion, Defendant argues that he cannot be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for possession of firearms on October 23, 1998 because his civil rights had been fully restored by operation of state law prior to that date.

In response, the Government asserts that the seizure of the three firearms on October 23, 1998 was valid under the doctrines of protective sweep, consent, and inevitable discovery. The Government further argues that Michigan law continues to encumber Defendant's right to carry a firearm, and thus Defendant remains subject to prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

The Court conducted a hearing on Defendant's motions on April 29, 1999, at which time the Court heard argument regarding the Motion to Dismiss Count II. However, the evidentiary hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress was adjourned due to the unavailability of the Government's primary witness, Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms ("ATF") Special Agent Gerald Woodard. Following an additional July 1, 1999 hearing, at which Agent Woodard testified, the Court ordered the submission of supplemental briefs on the law governing protective sweeps.1 Defendant timely filed his supplemental memorandum on July 9, 1999, to which the Government responded on July 23, 1999. Having heard the arguments of counsel and the testimony of Agent Woodard, and having reviewed the briefs and supporting documents submitted by the parties, the Court is now prepared to rule on Defendant's motions. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies both of these motions.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On October 20, 1998, Magistrate Judge Donald Scheer issued an arrest warrant for Defendant based on a Complaint issued that day charging Defendant with being a felon in possession of a firearm on May 1, 1997, the charge that constitutes Count I of the current Indictment. Shortly thereafter, a confidential source contacted ATF Special Agent Woodard and informed him that Defendant was residing at 14216 Saratoga in Detroit, Michigan. On the morning of October 23, 1998, Agent Woodard paged Defendant to confirm his presence at the Saratoga address and Defendant, who was cooperating with Agent Woodard, returned the page. Agent Woodard and approximately eight other ATF agents then proceeded to the Saratoga residence to execute the arrest warrant.

Upon arriving at the residence, the agents knocked on the door and announced their presence. When Defendant opened the door, Agent Woodard informed Defendant that he had an arrest warrant, and Defendant responded that he would come with the agents but that he needed to put on some clothes. Defendant then let the agents in the house. As Agent Woodard read Defendant his rights, searched him, and placed him in handcuffs, the other agents conducted a security sweep of the house. During the course of this security sweep, the agents discovered two rifles and a shotgun in plain view in an upstairs room. These firearms found on October 23, 1998 form the basis for Count II of the Indictment.

While the security sweep was ongoing, Agent Woodard remained downstairs with Defendant and escorted him into the kitchen. Agent Woodard asked Defendant whether anything in the house might pose a danger to the agents, and Defendant responded that there were some firearms upstairs. [7/1/99 Hearing Tr. at 22.]2 Defendant then agreed to execute an ATF "Consent to Search" form. [Government's Brief in Response to Defendant's Motion for Suppression, Ex. 3.]

The evidentiary record fails to establish whether Defendant signed the "Consent to Search" before or after the ATF agents discovered the firearms during their sweep. Although Agent Woodard speculated at the July 1, 1999 hearing that Defendant gave his consent prior to this discovery, the Agent's own testimony reveals his lack of knowledge on this point, as he remained downstairs with Defendant while the other agents performed their upstairs search:

THE COURT: Let me ask you some questions here, Mr. Woodard. I am not clear in my own mind exactly what the time line progression was of when all this happened .... And I want to focus particularly on when the search was conducted.

* * * * * *

THE COURT: [A]t some point he told you about the firearms.

AGENT WOODARD: Yes, he did.

THE COURT: When was that?

AGENT WOODARD: That was after I asked him was there anything that would be considered dangerous in the house ....

THE COURT: Was this while the protective sweep was going on?

AGENT WOODARD: That is correct, yes.

THE COURT: Had the guns been found yet?

AGENT WOODARD: I don't believe so. I didn't find out that the[re] were guns up there until after the protective search was completed and the agents came back down and told me there w[ere] firearms downstairs.

THE COURT: So they had found the guns?

AGENT WOODARD: Yes.

* * * * * *

THE COURT: Who seized the guns?

AGENT WOODARD: The agents that were doing a search. They did not — we had to take a picture of the firearms in place.

THE COURT: In place?

AGENT WOODARD: Yes.

THE COURT: At what point did you see the guns?

AGENT WOODARD: Actually, I stayed with Mr. Brown. That was after the officers brought the guns downstairs because I assisted in doing — writing up the evidence for the guns.

THE COURT: All right. At what point did he sign the consent; after the guns were found or before?

AGENT WOODARD: It was during.

THE COURT: During what?

AGENT WOODARD: He signed the Consent Form during the search of the residence.

THE COURT: Was that before [or] after the guns were found.

AGENT WOODARD: It was pretty close around the same time. I believe it was before the guns w[ere] found.

* * * * * *

THE COURT: Was it signed, was the consent signed before or after he told you about the guns?

AGENT WOODARD: That consent was signed after I had already knew there was a gun — there [were] some guns there.

[Hearing Tr. at 21-25.].3

After leaving the Saratoga residence, Defendant was taken directly to ATF headquarters, where he was once again advised of his rights and asked to make a statement. Defendant then executed a written waiver of his rights to remain silent and to advice of counsel and signed a written affidavit prepared by Agent Woodard. [Government's Brief in Response to Defendant's Motion for Suppression, Ex. 4.] This affidavit states:

I advised S/A Woodard that I was at 14216 Saratoga, Detroit, MI. At approximately two to three minutes later S/A Woodard along with other agents and officers arrived at my residence. I let the officers inside the residence and told them that I had three (3) firearms for personal safety.

[Ex. 4 at 3.]

III. ANALYSIS
A. Defendant's Motion to Suppress
1. The Legal Framework Governing Determination of This Motion

It is well established that the Fourth Amendment forbids only unreasonable searches and seizures. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 1096, 108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990). When determining the reasonableness of a particular search, courts must balance "the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Id. Given an individual's substantial privacy interests within his home, the Supreme Court has declared the principle that it is generally not reasonable to conduct an in-home search without a warrant issued on probable cause. 494 U.S. at 331, 110 S.Ct. at 1097. Under certain limited circumstances, however, the public interest permits such a search to proceed without a warrant or probable cause. Id.

Next, where a search exceeds the bounds of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule generally dictates that evidence seized during such a search is not admissible. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536, 108 S.Ct. 2529, 2533, 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988). This rule is intended to serve a deterrence function by ensuring that "the prosecution is not to be put in a better position than it would have been in if no illegality had transpired." Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2508, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984). The exclusionary rule, however, is not inviolate; rather, exceptions such as the "independent source" doctrine and the "inevitable discovery" doctrine seek to ensure that "the prosecution is not put in a worse position simply because of some...

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