U.S. v. Chamberlain

• Decision Date: 01 March 1999
• Docket Number: No. 98-1564,98-1564
• Citation: 163 F.3d 499
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. George Gerald CHAMBERLAIN, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 499

163 F.3d 499

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. George Gerald CHAMBERLAIN, Appellant.

No. 98-1564.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Oct. 20, 1998.

Decided Dec. 24, 1998.

Rehearing Denied March 1, 1999.

Jordan S. Kushner, Minneapolis, Minnesota, argued, for Appellant.

Mark D. Larsen, Minneapolis, Minnesota, argued (B. Todd Jones, United States Attorney, on the brief), for Appellee.

Before BOWMAN, Chief Judge, BRIGHT and RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

A jury convicted George Gerald Chamberlain of conspiracy to distribute child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). Chamberlain was sentenced to seven years and three months (87 months) in prison, to be followed by a three-year term of supervised release, to commence at the conclusion of a sentence Chamberlain is currently serving for a separate crime. Chamberlain appeals his conviction and sentence on a number of grounds, including the admission of statements he made to state prison officials who failed to precede their questioning with a Miranda warning. We believe that Chamberlain's statements were made while he was in custody for Miranda purposes. We therefore reverse on the Miranda issue and remand for a new trial.

I.

While serving a prison sentence for criminal sexual conduct, Chamberlain worked at Insight, a nonprofit corporation operating in the Minnesota state prison facilities. Inmates in the Insight program did telemarketing and computer programming work on contracts Insight made with various companies. The money Insight earned on the contracts was used to fund college programs for the inmates in the program. (Trial Tr. 49-50.) Chamberlain had his own office within the Insight offices in the prison, as well as his own computer. (Trial Tr. 41.) In November 1994, a news report alleging financial misconduct within the Insight program resulted in an administrative investigation of the program. During a search of the Insight offices, Department of Corrections investigators found lists of children's names and addresses, and an optical disk which they suspected contained child pornography, in Chamberlain's office. (Trial Tr. 45-46.)

As part of the investigation, investigators interviewed all of the prison inmates taking part in the program, including Chamberlain. (Trial Tr. 43.) The statements Chamberlain sought to suppress on Miranda grounds were made during two interviews in which Chamberlain was questioned by investigators. The Miranda issue turns on the circumstances of these interviews--on whether Chamberlain was "in custody" as defined by Miranda and its progeny. We therefore state in some detail the facts related to the interviews, culled from both the pretrial motion hearing and the trial itself.

The interviews took place in the Insight offices, inside the prison. Special investigator Mark Freer conducted Chamberlain's first interview. Because the Insight offices were secured during the investigation, any inmate brought in for an interview had to be escorted to the offices. (Pretrial Mot. Hr'g Tr. 111.) During the pretrial motion hearing Freer testified that although he did not recall how Chamberlain arrived for his interview, Freer generally either brought the inmates down to the offices himself or had another officer bring them down. Freer would then usually meet the officer halfway. (Pretrial Mot. Hr'g Tr. 95.) The interview took place in an office located near Chamberlain's own office. The door to the room was closed but unlocked. Chamberlain was not restrained in any way, and Freer displayed no weapons. (Pretrial Mot. Hr'g Tr. 95-97.) At no time during this interview, or the interview which followed later, did any investigator give Chamberlain a Miranda warning.

Towards the end of the interview, Freer asked Chamberlain about the child lists found in Chamberlain's office. Chamberlain denied any knowledge of the lists. (Trial Tr. 138.) Later the same day, however, in a second interview conducted by Steven Ayers, another special investigator employed by the Department of Corrections, Chamberlain admitted that he lied to Freer in the earlier interview and admitted knowledge of the lists. (Trial Tr. 155.) After the interview, Ayers told Chamberlain that he was going to be placed in administrative segregation and transferred to the Stillwater Correctional Facility. The Stillwater facility is a higher-level security facility than the Lino Lakes facility, where Chamberlain was then imprisoned. (Trial Tr. 21.) Chamberlain then indicated that he wanted to contact an attorney and was no longer willing to conduct further interviews. (Pretrial Mot. Hr'g Tr. 125.)

Chamberlain filed a pretrial motion to suppress the statements he made regarding the child lists. A magistrate judge, believing that Chamberlain was not "in custody" for Miranda purposes, recommended denying the motion, and the District Court adopted the recommendation. Tapes of Chamberlain's interviews were played for the jury at Chamberlain's trial, including portions of the interviews related to the child lists. (Trial Tr. 135, 159.) Additionally, the government discussed the lists in its closing argument. (Trial Tr. 894-95.) Chamberlain argues on appeal that the statements should not have been admitted into evidence because the statements were made during a custodial interrogation not preceded by a Miranda warning.

II.

We review the District Court's findings concerning custody under a clearly erroneous standard. See United States v. Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343, 1347 (8th Cir.1990). And we will affirm that decision "unless the decision ... is unsupported by substantial evidence, based on an erroneous interpretation of applicable law, or in light of the entire record we are left with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made." Id. at 1348 (quoting United States v. Jorgensen, 871 F.2d 725, 728 (8th Cir.1989)). We believe, in this case, that a mistake has been made.

A Miranda warning must precede any custodial interrogation. A custodial interrogation involves "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). An individual already in prison on another matter at the time of questioning is not necessarily, however, "in custody" for Miranda purposes. The mere fact of incarceration does not ipso facto render an interrogation custodial. Leviston v. Black, 843 F.2d 302, 304 (8th Cir.1988) (citing Flittie v. Solem, 775 F.2d 933, 944 (8th Cir.1985) (en banc)). A number of other circuits have a similar rule. See United States v. Menzer, 29 F.3d 1223, 1231 (7th Cir.1994) (citing cases). This does not mean, however, that the fact of incarceration is irrelevant. "The relevant inquiry is whether a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood himself to be in custody." Leviston, 843 F.2d at 304 (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984)). That inquiry must include consideration of the fact of incarceration. The Supreme Court has indicated that when the individual being questioned is already in prison, "[q]uestioning by captors, who appear to control the suspect's fate, may create mutually reinforcing pressures that ... will weaken the suspect's will." Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297, 110 S.Ct. 2394, 110 L.Ed.2d 243 (1990). ¹

Leviston established that incarceration does not necessarily render an interrogation custodial. But in that case, Leviston asked to speak to the police about a robbery for which he was later convicted. At the time Leviston initiated the interviews, he was incarcerated on an unrelated matter. During Leviston's conversations with the police, and prior to any Miranda warning, Leviston made statements which were later introduced at his trial for the robbery. The District Court found that Leviston initiated the interviews with the police, voluntarily went to the interview room, was free to end the conversations at any time, and was allowed to leave upon request. Leviston was therefore not "in custody" during questioning, and no Miranda warning was required. ² Leviston, 843 F.2d at 303-04.

We adhere to the rule set forth in Leviston that a Miranda warning is not automatically required when questioning an inmate. Chamberlain's situation, however, differs from Leviston's because Chamberlain did not initiate the conversations with Freer and Ayers. We therefore proceed to examine the other relevant circumstances.

III.

In determining whether Freer's and Ayers's conversations with Chamberlain amounted to custodial interrogation, we are "concerned with the suspect's subjective belief that 'his freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest' and whether that belief is objectively reasonable under the circumstances." Griffin, 922 F.2d at 1349 (citing Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439, 104 S.Ct. 3138, quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983)). A determination of how a reasonable person would have felt in this situation--whether a reasonable person would have thought he was in custody--requires close consideration both of how Chamberlain got to the interview room and of the atmosphere of the interviews once Chamberlain arrived for, and during, questioning.

The six factor analysis set out in United States v. Griffin provides guidance in making this determination:

(1) whether the suspect was informed at the time of questioning that the questioning was voluntary, that the suspect was free to leave or request the officers to do so, or that the suspect was not considered under arrest;

(2) whether the suspect possessed unrestrained freedom of movement during questioning;

(3) whether the suspect...