U.S. v. Chestna, 91-1785
Citation | 962 F.2d 103 |
Decision Date | 21 April 1992 |
Docket Number | No. 91-1785,91-1785 |
Parties | UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. Mary Lou CHESTNA, Defendant, Appellant. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit) |
John H. Montgomery, Kenneth D. Pierce, and Bernstein, Shur, Sawyer and Nelson, Portland, Me., on brief, for defendant, appellant.
Richard S. Cohen, U.S. Atty., Nicholas M. Gess, and Margaret D. McGaughey, Asst. U.S. Attys., Portland, Me., on brief, for appellee.
Before BREYER, Chief Judge, CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge, and SELYA, Circuit Judge.
The defendant, Mary Lou Chestna, was convicted, after jury trial, of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and distribution of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), 846. On appeal, defendant raises only an issue as to her resulting sentence. She has moved for an expedited appeal. We grant that request. At the same time, however, we conclude that no substantial question is presented and we affirm. U.S.Ct. of App.R. 27.1.
For purposes of determining defendant's Base Offense Level (BOL), the court found the relevant drug quantity to be 3.85 kilograms, for a BOL of 30. The court further found that defendant accepted responsibility for the offense conduct and so reduced the BOL two levels to 28. Defendant's Criminal History Category is Category I. Based on a total offense level of 28 and a Criminal History Category of I, the applicable Guideline range is 78 to 97 months. 1
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553 and U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, the government moved for a downward departure from the guidelines for defendant's substantial assistance in the prosecution of another person who had committed an offense. The government recommended a sentence of 60 months. Although disagreeing with the recommended sentence, defendant urged the court to grant the government's motion. "Alternatively," sentencing transcript (Tr.) at 10, defendant requested a downward departure, due to what defendant alleged were unique circumstances of her family responsibilities. At the time of sentencing, defendant was a single mother with three children, aged 13, 11, and 4 years. 2 Defendant sought a term of probation.
The court granted the government's motion for a downward departure for substantial assistance and denied defendant's request for departure for unique circumstances. The court imposed a term of imprisonment of 60 months, a 4 year term of supervised release and a felony assessment of $50.
On appeal, defendant does not attack directly the court's denial of her request for a downward departure due to alleged unique circumstances of her family responsibilities. She concedes that a district court's refusal to depart is not appealable. E.g., United States v. Romolo, 937 F.2d 20, 22 (1st Cir.1991). Rather, she seeks refuge in our recognition that appellate jurisdiction may attach where the decision not to depart is based on the court's mistaken view that it lacks the legal authority to consider a departure. See United States v. Romolo, 937 F.2d at 22 ( ). This does not satisfactorily aid defendant, however, because the court, in fact, did depart in this case. Defendant's argument appears foreclosed by caselaw rejecting the viability of appellate complaints from the beneficiary of a departure about the extent of such departure. United States v. Pighetti, 898 F.2d 3, 4-5 (1st Cir.1990).
Defendant posits, nonetheless, that we have jurisdiction to review whether a district court was mistaken as to the factors it was empowered to consider once it determined that a downward departure was warranted. But, a further barrier rises. The guidelines specifically speak to the ground upon which she bases district court error. "Family ties and responsibilities and community ties are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range." U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6 (Nov. 1991). 3 Defendant seeks to draw a distinction between considering family circumstances as a basis for departure (which she concedes is barred by the guidelines in the "ordinary" case) and considering family circumstances in calculating the extent of departure once a departure (on some other ground) is granted.
Putting defendant's claim in context, she contends that once the government moved for departure based on her substantial assistance, that is, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, it opened the door for the court to consider other factors, unrelated to assistance to the government, even those factors listed elsewhere as ordinarily irrelevant in determining the appropriateness of a departure. She contends that the court mistakenly believed that it did not have the discretion to consider her family circumstances in determining the extent of departure. 4 And, she contends, we have appellate jurisdiction to review this alleged error.
Despite defendant's care in crafting this argument, we have some difficulty in viewing this case as other than a complaint about the extent of a departure. Even were we to resolve our doubts about appellate jurisdiction in defendant's favor, we find the substance of defendant's argument unpersuasive.
We begin by quoting § 5K1.1:
Substantial Assistance to Authorities (Policy Statement)
Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense, the court may depart from the guidelines.
(a) The appropriate reduction shall be determined by the court for reasons stated that may include, but are not limited to, consideration of the following:
(1) the court's evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the defendant's assistance, taking into consideration the government's evaluation of the assistance rendered;
(2) the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or testimony provided by the defendant;
(3) the nature and extent of the defendant's assistance;
(4) any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the defendant or his family resulting from his assistance;
(5) the timeliness of the defendant's assistance.
(Emphasis added).
Defendant emphasizes that this list of factors is expressly nonexhaustive. Nonetheless, we believe, as did the district court, that the rational construction of the underscored language is that any additional non-listed factors, which a court appropriately may consider, necessarily would relate to the substance of the initiating motion, i.e., a defendant's substantial assistance to authorities.
The question here is what is an appropriate departure, in light of the benefit, significance, value of the cooperation of this defendant with the government, and what it may auger with respect to her disposition for purposes of rehabilitation. I don't see how you can meld together the value of her cooperation and her dier [sic] family circumstances that result from her own conduct which the guidelines themselves say is not a sufficient basis for downward departure, absent great uniqueness.
After counsel then read aloud, at the court's request, § 5K1.1, the following colloquy occurred:
THE COURT: But none of them involve any circumstance other than the evaluation of the significance, nature, extent and value of the assistance given to the government.
What I understood you to be saying, and I have understood right along for you to be saying, is that she has cooperated with the government and the government made a motion to that extent but to a certain extent there should be a departure downward.
You now want me to go beyond that and you give me two principal reasons for doing so, some disagreement with the government's assessment of the value of her cooperation, and; secondly, once the door is open for downward departure, you want me to consider the effect of her prolonged absence as a parent from her three children.
We, like the district court, find no support in the language of § 5K1.1 for defendant's argument that, once animated, § 5K1.1 does not cabin the grounds presented to the court to support a downward departure. United States v. Thomas, 930 F.2d 526, 529 (7th Cir.) (only factors relating to a defendant's cooperation can support departure, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553 and U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, for substantial assistance in the prosecution of another), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 171, 116 L.Ed.2d 134 (1991).
In any event, defendant's appeal flounders on a more fundamental ground. Her status as a single mother of three, (now four), young children simply is not, as she contends, an unusual family circumstance. In the end, defendant's postulation of § 5K1.1 as a vehicle for district court consideration of her family responsibilities matters little. Whether parental responsibilities under extraordinary circumstances can be the basis for a downward departure or, as defendant would argue, to calculate the extent of a departure, once a departure for substantial assistance to authorities is granted, is a question we do not reach. While we can sympathize with the effect of extended incarceration on her family...
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