U.S. v. Chippas, 91-1062

Decision Date16 August 1991
Docket NumberNo. 91-1062,91-1062
Citation942 F.2d 498
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. William CHIPPAS, Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

William Chippas, pro se.

Mitchell F. Stevens, St. Louis, Mo., for U.S.

Before JOHN R. GIBSON, WOLLMAN and MAGILL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

William Chippas appeals from the district court's denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence filed under former Rule 35(a). We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Chippas was convicted of distributing cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. On direct appeal, this court, in United States v. Padilla, 869 F.2d 372 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 909, 109 S.Ct. 3223, 106 L.Ed.2d 572 (1989), relying on United States v. Portillo, 863 F.2d 25, 26 (8th Cir.1988) (per curiam), vacated Chippas's sentence which included a term of supervised release, and remanded to the district court for re-sentencing. On remand, in accordance with this court's direction, the district court resentenced Chippas to, among other things, a five-year term of special parole in place of the term of supervised release. The district court also imposed a $25,000 fine.

Chippas then filed the instant Rule 35(a) motion, arguing that his convictions for both distributing cocaine and conspiracy to distribute cocaine, were in violation of the double jeopardy clause under Grady v. Corbin, --- U.S. ---, 110 S.Ct. 2084, 2087, 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990) (double jeopardy clause bars subsequent prosecution if, to establish essential element of offense charged in prosecution, government will prove conduct for which defendant has already been prosecuted), because they required proof of the same conduct, and that the district court did not have statutory authority to impose the special parole term upon resentencing. On appeal Chippas reasserts these arguments and also argues, citing United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 101 S.Ct. 426, 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980), that because he has begun serving his sentence, the district court cannot now reimpose a term of supervised release. In addition, Chippas argues that the district court failed to consider his inability to pay a fine under 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a).

Chippas's reliance on Grady in support of his double jeopardy claim is misplaced. In Grady, 110 S.Ct. at 2090-91, the Court stated that when a double jeopardy claim concerns multiple punishments imposed in a single prosecution, as in the instant case, the test announced in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) (no violation if each offense requires proof of a fact which the other does not), controls. Chippas admits on appeal that his prosecution did not violate Blockburger, but argues that the Grady test applies to his type of double jeopardy claim. We believe it is clear, as the district court found, "that Grady pertains only to successive prosecutions, not to claims that multiple counts within a single indictment have double jeopardy connotations." United States v. Oritz-Alarcon, 917 F.2d 651, 654 (1st Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 111 S.Ct. 2035, 114 L.Ed.2d 120 (1991); accord United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1117 n. 42 (3d Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 111 S.Ct. 2009, 114 L.Ed.2d 98 (1991).

Chippas is correct, however, that the district court did not have authority to impose a term of special parole. In Gozlon-Perez v. United States, --- U.S. ---, 111 S.Ct. 840, 847-49, 112 L.Ed.2d 919 (1991), the Court held that section 1002 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub.L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207, §§ 1001-1009, mandating terms of supervised release in place of terms of special parole, became effective on the date of the ADAA's enactment, October 27, 1986. Chippas committed his crimes in March 1987....

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5 cases
  • U.S. v. Bauer, 93-1165
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • March 18, 1994
    ...district court and was raised for the first time on appeal in [a] reply brief, is not properly before the court." United States v. Chippas, 942 F.2d 498, 500 (8th Cir.1991). In this case, Bauer specifically objected to the "Financial Situation" portions of his PSR, and he testified at the s......
  • U.S. v. Charles
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • July 7, 2008
    ...is not waived by his failure to raise this argument before the district court or assert it in his opening brief, United States v. Chippas, 942 F.2d 498, 500 (8th Cir.1991) (stating that we generally do not consider arguments not raised below and that issues raised for the first time in a re......
  • U.S. v. Preston
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • May 1, 2000
    ...Gozlon-Peretz holds that "section 1002 became effective in its entirety when it was enacted on October 27, 1986"); United States v. Chippas, 942 F.2d 498, 500 (8th Cir. 1991) ("[S]ection 1002 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 . . . became effective on the date of the ADAA's enactment, Octo......
  • U.S. v. Hurst, 92-6316
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • July 21, 1993
    ...(7th Cir.1993); United States v. Nueva, 979 F.2d 880, 885 n. 8 (1st Cir.1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1615 (1993); United States v. Chippas, 942 F.2d 498, 500 (8th Cir.1991); United States v. Campo, 793 F.2d 1251, 1252 (11th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986).Moreover, w......
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