U.S. v. Coleman, 73-1679
| Decision Date | 29 July 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 73-1679,73-1679 |
| Citation | 501 F.2d 342 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Donald Lewis COLEMAN, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Phil L. Hansen, Salt Lake City, Utah, for defendant-appellant.
Rodney G. Snow, Asst. U.S. Atty. (C. Nelson Day, U.S. Atty., Salt Lake City, Utah, on the brief), for plaintiff-appellee.
Before LEWIS, Chief Judge, and PICKETT and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.
Donald Lewis Coleman was tried under a two-count indictment which charged him with committing and attempting to commit aircraft piracy in violation of 49 U.S.C. 1472(i), and with interfering with flight attendants in violation of 49 U.S.C. 1472(j). He was convicted after jury trial in the United States District Court for the District of Utah and received concurrent 10-year sentences under each count. He has appealed, claiming that the trial court erred in denying his motions for judgment of acquittal and, alternatively, a new trial.
Coleman's defense at trial was insanity. Upon motion of the government, the court ordered that Coleman be examined by Dr. Eugene Bliss, a psychiatrist at the University of Utah Medical Center. His was the only expert testimony offered at trial, and it is on the basis of what Coleman claims is his unrebutted testimony that the alleged errors are claimed. It is Coleman's contention that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the government's burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that he was mentally competent at the time the crime was committed.
The test for determining criminal responsibility in this circuit was clearly stated in Wion v. United States, 10 Cir., 325 F.2d 420, 430, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 946, 84 S.Ct. 1354, 12 L.Ed.2d 309:
The jury is then to be told that, as applied to their case, the test for criminal responsibility means that before they may return a verdict of guilty, they must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time the accused committed the unlawful act, he was mentally capable of knowing what he was doing, was mentally capable of knowing that it was wrong, and was mentally capable of controlling his conduct.
In applying this test to our consideration of the issues raised by the instant case, we must bear in mind that the nature and quantum of the evidence which the government must produce to justify submission of the insanity issue to the jury necessarily varies with the nature and quantum of the evidence indicating mental incompetence. A thorough examination of the evidence adduced at trial is thus essential to our review.
On December 26, 1971 Coleman boarded American Airlines' nonstop flight 47 from Chicago to San Francisco. Stewardness Peggy Sue Harrell testified for the government that Coleman first asked her for a 'rather strange drink' (creme de menthe and bourbon) and that she subsequently had several verbal exchanges with him. At one point Coleman remarked 'I think I'll hijack a plane' and pulled out a gun 1 and said 'all right now, I mean it.' Stewardess Anne Marie Theiser then went to the rear of the plane and called the captain to inform him as to what had transpired. Coleman demanded a large sum of money and warned that the plane was not to go below 25,000 feet because he had plastic explosives in the cargo compartment. He repeatedly asked to talk to the captain and to go into the cockpit, claiming that he was a former pilot for United Air Lines. Stewardess Harrell further testified that Coleman also exhibited a knife during this period and inquired with reference to several passengers if they were Secret Service agents. The captain advised the crew that they would land in Salt Lake City. When the plane landed, Coleman made an unsuccessful attempt to jump out of the slide door. Stewardess Harrell later observed the apprehended Coleman in front of the airplane, crying and saying 'They wouldn't believe me, they wouldn't believe me.'
On cross-examination, Stewardess Harrell related that Coleman was confusing to her, that his actions were not those of an ordinary passenger, that he was irrational, that he jumped around in the things he talked about, and that rather than following a specific plan, his behavior was more a 'muddled mess.'
Stewardess Theiser's testimony corroborated that of Stewardess Harrell. She explained that the blade of Coleman's knife was open, but that he was 'just holding it kind of.' On cross-examination, she agreed with Harrell that Coleman was confused and didn't appear to be following any set plan of activity, although on redirect she testified that after Coleman inquired about Secret Service agents she felt that 'he had something in mind.'
The testimony of D. E. Ehman, a flying superintendent, was essentially in line with that of the two stewardesses. At one point, after Coleman had been displaying the gun and oddly 'fanning' it, Ehman inquired of one of the stewardesses if Coleman was bothering them. She responded Ehman believed that Coleman was joking and more a nuisance than anything else, but became concerned because he was making the passengers frightened and anxious. Ehman also stated, on cross-examination, that Coleman 'wasn't acting rationally.'
FBI Agent Charles Shepherd, one of the arresting officers at Salt Lake International Airport, testified that Coleman asked to call his attorney and that he overheard Coleman tell his attorney that he had hijacked an airplane. FBI Agent Harry Jones, another arresting officer, stated that Coleman told him that he had considered hijacking the airplane prior to boarding his flight.
The government rested and the defense called Dr. Bliss, who was accepted by stipulation as an expert in psychiatry. On the basis of two interviews conducted with Coleman after the airplane incident, Dr. Bliss stated that in his opinion Coleman was psychotic and not mentally competent on the date of the offense and that 'in all probability' he was not mentally capable of knowing what he was doing. He stated that his behavior was under very poor control at the time, although he admitted that
Dr. Bliss' opinions were based on the interviews themselves, Coleman's prior history, which revealed that he had a psychotic brother and that Coleman had experienced at least two previous psychotic episodes, and a disjointed letter allegedly written by Coleman...
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