U.S. v. Corona
| Decision Date | 14 July 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 87-5263,87-5263 |
| Citation | 849 F.2d 562 |
| Parties | 25 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1361 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ray L. CORONA, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Donald I. Bierman, Bierman, Sonnett, Shohat & Sale, P.A., Benedict P. Kuehne, Sonnett Sale & Kuehne, Miami, Fla., for defendant-appellant.
Bruce E. Lowe, Asst. U.S. Atty., Mary K. Butler, Linda Collins Hertz, Sonia Escobio O'Donnell, Asst. U.S. Attys., Miami, Fla., for plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.
Before TJOFLAT and HILL, Circuit Judges, and HALL, * District Judge.
On December 22, 1986 appellant, Ray L. Corona ("Corona"), was convicted of eighteen violations of the Drug Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. Secs. 922(a)(6) and 922(h)(3). 1 Those Code sections, respectively, make it
unlawful for a person, in connection with the purchase of firearms, to make a false or fictitious written statement intended or likely to deceive the firearms dealer and for a person who is an unlawful user of or addicted to a controlled substance to receive firearms. In order to prove its case against Corona, the government offered into evidence the redacted treatment records of Corona from the Palm Beach Institute ("PBI"), a private drug and alcohol abuse treatment center in Palm Beach, Florida and the testimony of a private psychiatrist who separately treated Corona. The issues before this court are whether the trial court erroneously admitted into evidence both Corona's PBI treatment records and the testimony of Corona's psychiatrist; whether the evidence was sufficient to support Corona's conviction; whether Corona's conviction should be reversed on grounds of prosecutorial vindictiveness; and whether the trial court erred in failing to give some of Corona's requested jury instructions.
On six separate occasions between October 1981 and October 1984 Corona purchased a total of nine firearms from the Tamiami Gun Shop in Miami, Florida. On each occasion and for purposes of purchasing each gun, Corona completed a form published by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms ("ATF Form 4473") which is designed to identify prospective buyers who are statutorily prohibited from purchasing guns. On each of the nine ATF Forms 4473, Corona answered "no" in response to the question "Are you an unlawful user of, or addicted to marijuana, or a depressant, stimulant or narcotic drug?" At trial, the government sought to prove that Corona's negative responses on the ATF Forms 4473 were false or fictitious in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(a)(6) and that, during the three year period Corona purchased guns from Tamiami, he was an unlawful user of or addicted to cocaine in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(h)(3). 2
To prove its case that Corona was addicted to or an unlawful user of cocaine, the government pursued three main avenues at trial. 3 The government called Shelley Phillips, a social acquaintance of Corona's, who testified that each time she and Corona socialized between 1981 and 1983 they ingested cocaine, procured by Corona, approximately twelve times per evening. The government also called as a witness Dr. Roberto Ruiz, a psychiatrist who, in his private practice, treated Corona on a weekly basis from August 1980 through January 1981.
During treatment, Corona confided in Dr. Ruiz that he suffered from extensive cocaine use which progressed from an initial social use. Although Corona and Dr The government's third offer of proof of Corona's addiction to or unlawful use of cocaine was Corona's PBI treatment records. On two occasions, for six weeks in 1982 and for three days in 1983, Corona entered PBI for chemical substance therapy and treatment. PBI kept written records, prepared by Corona's therapist, nurses and other employees of PBI, of Corona's admissions and discharges, statements, treatment, and evaluations of his progress. Although Corona's therapist at PBI was unaware of whether Corona described himself as an addict, the therapist and others at PBI considered Corona to be addicted to cocaine.
Ruiz did not discuss the specific amount of cocaine Corona ingested, Dr. Ruiz learned that Corona used cocaine quite often, at times on a daily basis, and may have spent as much as $10,000 per month to purchase cocaine. Dr. Ruiz observed that Corona was able to stop his cocaine use for periods of time and concluded that Corona, rather than being an addict, was a chronic cocaine user.
In presenting his case, Corona sought to prove that he was neither addicted to nor an unlawful user of cocaine at the times he purchased the guns at issue. Corona did not dispute that he purchased the firearms or that he filled out and signed the ATF Forms 4473. Corona called three lay witnesses, business and social acquaintances of his, who testified that he was a dedicated banker who often worked long hours and performed complex transactions and that he never appeared unduly fatigued, out of control or a danger to the public safety and welfare.
The defense also called two witnesses who were qualified as experts in the field of chemical dependency. Both expert witnesses offered testimony contrary to that offered by Corona's PBI therapist. The defense expert witnesses testified that cocaine was not considered addictive during the years in question and one expert opined that Corona was able to control his cocaine use and was not an addict. Finally, Corona called a former BATF Special Agent who testified that the BATF published materials provided to firearms dealers do not define the terms "unlawful user of or addicted to" a controlled substance as used on the ATF Forms 4473.
Prior to striking the jury, the trial court held a hearing to consider, among other issues, the questions of the propriety of admitting the PBI records and allowing the testimony of Dr. Ruiz. The court denied Corona's motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Ruiz finding that no psychotherapist-patient privilege exists in Eleventh Circuit criminal actions. The court also denied Corona's motion to suppress the PBI records. In so ruling, however, the court severely limited admission of the 130 page file, allowing only some 13 pages into evidence, in accordance with the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Drug Abuse Confidentiality Statute, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 290ee-3, and its implementing regulations, 42 C.F.R. Sec. 2.61 et seq. On December 22, 1986, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all 18 counts of the indictment. After denying Corona's post-trial motions, the court sentenced Corona to twelve months imprisonment followed by five years of probation.
Corona contends the trial court committed reversible error by admitting into evidence part of his PBI treatment records. Although the trial judge redacted the records and allowed into evidence approximately 13 of 130 pages, Corona argues that the Drug Abuse Confidentiality Statute, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 290ee-3, governs the disclosure of drug treatment records and that no part of the PBI records should have been admitted absent the district court's strict compliance with the procedures set forth in Sec. 290ee-3 and its implementing regulations, 42 C.F.R. Sec. 2.61 et seq.
The section of the Public Health and Welfare Title to which Corona refers provides in pertinent part that "Records of the identity, diagnosis, prognosis, or treatment of any patient which are maintained in connection with the performance of any drug abuse prevention function ... [shall] be Although the confidentiality statute provides only that a court must assess good cause before granting a disclosure application, the statute's implementing regulations, 42 C.F.R. Sec. 2.61 et seq., set forth specific procedures a court should follow to determine the propriety of disclosing drug treatment records. 4 Corona argues that a court may not disclose confidential drug treatment records for purposes of investigating or prosecuting a patient for a crime unless the court has made findings that the criteria of Sec. 2.65 have been met. We agree and we do not dispute Corona's contention that the trial court below failed to make findings that the criteria were met in this case. We nonetheless decline to reverse Corona's conviction finding that a reasonable trial judge could have found that all the criteria were met.
confidential and be disclosed only ... under the circumstances expressly authorized" under the Statute. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 290ee-3(a). The Statute specifically allows the disclosure of drug treatment records pursuant to a court order even in the absence of a patient's consent authorizing the disclosure of his records. Id. Sec. 290ee-3(b)(2)(C). Before drug treatment records may be disclosed pursuant to a court order, however, the court must assess good cause for the disclosure by "weigh[ing] the public interest and the need for disclosure against the injury to the patient, to the physician-patient relationship, and to the treatment services." Id
Whether the district court properly admitted a portion of Corona's PBI records is a mixed question of law and fact which requires this court to independently apply legal principles to the trial court's findings of facts. We must, therefore, defer to the district court's findings of basic, historical facts of the case and independently evaluate whether, pursuant to the confidentiality statute and implementing regulations, portions of Corona's PBI records should have been disclosed at trial. Adams v. Balkcom, 688 F.2d 734, 739 (11th Cir.1982).
Under 42 C.F.R. Sec. 2.65(c) (1986 edition), a court may authorize disclosure of confidential drug treatment records for the purpose of conducting an investigation of or a prosecution for a crime of which the patient is suspected only if the court finds that all of four enumerated...
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