U.S. v. David

• Decision Date: 30 January 1975
• Docket Number: No. 72--2149,72--2149
• Citation: 167 U.S.App.D.C. 117,511 F.2d 355
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Reginald E. DAVID, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Page 355

511 F.2d 355

167 U.S.App.D.C. 117

UNITED STATES of America v. Reginald E. DAVID, Appellant.

No. 72--2149.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued Oct. 25, 1975.

Decided Jan. 30, 1975.

Michael Schatzow, with whom Larry J. Ritchie, Washington, D.C. (both appointed by this Court), was on the brief for appellant.

Steven R. Schaars, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Earl J. Silbert, U.S. Atty., John A. Terry and Roger M. Adelman, Asst. U.S. Attys., were on the brief for appellee.

Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, and WRIGHT, Circuit Judge and MERHIGE, ^* United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia.

BAZELON, Chief Judge:

On August 16, 1972, Reginald E. David was convicted in a non-jury trial of assault with intent to commit rape while armed, ¹ taking indecent liberties with a minor, ² and sodomy. ³ Testimony at trial indicated that on October 28, 1971 the 13 year old prosecutrix was walking with two young girl friends in the parking lot of Robert F. Kennedy Stadium. A man approached them in a green car. The man--identified at trial by all three girls as the appellant--left his car and began chasing them. While two of the girls eluded him, he caught up with the prosecutrix, ripped her slacks off, attempted to have intercourse with her, and compelled her to commit various sodomous acts at knife point. He then released her.

In the meantime, the two other girls met a policeman and alerted him to the danger confronting their friend. He went immediately to the parking lot where he and a fellow officer found David crouching in a bush near the lot with an open knife in his hand. They arrested David after both girls identified him as the man in the green car.

I

Treatment of the central issues raised on appeal requires a detailed description of the several reports and proceedings relating to David's mental condition both at the time of the offense and at the time of trial.

Four days after the instant offense, a United States Magistrate ordered, on request of defense counsel, that David be examined by the Legal Psychiatric Service to determine whether he was 'competent for trial and whether (he) was suffering from a mental disease or defect at the time of the alleged offenses and whether those offenses, if committed by (him), were a product of such mental disease or defect.'

Pursuant to this order, David was examined in his cell block by Dr. Leonard C. Maguigad, a staff psychiatrist with the Legal Psychiatric Service. Maguigad, in his report to the Magistrate dated December 10, 1971, found that David was incompetent to stand trial. He also reported that David was 'suffering from schizophrenia at the time of the alleged offense, but I have no opinion at this time as to productivity.' He 'highly recommend(ed) that (David) receive hospital treatment at this time.'

Maguigad's letter to the Magistrate also disclosed that David had a prior psychiatric history. David revealed to Maguigad that, while employed as a police officer in the summer of 1970, 'he had a 'nervous breakdown' which led to the termination of his services from the police force.' Maguigad reported that the records he obtained from the D.C. Police and Fireman's Clinic 'confirm that (David) had psychotic symptomatologies and had been diagnosed Schizophrenia Paranoid Type in (sic) August 3, 1970. He had been hospitalized at Washington Hospital Center for his psychosis and had been committed to St. Elizabeths Hospital during the summer months of 1970.'

On February 9, 1972, David was arraigned before the District Court in this case. At that time, the District Court, again on defendant's motion, ordered that he be committed to St. Elizabeths Hospital for an examination both as to his competency to stand trial and as to his mental condition at the time of the offenses for which he was charged. ⁴ Pursuant to that order, David was examined by Dr. Robert H. Robertson, a staff psychiatrist at St. Elizabeths who consulted with Dr. Robert O. Randle, a staff psychologist at the hospital. On the basis of their examination, Dr. Elizabeth Strawinsky, Acting Associate Director for Forensic Programs at St. Elizabeths, reported in a letter to the court that David had been 'diagnosed No mental disorder and is competent for trial by virtue of having a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings pending against him and being able to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.' Strawinsky further reported that 'on or about October 28, 1971, the date of the alleged offenses, (David) was not suffering from a mental disease or defect which substantially impaired his behavior controls, and the alleged offenses, if committed by him, were not the product of an abnormal mental condition.' Thus, at the time of the trial, the reports of Dr. Maguigad and St. Elizabeths conflicted as to both the questions of competency to stand trial and mental condition at the time of the offense.

At the trial's outset, David's counsel presented the court with what he perceived to be a 'dilemma.' After noting the two conflicting reports on David's competency, counsel stated that 'my position at this point is to alert the Court to the fact that I have misgivings about my client's competency which I think warrants an inquiry of some sort at this point.' While counsel was not specific as to the basis for his misgivings, he did indicate that 'it has to do with Mr. David's apparent lack of appreciation of what the Government's evidence against him is and the corresponding inability to consider the wisdom of taking a course other than standing trial on the merits.' Counsel made clear that while he was calling the 'dilemma' to the court's attention, he was doing so not at the direction of his client. He stated explicitly that 'Mr. David does not want me to assert his incompetence.'

On considering defense counsel's statement, the trial court decided to hold a hearing into David's competency. Prior to doing so, the court called a brief recess to allow Dr. Maguigad, who had arrived in court, to meet once again with David in his jail cell and to allow the government time to contact St. Elizabeths authorities in the event they were needed to testify.

The recess--and Dr. Maguigad's 'reexamination' of David--lasted no longer than thirty minutes. ⁵ When court reconvened Maguigad was called as a witness and testified that, on the basis of the interview he had just conducted, he now felt that David was competent to stand trial. He stated that, in contrast to the last time that he had met David, 'he was accommodating and cooperative and seem(ed) to be warm and . . . less guarded. He understands the procedures that are forthcoming to him. He understands the fashion of the prosecution and the defense. He is more realistic about what is happening now.' In response to a question from the court, Dr. Maguigad further stated that in his opinion David now was competent to waive a jury trial. Maguigad's testimony was limited to the competency issue; he gave no indication that he had altered his earlier opinion that at the time of the offense David was suffering from schizophrenia.

On the basis of Dr. Maguigad's change of opinion and without the testimony of any other witnesses, the trial court declared David competent to stand trial. Neither party raised any objection to this ruling.

Following the competency ruling, defense counsel proffered to the trial court a waiver of David's constitutional right to a jury trial and requested the trial court to 'inquire of Mr. David directly.' ⁶ In response to this request, the trial judge conducted a three question inquiry of David. ⁷ After this inquiry, defense counsel stated that 'I have explained before Mr. David actually signs this waiver that the technical difference is that the Government has to convince 12 people beyond a reasonable doubt in a jury trial and that a waiver of jury trial makes Your Honor a judge of both fact and law.'

After the court then accepted defendant's signed waiver, defense counsel offered one additional matter before the first trial witness was called. Counsel stated that the defendant was choosing not to raise the insanity defense and that 'if and when it does come into the trial, it will be with Your Honor's discretion.' The trial court chose not to interpose the insanity defense sua sponte at that point ⁸ and stated that she 'felt that St. Elizabeths had an opportunity to observe the defendant at considerable length and Dr. Maguigad had not and that, indeed, perhaps, that was why, when he saw the defendant today, he changed his opinion as to his condition, since he had seen him only briefly, I believe in the cellblock before.' At no point during the balance of the trial was the question of an insanity defense raised again by either party or by the court.

II

At issue in this case are a) the adequacy of the competency hearing; b) the adequacy of the interrogation of the defendant on his jury trial waiver; and c) the adequacy of the basis for the trial judge's refusal to interpose the insanity defense sua sponte.

A

With regard to the first issue, appellant and appellee are agreed as to the standard against which competency is to be measured. The test is whether a defendant 'has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding--and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.' Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960). David claims that the trial judge's hearing into his competency was insufficiently comprehensive to adequately apply that standard. He asserts that the trial court erred in not further questioning defense counsel on the source and scope of his stated 'misgivings' as to David's competency. Moreover, in making his competency ruling, the trial court posed no questions to David himself.

The government asserts,...