U.S. v. Davis, Criminal Action No. 03-348 (RWR).
Decision Date | 04 May 2009 |
Docket Number | Criminal Action No. 03-348 (RWR). |
Citation | 612 F.Supp.2d 48 |
Parties | UNITED STATES, v. Jack DAVIS, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Defendant Jack Davis filed a motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 for a new trial claiming that a newly conceived argument for impeaching an FBI agent's trial testimony is newly discovered evidence, and that an alleged comment by a juror months after the trial about misunderstanding the court's instructions entitles Davis to an evidentiary hearing. The government opposes Davis' motion. Because Davis has not shown that the agent's testimony is newly discovered, that he is entitled to a hearing, or that his new argument would probably result in an acquittal if a new trial were granted, Davis' motion for a new trial will be denied.
The background of this case is fully discussed in United States v. Davis, 402 F.Supp.2d 252, 255-58 (D.D.C.2005), aff'd, 235 Fed.Appx. 747 (D.C.Cir.2007). Briefly, F.B.I. agents Kyle Fulmer and Robert Lockhart conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle Davis was driving. They found in it marijuana, PCP, and a weapon that Davis sought to suppress. At the suppression hearing, the court credited Fulmer's testimony that the agents stopped Davis' vehicle because Davis failed to come to a complete stop at a stop sign. The motion to suppress was denied and the recovered items were admitted into evidence at trial. Id. at 256. At trial, when questioned about the same traffic stop, Fulmer first stated that Davis stopped his vehicle at the stop sign before making a U-turn. When Davis' trial counsel confronted Fulmer about the inconsistency between his suppression hearing and trial testimony, Fulmer explained that Id. The jury convicted Davis of a narcotics conspiracy involving five kilograms or more of cocaine, 1.5 kilograms or more of crack cocaine, and .5 grams or more of pure PCP; possession of marijuana; possession with intent to distribute PCP; possession of a firearm during a drug trafficking offense; and unlawful distribution of cocaine.
Davis has moved for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence under Rule 33(b)(1). He advances a new argument about Fulmer's traffic stop testimony that he says his lawyer should have made before trial to show that Davis had come to a complete stop, that the traffic stop was thus illegal, and that the evidence recovered at the traffic stop therefore should have been suppressed.1 (Def.'s Mot. at 2-4.) Davis also seeks an evidentiary hearing, asserting that months after the verdict, his father encountered a juror who "expressed confusion about the conspiracy . . . and the Court's instructions regarding the definition of a conspiracy." (Id. at 4-5.)
Under Rule 33, the "court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires." Fed. R.Crim.P. 33(a). In order for a defendant to obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence,
(1) the evidence must have been discovered since the trial; (2) the party seeking the new trial must show diligence in the attempt to procure the newly discovered evidence; (3) the evidence relied on must not be merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) it must be material to the issues involved; and (5) [it must be] of such nature that in a new trial it would probably produce an acquittal.
United States v. Johnson, 519 F.3d 478, 487 (D.C.Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. Lafayette, 983 F.2d 1102, 1105 (D.C.Cir. 1993)) (brackets in original).
In order to be considered newly discovered, the evidence must have been in existence at the time of trial, Lafayette, 983 F.2d at 1105, and "discovered since the trial." United States v. Ortiz, 136 F.3d 161, 168 (D.C.Cir.1998). See also United States v. Dale, 991 F.2d 819, 839 (D.C.Cir. 1993) ( ); United States v. Howard, 267 F.Supp.2d 1, 4 (D.D.C.2003) ( ). The decision about whether to hold an evidentiary hearing on a Rule 33 motion rests within the sound discretion of the district court. See United States v. Blackwood, Nos. 88-3113 et al., 1990 WL 78160, at *6 (D.C.Cir. June 11, 1990) ( ). A district court "may decide a motion for [a] new trial on the basis of affidavits without an evidentiary hearing." United States v. Sensi, 879 F.2d 888, 900 n. 12 (D.C.Cir. 1989).
Davis argues that his new assessment of Fulmer's testimony constitutes newly discovered evidence and that his counsel "failed to properly identify and direct the Court's attention to Agent Fulmer's contradictory testimony." (Def.'s Mot. at 4.) However, "where a defendant knows the facts supporting his ineffective assistance of counsel claim at the time of trial, those facts are not `newly discovered' for the purposes of Rule 33." United States v. Torres, 115 F.3d 1033, 1037 (D.C.Cir.1997) ( )(emphasis in original). Davis knew at trial of the factual basis for his ineffectiveness argument. He was present at trial, heard Fulmer's examination, and concedes that his trial counsel considered and cross-examined Fulmer on this specific testimony. (Def.'s Reply at 3 ( ); Def.'s Mot. at 3 ( ).) Neither Davis' new assessment of the conflicting testimony he heard, nor his disagreement with trial counsel's strategy, nor speculation about how the traffic stop occurred based on testimony readily available at trial constitutes newly discovered evidence. See United States v. Gloster, 185 F.3d 910, 915 (D.C.Cir.1999) ( ).
Moreover, Davis is not entitled to a new trial on the basis of his new assessment of Fulmer's inconsistent testimony because the assessment is merely cumulative impeachment and he has not shown that "`a new trial would probably produce an acquittal'" on any counts. United States v. Williams, 233 F.3d 592, 593 (D.C.Cir.2000) (emphasis in original) (quoting Thompson v. United States, 188 F.2d 652, 653 (D.C.Cir.1951)). Davis speculates that it is "probable that the Court would have reversed its previous suppression ruling" and he would have been acquitted of the conspiracy and possession counts had trial counsel advanced Davis' newly minted argument. (Def.'s Reply at 3.) However, in denying Davis' motion for judgment of acquittal, the court has already found Fulmer's inconsistency to be only a minor one that did not warrant any reconsideration of the motion to suppress, Davis, 402 F.Supp.2d at 260-61, and that there was sufficient evidence to sustain his challenged convictions. Id. at 258-61. The D.C. Circuit affirmed this ruling on appeal, and noted that "given the district court's opportunity to evaluate witness credibility in the first instance, we would find no error in the court's crediting the agents' testimony that the appellant failed to come to a complete stop and nearly hit their car." Davis, 235 Fed.Appx. at 748-49.
Davis also asserts that a claim that a juror expressed months after the trial confusion about the court's conspiracy instructions entitles him to an evidentiary hearing and a new trial. What is most telling is what Davis does not present in supporting his request for a hearing. The allegation that the father had contact with the juror is unsworn. No affidavit from the father, much less the juror, is presented. No reason for the absence of an affidavit is offered. The account reportedly comes from Davis' father, not an unrelated person. The account is wholly uncorroborated. The juror is wholly unidentified, and Davis does not even appear to know the juror's gender. (Def.'s Reply at 4 ( ), 5 ("he or she did not understand").) No support is presented for how the father purported to authenticate months after the trial that the person really was a juror in this trial. No claim is made or supported that Davis' father even attended the trial or otherwise saw the jurors while the trial was underway. No specifics are given about how many months later the encounter occurred to show whether little or great passage of time may have affected the sharpness of memory. These...
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