U.S. v. DeJesus-Gaul, JESUS-GAU
| Decision Date | 12 January 1996 |
| Docket Number | A,No. 95-3045,JESUS-GAU,95-3045 |
| Citation | 73 F.3d 395 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee v. Carlos Deppellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Carmen D. Hernandez, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Washington, DC, argued the cause, for appellant. With her on the briefs was A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender.
Geoffrey Bestor, Assistant United States Attorney, Washington, DC, argued the cause, for appellee. With him on the brief were Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, John R. Fisher and Thomas J. Tourish, Jr., Assistant United States Attorneys.
Before: SILBERMAN, SENTELLE, and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.
With respect to certain statutory minimum sentences, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(f), and its guideline equivalent, U.S.S.G. Sec. 5C1.2, provide that the sentencing court "shall" disregard the mandatory minimum and impose a sentence within the guideline range if the court makes five specified findings favorable to the defendant. The question is whether, in sentencing DeJesus-Gaul, the district judge properly refused to give him the potential benefit of this "safety valve."
DeJesus-Gaul and his co-defendant Ingrid Lopez pled guilty to one count of distributing 50 grams or more of cocaine base. The government agreed in writing to drop the other two counts in the indictment and four state prosecutors (three in New York and one in Rhode Island) agreed not to prosecute DeJesus-Gaul on pending charges so long as he received "at least a mandatory minimum term of ten years."
The district judge sentenced Lopez first. Her conviction carried with it a statutory minimum sentence of 120 months' imprisonment, as did DeJesus-Gaul's. 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(A)(iii). Lopez asked the district judge to invoke the "safety valve," as her presentence investigation report had recommended. She testified at the sentencing hearing that she was merely a go-between who controlled neither the means nor the proceeds of the drug conspiracy. Her role was limited to that of a translator, and she was at all times subject to DeJesus-Gaul's direction. According to her testimony and counsel's representations, it was DeJesus-Gaul who went to New York to acquire the drugs, cooked the powder cocaine into cocaine base, and took charge of the money. Finding that Lopez had satisfied the five criteria in U.S.S.G. Sec. 5C1.2, the judge disregarded the mandatory minimum and sentenced her to 108 months' imprisonment, the bottom of the guideline range.
DeJesus-Gaul had been set for sentencing on the same day as Lopez, before the same judge. At DeJesus-Gaul's request, this was put off for several weeks. In the meantime, on March 31, 1995, counsel for DeJesus-Gaul filed a memorandum asking the judge to invoke the safety valve provision and to impose a sentence at the low end of the guideline range of 108-135 months, rather than the mandatory minimum of 120 months.
The government filed a memorandum on the same day opposing lenient treatment and urging the judge to view this defendant "with a harsher eye" than Lopez: DeJesus-Gaul "did not cooperate with authorities; he lied about his true identity in a[n] attempt to avoid his multiple pending cases in several jurisdictions"; the district judge had already credited Lopez's testimony that DeJesus-Gaul controlled the drug conspiracy, received the proceeds, and engaged in major narcotic transactions in New York.
The government's representations related to subsections (4) and (5) of the safety valve provisions in U.S.S.G. Sec. 5C1.2, and the corresponding statute (18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(f)(4) & (5)). These subsections state that in order to disregard the statutory minimum sentence the court must find that:
(4) the defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of others in the offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines and was not engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in 21 U.S.C. Sec. 848; and
(5) not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant has truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence the defendant has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan, but the fact that the defendant has no relevant or useful other information to provide or that the Government is already aware of the information shall not preclude a determination by the court that the defendant has complied with this requirement.
The sentencing hearing took place on April 6, 1995. Defense counsel continued to maintain that...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
U.S. v. Gaviria
...disclosure by the defendant of all information in his possession concerning the charged offense, see, e.g., United States v. DeJesus-Gaul, 73 F.3d 395, 397 (D.C.Cir.1996), 33 and Zambrano clearly failed to meet this requirement when he perjured himself during the trial and presentencing pro......
- Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps. v. Shinseki
-
U.S. v. Cruz, 96-2270
... ... States v. DeJesus-Gaul, 73 F.3d 395, 397 (D.C.Cir.1996); United States v. Rodriguez, 60 F.3d 193, 195 n. 1 (5th Cir.), ... Romo, 81 F.3d at 85 ... Based on the record before us, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in concluding that Cruz had not met his ... ...
-
U.S. v. Ivester
...or part of the context for the defendant's revelation has been initiated by the government or by the court. See United States v. DeJesus-Gaul, 73 F.3d 395, 396 (D.C.Cir.1996) (testimony at sentencing hearing); United States v. Rodriguez, 69 F.3d 136, 143 (7th Cir.1995) (verbal admission of ......