U.S. v. Deshazar

• Decision Date: 07 July 2006
• Docket Number: No. 05-8053.,05-8053.
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Timothy DESHAZAR, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

451 F.3d 1221

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Timothy DESHAZAR, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 05-8053.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

July 7, 2006.

W. Keith Goody, Attorney at Law, Alpine, Wyoming, for Defendant-Appellant.

David A. Kubichek, Assistant United States Attorney, District of Wyoming (Matthew H. Mead, United States Attorney, District of Wyoming, with him on the brief), Casper, Wyoming, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before HENRY, BALDOCK and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Timothy deShazar appeals the partial denial of his Motion to Continue Trial, or in the Alternative, Renewal of Motion to Dismiss — Jackson v. Indiana (the "Motion"). Although the district court granted Mr. deShazar's request to continue his trial during the pendency of additional competency evaluations, it denied that part of the Motion seeking outright dismissal of the indictment. On appeal, Mr. deShazar asserts the district court erred in refusing to dismiss the indictment because his pretrial confinement during the pendency of competency proceedings has prejudiced his ability to present an adequate defense to the charges against him. Although Mr. deShazar asserts he raises this claim pursuant to Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972), this court concludes his claim is, in reality, a disguised speedy-trial claim. Because this court does not have jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders of the district courts refusing to dismiss indictments on speedy-trial grounds, United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 861, 98 S.Ct. 1547, 56 L.Ed.2d 18 (1978), we dismiss Mr. deShazar's appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

II. BACKGROUND

To place this appeal in context, it is necessary to set out the history of Mr. deShazar's pretrial confinement. On January 5, 2000, Mr. deShazar was charged in Wyoming state court with attempted kidnapping, aggravated assault and battery, and aggravated burglary. A few days later Mr. deShazar was indicted in federal district court on one count of interstate stalking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A, and one count of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). Both the federal and state charges arose out of a stalking incident which culminated when Mr. deShazar broke into the victim's home and attempted to kidnap her.¹

Proceedings on the federal charges were deferred pending a state-court trial on the state charges. Mr. deShazar was found guilty on the state charges in May 2000. Shortly thereafter, while still in state custody awaiting sentencing, Mr. deShazar was diagnosed with delusional and depressive disorders.² The United States moved the federal district court to take Mr. deShazar into federal custody pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum so he could undergo further psychiatric evaluation. Wyoming wished to obtain a second opinion on the question of Mr. deShazar's competence and indicated a federal evaluation would be satisfactory. Mr. deShazar had no objection and specifically waived his right to a speedy trial and his rights under the Interstate Compact on Detainers. Accordingly, the district court ordered Mr. deShazar taken into federal custody and subjected to a psychiatric or psychological examination pursuant to the terms of 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241, 4242, and 4247.

Mr. deShazar was evaluated at the Federal Medical Center in Rochester, Minnesota; Federal Medical Center staff agreed with the conclusion of the Wyoming State Hospital that Mr. deShazar was currently competent to stand trial. Mr. deShazar was returned to Wyoming state custody on November 6, 2001, to await sentencing on his state convictions. After his state sentencing proceedings were complete, Mr. deShazar was again taken into federal custody, on June 25, 2002, to resolve the pending federal charges. Since that time, Mr. deShazar has remained in federal custody pending trial on the federal charges.

There is no question the federal proceedings have been repeatedly delayed. Arraignment was originally scheduled for July 8, 2002, but was continued because defense counsel claimed Mr. deShazar was incompetent to proceed and sought an independent mental evaluation to support that assertion. The independent competency evaluation, along with a notice that Mr. deShazar would pursue an insanity defense at trial, was provided to the district court on September 13, 2002. The independent competency evaluation concluded Mr. deShazar was presently competent to stand trial. The arraignment was rescheduled for October 15, 2002, but was continued due to defense counsel's renewed concerns about Mr. deShazar's competency. The district court then determined it was necessary to conduct a competency hearing.

The district court held a competency hearing on February 24, 2003. Following the hearing, the district court found Mr. deShazar competent to stand trial and reset the arraignment for April 16, 2003. At the arraignment, the district court scheduled a jury trial for June 2, 2003. Shortly thereafter, Mr. deShazar filed a motion to dismiss the federal charges based upon the Double Jeopardy Clause, asserting his state court prosecution was a sham and a cover for a federal prosecution. After further delays at the request of Mr. deShazar, the district court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss on June 24, 2003. The district court subsequently denied the motion to dismiss; Mr. deShazar quickly filed a notice of appeal; and further proceedings in the district court were stayed pending the outcome of the appeal in this court. After the Wyoming Supreme Court overturned Mr. deShazar's state court convictions on direct appeal, Mr. deShazar moved this court to dismiss as moot his appeal from the denial of his Double-Jeopardy-based motion to dismiss the federal charges. This court granted Mr. deShazar's motion and the matter was reactivated in the district court.

On December 22, 2003, the district court held a status conference and set a trial date of February 17, 2004. Shortly thereafter, the district court entered an order setting another competency hearing for February 13, 2004, four days before the jury trial was set to begin. The very next day, Mr. deShazar asked the district court to allow another competency examination and to continue the competency hearing until February 17, 2004, the date the jury trial was set to begin. At the conclusion of the February 17 competency hearing, the court ordered, in accordance with the positions of both parties, that Mr. deShazar be re-evaluated by the Bureau of Prisons as to his competency to stand trial.

The district court set another competency hearing for July 28, 2004. At the request of both Mr. deShazar and the government, the competency hearing was continued until August 25, 2004, though the district court noted it would not authorize any further delays. Despite the district court's admonition, Mr. deShazar again moved to continue the competency hearing and, furthermore, requested the appointment of experts to perform competency evaluations on behalf of the defense. After a hearing on the matter, the district court granted Mr. deShazar's requests. While those evaluations were underway, and before a new date had been set for a competency hearing, the district court set a trial date of January 4, 2005; the district court also set an alternate trial date of April 18, 2005, in case the first date was taken up by a different criminal matter.

Approximately two weeks before the January 4, 2005 trial date, Mr. deShazar filed an omnibus motion asking the district court to continue the trial until April 18, 2005, schedule a competency hearing, and dismiss the charges against him for violation of his rights under Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972). After a hearing on the matter, the district court entered an order denying the request to dismiss the indictment outright, but granting the request to continue the trial during the pendency of further competency proceedings.

The district court interpreted Mr. deShazar's motion to dismiss as raising two distinct claims: (1) a claim under Jackson that he has been held more than a reasonable time necessary to determine whether there was a substantial chance he would attain competency to stand trial in the foreseeable future; and (2) a Sixth Amendment speedy-trial claim challenging his lengthy pretrial confinement. In rejecting Mr. deShazar's Jackson-based ground for dismissal of the indictment, the district court ruled as follows:

The Defendant's right under Jackson to be held no more than a reasonable amount of time necessary to determine whether he is competent to stand trial has not been violated. The Court in Jackson declined to prescribe arbitrary time limits. [406 U.S at 738, 92 S.Ct. 1845] Therefore, whether a pretrial detention is reasonable is left to the judgment of the trial court. In this case, no doctor has stated that the Defendant will never be competent to stand trial. To the contrary, there has always been hope that with proper treatment he would become competent. Take for example, Dr. Kahn's latest letter which opines that there is at least a possibility that the Defendant will become competent after treatment with Geodon. In fact, the Defendant was found to be competent by this Court in March of 2003. Furthermore, much of the delay in this case was caused by the parallel state court proceedings as well as the Defendant's appeal to the Tenth Circuit. Those periods in which the proceedings were delayed for the purpose of determining the Defendant's competence were justified, and were always permitted with the hope that evaluation and treatment would render the defendant competent to stand trial. The Defendant has been held only the amount of time reasonably necessary to determine whether he is competent, and no longer, and the Defendant...