U.S. v. Diaz

• Decision Date: 12 January 2011
• Docket Number: No. 09–15421.,09–15421.
• Citation: 630 F.3d 1314
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee,v.Michael A. DIAZ, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

630 F.3d 1314

22 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1690

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Michael A. DIAZ, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 09–15421.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Jan. 12, 2011.

Timothy R. Saviello (Court–Appointed), Law Offices of Tim Saviello, L.L.C., Stephanie Kearns, Fed. Pub. Def., Fed. Def. Program, Inc., Atlanta, GA, for Diaz.Zahra S. Karinshak, Lawrence R. Sommerfeld, Asst. U.S. Atty., Atlanta, GA, for U.S.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.Before HULL and MARCUS, Circuit Judges, and COOKE,^* District Judge.HULL, Circuit Judge:

Defendant Michael Diaz appeals from the district court's order granting permission for the government to medicate him involuntarily with anti-psychotic medication to render him competent to stand trial for two armed robberies and other firearm offenses. After review and oral argument, we affirm. Diaz has not shown that the district court clearly erred in finding that the government satisfied its burden under Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 123 S.Ct. 2174, 156 L.Ed.2d 197 (2003), and in granting permission to medicate Diaz involuntarily.

I. BACKGROUND

A. First Competency Hearing and Trial

In July 2004, a superseding indictment charged Diaz with: (1) armed bank robbery on January 27, 2004, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d) (“Count 1”); (2) carrying and using a firearm in connection with a crime of violence— i.e., armed bank robbery, as charged in Count 1—in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) and (c)(1)(A)(iii) (“Count 2”); (3) another armed bank robbery on April 8, 2004, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d) (“Count 3”); (4) using a firearm in connection with a crime of violence— i.e., armed bank robbery, as charged in Count 3—in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) and (c)(1)(A)(iii) (“Count 4”); and (5) possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(a)(2) (“Count 5”). At the time of his arrest, Diaz was on supervised release for a prior federal conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm in the Eastern District of Louisiana.

On March 7, 2005, the district court ordered the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) to conduct a psychiatric examination of Diaz to determine his competency to stand trial. From April 4 to May 4, 2005, and again from November 14, 2005 to January 3, 2006, Diaz was evaluated by Dr. Jorge Luis of the Federal Detention Center in Miami, Florida (“FDC Miami”). Dr. Luis conducted extensive interviews with Diaz and administered several psychological tests, including tests to assess malingering psychological problems. Dr. Luis concluded that Diaz was competent to stand trial.

On February 23, 2005, at the request of Diaz's counsel, Diaz was evaluated by Michael Hilton, M.D., a psychiatrist. Dr. Hilton's report indicated that there was limited information regarding Diaz's previous mental health treatment. During his interview, Diaz provided Dr. Hilton with an explanation of his experiences beginning at age 13, whereby “Michael Anthony Diaz was vanquished” and “subsequently took on a new identity of ‘MAD-one.’ ” At age 23, Diaz changed identities again and “JahI” took over “as a result of spiritual growth.” JahI was then vanquished and “Ichaelimaye,” or “Iko,” was “re-earthed.” Diaz later became “Ineyah Imaye,” or “Yah,” and then later “Ieh” was “re-earthed.” Dr. Hilton noted that Diaz's “conversation flow is just about impossible to follow,” determined that Diaz was suffering from “undifferentiated schizophrenia,” and opined that he was not competent to stand trial.

In October 2005, the district court conducted a hearing at which both Dr. Luis and Dr. Hilton testified.¹ The district court found Diaz competent to stand trial. Diaz later moved to dismiss his attorney and proceed pro se. The district court granted Diaz's motion, but ordered that his attorney remain as stand-by counsel during the trial.

In a March 2006 bench trial, Diaz represented himself. The district court found Diaz guilty of all five counts in the superseding indictment, and sentenced him to a term of 584 months' imprisonment. Diaz appealed. In August 2008, this Court concluded that Diaz did not knowingly waive his right to a jury trial, and vacated his convictions as to all five counts. See United States v. Diaz, 540 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir.2008).

B. Second Competency Hearing

At some point Diaz was placed at the United States Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania (“USP Lewisburg”). The staff at USP Lewisburg referred Diaz to a telepsychiatry clinic for a psychiatric consultation to determine whether he suffered from mental illness and would benefit from medication.² On July 24, 2008, Dr. James K. Wolfson, located at the Mental Health Evaluation Unit at the U.S. Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri (“Springfield medical center”), conducted a telepsychiatric evaluation of Diaz. Dr. Wolfson concluded that Diaz was psychotic, substantially impaired, and should take anti-psychotic medication. Diaz refused to take medication voluntarily. Dr. Wolfson opined that Diaz would not meet the criteria for involuntary medication, and, therefore, did not prescribe medication for him.

On December 31, 2008, Diaz was admitted to Springfield medical center. Diaz was initially placed in the open population, but was later placed in a locked unit. From December 31, 2008 to January 31, 2009, Diaz was evaluated by Dr. Christina Pietz, a forensic psychologist at Springfield medical center. Dr. Pietz's forensic report, dated February 3, 2009, stated that Diaz refused to participate in all clinical interviews, refused to complete psychological testing, and refused to answer any questions about his background.

On May 6, 2009, the district court conducted a second competency hearing at which Dr. Pietz testified. In a written order, the court found that Diaz was incompetent to stand trial. The court's order directed that (1) Diaz be committed to the custody of the U.S. Attorney General and (2) the Attorney General hospitalize Diaz for a maximum period of four months to determine whether there was a substantial probability that, in the foreseeable future, he could attain the capacity to stand trial. The court recommended that Diaz be returned to Springfield medical center so that he could have continuity of treatment and surroundings.

C. Diaz's Re–Admission to Springfield Medical Center

On May 21, 2009, Diaz was re-admitted to Springfield medical center. On May 27, 2009, he received advance written notice that a Due Process Involuntary Medication Hearing would be held on June 3, 2009. After a hearing, Dr. Carlos Tomelleri concluded that he could not approve involuntary medication because Diaz was not likely to cause harm to himself or others. Dr. Tomelleri's report stated that: (1) Diaz said that he was not mentally ill and “did not wish to consider treatment with psychotropic medication”; (2) since Diaz's admission to Springfield medical center, Diaz “has refused psychological testing, [and] has refused to attend required orientation proceedings”; and (3) psychotherapy and similar options would be futile. Dr. Tomelleri's report recommended a treatment of psychotropic medication, which would have a “substantial probability” of restoring Diaz to competency to proceed with his legal case. However, given that Diaz did not pose a danger to himself or to others, the BOP could not involuntarily medicate Diaz without a court order.

The district court next scheduled a hearing pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 123 S.Ct. 2174, 156 L.Ed.2d 197 (2003), which addressed involuntary medication for the sole purpose of rendering a defendant competent to stand trial.³ Sell laid out these four standards the government must satisfy for involuntary medication to render a defendant competent to stand trial: (1) important government interests must be at stake, (2) involuntary medication must significantly further the state interests in assuring a fair and timely trial, (3) involuntary medication must be necessary to further the state interests, and (4) administration of the medication must be “ medically appropriate, i.e., in the patient's best medical interest in light of his medical condition.” Id. at 180–81, 123 S.Ct. at 2184–85. Because this appeal turns largely on whether the district court erred in finding the government satisfied two of these factors, we review in great detail the evidence at the Sell hearing.

D. Government's Witnesses at Sell Hearing

On September 8, 2009, the district court conducted the Sell hearing, during which counsel represented Diaz.⁴ Addressing the court, Diaz personally stated that he retained “sovereign immunity” from the judicial proceedings, was not a citizen of the United States and did not adhere to the laws of the United States, and invoked his right against self-incrimination.

The government responded that it had a strong and important interest in bringing Diaz's case to trial because of the violent nature of his crimes—two armed bank robberies and a felon-in-possession charge—and because of its interest in a speedy trial. The government presented evidence on the Sell factors.

1. Dr. Christina Pietz

The government first called Dr. Pietz to testify. Dr. Pietz, a psychologist, is Diaz's primary clinician at Springfield medical center. Dr. Pietz opined that Diaz suffers from paranoid schizophrenia. On May 21, 2009, Diaz was re-admitted to Springfield medical center and, since being re-admitted, Diaz has refused to be interviewed by Dr. Pietz and has refused to take any medication. Diaz has also refused the staff's attempts to administer medication to him and refused to participate in therapy sessions or undergo any other type of treatment.

Because Diaz would not take medicine, Springfield medical center conducted the due process hearing to determine whether they forcibly could...