U.S. v. Diaz
| Decision Date | 22 August 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 06-13782.,06-13782. |
| Citation | 540 F.3d 1316 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael A. DIAZ, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.
Before BIRCH, CARNES and COX Circuit Judges.
Michael A. Diaz ("Diaz") appeals his convictions for armed bank robbery, use of a firearm during a crime of violence, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. On appeal, Diaz argues that his waivers of his rights to counsel and to a jury were not knowing and voluntary. After reviewing the record and the parties' briefs, and with the benefit of oral argument, we conclude that Diaz did not knowingly waive his right to a jury trial.1 Accordingly, we VACATE Diaz's convictions and REMAND.
Armed, Diaz twice robbed the same Atlanta bank on different dates in 2004. He was arrested by officers of the Atlanta Police Department as he fled from the bank after the second robbery.2 By a superseding indictment, Diaz was charged with two separate counts of armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and (d), two counts of using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(a)(2).
Diaz's initial counsel had retained a mental health expert and requested a continuance because he believed that Diaz was suffering from a mental illness. Diaz sent a letter to the district court, in which he complained about his counsel. At a hearing regarding Diaz's letter, Diaz stated that his name was actually D'Ineiehaimaye D'Inemani, not Michael Diaz, and he sought to discharge his counsel. Diaz's counsel explained to the court that, according to Diaz, after the dates of the attempted robberies, a personality named D'Ineiehaimaye D'Inemani had been "re-earthed" into the body formerly occupied by Michael Diaz. Therefore, while Diaz may have committed the crimes when his personality inhabited the body, D'Ineiehaimaye D'Inemani claimed to be innocent of the charges. The district court permitted Diaz's counsel to withdraw and substitute another federal defender, Timothy Saviello ("Saviello") to represent Diaz.
The court held a hearing to determine whether Diaz was competent to stand trial. Dr. Michael Hilton ("Hilton"), a forensic psychiatrist who evaluated Diaz at defense counsel's request, testified that his evaluation included an three-hour interview with Diaz, but he did not administer any written or oral tests. During the interview, Diaz said that he was an individual called "Ieh," and that he had experienced roughly six personality changes since his adolescence. R5 at 10. According to Diaz, each new personality was imbued only the information known by the preceding personality. Hilton testified that Diaz either truly believed that these personality changes had occurred, or that Diaz spent a "tremendous amount of time memorizing these characters in anticipation of" fabricating a mental illness. Id. at 11. Hilton concluded that Diaz was expressing a true belief. Id. at 18. Hilton assessed Diaz's intelligence as generally average and that his IQ was at the low end of the average range. Hilton was asked for his reaction to a report prepared by a government expert which assessed Diaz's IQ at 79. Hilton opined that an individual with such an IQ normally would not be able to convincingly fake a mental illness, though Hilton conceded on cross-examination that it was possible that Diaz fooled him into diagnosing him as schizophrenic. He testified that he believed that there was a good chance that Diaz was mentally ill and showed signs of malingering.
Upon questioning by the district court, Hilton stated that Diaz could recount the events that resulted in the charges against him, and Hilton agreed with the district court that Diaz had "a reasonable degree of rational understanding about what's going on, why he's in the situation he's in." Id. at 52. Saviello then informed the court that Diaz had prepared several letters that he wished to read. Diaz began by reaffirming that his true name was D'Ineiehaimaye D'Inemani. Id. at 56. He then read two letters, which were about an entity called "D.I." Id. at 58-64. In another letter, Diaz claimed that he had not been examined by qualified, impartial doctors, and had not received professional representation. In a final letter, Diaz stated that Hilton's report was fair but the report of the government's expert was forged and contained lies.
The government called Dr. Jorge Luis, a Bureau of Prisons forensic psychologist, who had examined Diaz over a one-month period by order of the court. Luis testified that Diaz refused to acknowledge himself as Michael Diaz and claimed to be "another entity" during their initial meeting. Id. at 78-80. Luis gave, or attempted to give, a number of oral and written tests to Diaz. According to Luis, the results of Diaz's I.Q. tests placed him in the "slightly below average" to "average" range of intelligence, depending on the test. Id. at 95-97. Test results also showed that Diaz was not suffering from neuropsychological damage or disease. An initial test indicated that Diaz may have been malingering, and a follow-up test indicated a 100 percent chance that Diaz was fabricating his symptoms. Id. at 97-104. Luis also tested Diaz's understanding of trial proceedings and his competency to stand trial. The results of that test indicated Diaz was incompetent, but they also indicated that he was feigning incompetence. Id. at 112-13. Luis diagnosed Diaz with malingering and with a personality disorder not otherwise specified, with schizotypal and antisocial features. Luis opined that Diaz's personality disorder did not affect his competency to stand trial or to assist in his defense.
Following this hearing, Saviello submitted a brief arguing that Diaz was not competent to stand trial, and that Hilton's findings and conclusions carried more weight than Luis's because Hilton used a more complex methodology. Through counsel, Diaz moved to substitute his attorney, arguing that his attorney had provided insufficient representation. The district court denied Diaz's motion for new counsel, finding that Diaz had failed to state good cause for a new lawyer, and that he did not have the right to be represented by a particular lawyer. The district court also ruled that Diaz was competent to stand trial, finding that Diaz understood the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him and that Diaz could assist properly in his defense.
In pretrial discussions on the day of Diaz's trial, Diaz stated that he had motions to present. He began with a motion of "identity mix-up." R7 at 4. Diaz again stated that his name was D'Ineiehaimaye D'Inemani and said that he was innocent of the charges against Michael Diaz, who was dead, having "lived out transitional transformation until the next one, until D'Ine's entity transcendents even in incarnation and re-Earth experience." Id. Diaz next moved to dismiss Saviello and to proceed pro se, explaining that he did not want to be "under the wardship of the court." Id. at 6. The district court responded that Diaz was "accused of a very serious crime" and that the court was preparing to have a jury hear the evidence against him, and asked whether Diaz had any legal training. Id. at 7. Diaz did not answer the question. The court again asked whether he had "any legal training whatsoever," and commented that this was a "very serious proceeding with very serious consequences" and that he would be "making a terrible mistake to try to proceed without a lawyer." Id. Diaz responded that his ability to speak on his own behalf was being "neglected" and that his ability to prepare a proper defense team was limited. Id. at 7-8.
The court then asked Diaz directly whether he was requesting to proceed without a lawyer. Diaz returned to a discussion of his motion regarding jurisdiction and did not answer the question. Saviello informed the court that Diaz previously had stated his desire to represent himself and argued that, under Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993), Diaz was competent to waive his right to counsel since he had been found competent to stand trial. R7 at 10-11. The district court then stated that, if it was Diaz's request to proceed pro se, based on the Godinez standard, Diaz could do so, but Saviello would remain as stand-by counsel. Id. at 14.
The district court then told Diaz that it would ask Saviello to help him pick a jury, and Diaz stated that he did Id. at 16-17. The district court asked Diaz if he was saying that he wanted to proceed with a bench trial instead of a jury trial, and Diaz responded that he did "not want no jurors, any jurors infringed upon D'Ineiehaimaye." Id. at 17. The district court asked Diaz to explain what he meant by "infringed upon," and Diaz responded that he meant "forced upon D'Ine" and that it was not his will "to have this mockery of justice." Id. Diaz stated that he understood the court's explanation that, if there was no jury to try the case, then the district court would try it. Id. Again, the district court asked Diaz if he wanted to proceed with a bench trial instead of a jury trial, and, again, Diaz responded that he did not want "any jury infringed upon D'Ine." Id.
After explaining the jury selection process, the role of the jury, and what Diaz's right to a jury trial entailed, the court stated that, Diaz could...
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