U.S. v. Dominguez
| Decision Date | 13 February 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 85-2990,85-2990 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Antonio DOMINGUEZ and Roberto Rodriguez, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Antonio J. Curiel, Rios & Curiel, Chicago, Ill., for defendants-appellants.
Samuel Rosenthal, Dept. of Justice, Appellate Div., Washington, D.C., Gregory A. Vega, Asst. U.S. Atty., Hammond, Ind., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before BAUER, WOOD and CUDAHY, Circuit Judges.
Defendants appeal from an order of the district court detaining them without bail pending trial under provisions of the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3141 et seq. For the reasons detailed below, we vacate the order and remand to the district judge for further proceedings.
Defendants were indicted on cocaine-trafficking charges on July 19, 1985 in the Northern District of Indiana. 1 They were arrested in Florida and appeared before a magistrate in Miami on July 23. The magistrate conducted a hearing under Rule 40(a), Fed.R.Crim.P. Bond was set at one million dollars for each defendant, but was reduced to $500,000 for defendant Rodriguez on July 26.
After removal proceedings in Florida the defendants were transported to Indiana, where they first appeared on August 27. At that time the defendants moved for reduction of bond. The government for the first time moved for pretrial detention under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3142(e). Over defendants' objections, the presiding magistrate held a detention hearing on August 29 and afterward ordered them detained. Defendants filed motions with the assigned district judge for revocation of that order and renewed their motion for reduction of the bond set in Florida.
On October 25 the judge revoked the magistrate's detention order, agreeing with defendants that the government had waived its right to request pretrial detention by failing to do so at their first appearance in Florida. The judge then announced his intention to conduct a de novo hearing on defendant's motion to modify the Florida bond, at which he would consider whether the monetary bond was set too high as well as "whether bail should have been set at all." Memorandum Decision and Order, October 25, 1985, at p. 9. That hearing was held on October 29. In an order issued on November 5 the judge concluded that he had the authority to detain defendants on his own motion upon review of defendants' motion for bail reduction. He reviewed the evidence presented to him at the October 29 hearing as well as that presented at the August 29 hearing before the magistrate, and concluded that defendants had not rebutted the statutory presumption that they were dangerous to the community. He also found that, "if given the benefit of the doubt," defendants had rebutted the presumption that they would flee if released. Based on the former finding, the judge ordered them detained. Defendants appealed to this court under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3145(c), and filed a motion for reversal of the detention order in accordance with the procedure directed in United States v. Daniels, 772 F.2d 382, 383-384 (7th Cir.1985).
Defendants argue that the district judge had no authority to detain them after he concluded, correctly in their view, that the government had waived its right to seek pretrial detention by not requesting it in Florida. We disagree with that initial conclusion and find that the government's request for detention at the first Indiana appearance was timely.
The Bail Reform Act provides a judicial officer with several pretrial custodial options. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3142(a). The most severe of these is detention without bail, as provided under Sec. 3142(e). Before a person may be detained, though, a "detention hearing" must be held in accordance with the procedures prescribed by Sec. 3142(f). That subsection describes the conditions under which detention may be requested and further requires that "[t]he hearing shall be held immediately upon the person's first appearance before the judicial officer unless that person, or the attorney for the government, seeks a continuance." Continuances are limited, absent good cause, to three days at the government's request and five days at the defendant's.
The district judge held in his October 25 order that defendants' "first appearance" for purposes of Sec. 3142(f) took place in Florida, where the initial obligation to set conditions of release attached. Under Rule 40(a), Fed.R.Crim.P., a defendant arrested in a district other than that in which he is charged is entitled to an initial appearance as provided by Rule 5, Fed.R.Crim.P. One of the requirements of Rule 5(c) is that the magistrate "shall detain or conditionally release the defendant as provided by statute or in these rules." The district judge reasoned that the "first appearance" clause of Sec. 3142(f) obliged the government to make its detention request when the duty to set bond first arose under the rules, or to be thereafter barred from seeking it. 2
Although it is semantically tempting to equate the expressions "initial appearance" and "first appearance", we do not believe that such an interpretation is consistent with the policies behind pretrial detention or with the requirements for its employment under the Bail Reform Act. To require the government (or the court, see Sec. 3142(f)(2)) to decide whether to seek detention when a defendant first appears in a non-charging district places the decision in the hands of persons who are not only less concerned about the ultimate proceedings but also, more importantly, much less likely to have the knowledge of the defendant and of the charges against him that is required to make an informed decision on whether detention is appropriate. The result, we are sure, would be many "automatic" requests by prosecutors for continuances in cases where a defendant was charged in another district as specified in Sec. 3142(f)(1). Defendants would be detained during these continuances, which could become extended if the inability to obtain information promptly from the charging district constituted "good cause."
While the legislative history does suggest that the automatic continuances are available to facilitate preparation for a detention hearing, 3 we do not believe that they should be used in wholesale fashion by prosecutors or courts forced to protect their detention positions as to a defendant they may never have heard of before that day. Nor do we believe that a prosecutor or court in a charging district must be foreclosed from pursuing pretrial detention because officials in an arresting district decline to detain a defendant in the absence of full information. In some cases, of course, circumstances may make it appropriate to request detention in the arresting district. Nevertheless we believe that the most informed decisions will almost always be made in the charging district by prosecutors that have supervised the investigations and by courts that will supervise the remaining proceedings. Those officials should always have the option of seeking detention within the statute's limits and according to its procedures.
Our conclusion is further supported by reference to the parameters of the detention hearing required under Sec. 3142(f). While it is not intended that it become a full-blown trial on the charges at issue, the nature of the charged offenses and the weight of the evidence against the defendant are among the factors to be explored. See Sec. 3142(g)(1); S.Rep. 225, supra n. 3, at p. 22 (1984 U.S.C.C. & A.N. at 3205). The best assessment of these factors will most assuredly be available in the charging district.
Although our conclusion is based on pragmatic considerations, we do not believe that we have violated legislative intent in reaching it. The "first appearance" clause is not entirely unambiguous, referring as it does to "the judicial officer" without expressly limiting its meaning to those acting at a particular stage of the proceedings. This clause could be read, as at least one court has read it, 4 to refer to the first appearance before any judicial officer; a person would then have as many "first appearances" as judicial officers his bail determination came before (arguably including judges of this court).
Reading the "first appearance" clause of Sec. 3142(f) to require that pretrial detention be raised outside the charging district or never again would tie the hands of the officials with the greatest interest in detention and the best opportunity to fully litigate the issues that the statute makes critical to detention rulings. We would regard such a requirement as inconsistent both with the purpose behind the availability of pretrial detention under the Act (i.e. that courts have available to them the powers necessary to assure the appearances and behavior of defendants throughout their proceedings) and with the Act's detailed procedures, including the requirement of and specifications for a hearing. These procedures suggest that pretrial detention should be neither sought nor ordered absent careful consideration. It makes no sense to mandate in multi-district situations that these procedures be conducted in the district court with the lesser interest in the defendant and less complete knowledge of his case.
Accordingly we conclude that the government's detention motion, made at defendants' first appearance in the charging district, was timely made under Sec. 3142(f). 5
The district judge never reviewed the magistrate's detention order under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3145(b), although he should have in light of our conclusion set forth in part I of this opinion. It might seem to be a waste of judicial time to remand for that purpose in view of the judge's finding, albeit one made on his own initiative, that defendants were dangerous to the community. Nevertheless the defendants have also challenged the judge's...
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