U.S. v. Dowthard, 06-2817.

• Decision Date: 29 August 2007
• Docket Number: No. 06-2817.,06-2817.
• Citation: 500 F.3d 567
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kenneth R. DOWTHARD, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

500 F.3d 567

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kenneth R. DOWTHARD, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 06-2817.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued April 11, 2007.

Decided August 29, 2007.

Michael Iasparro (argued), Office of the United States Attorney, Rockford, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Matthew M. Wawrzyn (argued), Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before CUDAHY, KANNE, and WOOD, Circuit Judges.

WOOD, Circuit Judge.

On April 7, 2005, Kenneth Dowthard was pulled over by a Rockford, Illinois, police officer. The officer testified that she stopped Dowthard because she had observed him driving without wearing a seatbelt. During the traffic stop, the officer learned that there were two outstanding warrants for Dowthard's arrest. She accordingly placed him under arrest. Subsequent searches of his person led to the discovery of cocaine, a large sum of cash, and a gun. After his indictment, Dowthard moved to suppress this evidence, claiming that the officer lacked probable cause to stop him. The district court credited the officer's testimony and denied Dowthard's motion to suppress. Dowthard entered a conditional plea of guilty to counts of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and being a felon in possession of a firearm, and now appeals the denial of the suppression motion.

I

Officer Amy Kennedy was patrolling the northwest side of Rockford, Illinois, on April 7, 2005. Just after 10:00 pm, her vehicle was stopped facing westbound at a red light at the intersection of Auburn Street and Central Avenue. From that vantage point, she told the district court, she observed Dowthard driving a dark-colored vehicle, and she was able to see that he was not wearing a seatbelt. Dowthard turned from southbound Central Avenue onto westbound Auburn Street, directly in front of her. Dowthard disputes this, claiming instead that he was heading north on Central Avenue, and turned left onto westbound Auburn Street; if that had been the case, Officer Kennedy would have had at best an obstructed view of Dowthard's seatbelt. Either way, Officer Kennedy made the decision to pull over Dowthard after he made the turn.

One block west of that intersection, two other police officers were by the side of the road because they had stopped another vehicle. Officer Kennedy decided to pull over Dowthard's vehicle a short distance away, about two blocks past the other traffic stop. As Dowthard's vehicle came to a stop, the passenger in the front seat ran from the vehicle. Another passenger remained in the back seat. Officer Kennedy approached the vehicle and, according to her report, smelled marijuana coming from the vehicle. She asked Dowthard to turn off the engine, asked about the fleeing passenger, and asked whether Dowthard had been smoking marijuana. Dowthard claimed barely to know the fleeing passenger, but admitted that he had been smoking marijuana. Officer Kennedy retrieved identification documents from both Dowthard and the remaining passenger. She radioed for warrant checks on both of them.

Officer Kennedy learned that Dowthard was wanted on two outstanding arrest warrants, which she confirmed were active. She arrested him, and then two additional police officers who had since arrived on the scene searched him. These officers found some United States currency and a cell phone. At that point, Officer Kennedy took Dowthard to a local police station where she wrote two tickets for him, one for "No insurance" and one for "Not Wearing a Seat Belt." When Dowthard was searched again at the police station, the officers found crack cocaine and a .22 caliber semi-automatic firearm on his person.

Dowthard was indicted for possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, possessing a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), and 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered on his person, claiming that Officer Kennedy lacked probable cause to stop him and that her later discovery of his outstanding arrest warrants did not dissipate the taint of the unlawful stop. The district court held a hearing and then denied the motion to suppress. Dowthard entered a conditional guilty plea to the first and third counts, allowing him to challenge the motion to suppress on appeal. The government dismissed the second charge against him.

II

A

"On appeal of the district court's denial of [a] motion to suppress, we review the district court's legal conclusions de novo and its findings of fact for clear error." United States v. Robeles-Ortega, 348 F.3d 679, 681 (7th Cir.2003). An officer has probable cause for a traffic stop when she has an "objectively reasonable" basis to believe a traffic law has been violated. United States v. McDonald, 453 F.3d 958, 961-62 (7th Cir.2006). "A stop based on a subjective belief that a law has been broken, when no violation actually occurred, is not objectively reasonable." Id. at 962. In McDonald, however, the police officer believed that the driver of the vehicle he stopped had violated a traffic law regarding turn signal usage, but in fact there was no such traffic law. Id. The officer's "good faith belief" may have been subjectively reasonable, but alone it was not objectively reasonable. Id.

Here, in contrast to McDonald, there is no dispute about the fact that driving without wearing a seatbelt violates Illinois law. See 625 ILCS 5/12-603.1. Indeed, Dowthard received a ticket the night of the traffic stop for exactly that infraction, in addition to being arrested on his outstanding warrants. Dowthard argues nonetheless that Officer Kennedy's testimony about her observations of Dowthard prior to the stop is insufficient to establish probable cause, because it represents only the officer's "subjective belief." Dowthard likens this basis for probable cause to a situation where a police officer with her eyes closed decides to make a traffic stop without having observed a thing. This is ridiculous. It is uncontested that Officer Kennedy believed at the time of the stop that driving without wearing a seatbelt violated a traffic law, and she was correct. She also thought, based on her observations, that Dowthard was not wearing his seatbelt. Only in the realm of epistemology might one think that this could be inadequate, but courts perforce rely on normal human observation of the natural world every day.

In order to prove probable cause, the government need show only that it was "reasonable" for Officer Kennedy to conclude that Dowthard was not wearing a seatbelt. Even if her belief was incorrect, "[w]hen an officer makes a stop based on a mistake of fact, we ask only whether the mistake was reasonable" in order to determine if there was probable cause for the stop. McDonald, 453 F.3d at 962 (emphasis in original). Therefore, the only argument available to Dowthard is the factual question whether it was reasonable for Officer Kennedy to believe that she actually observed him driving without wearing a seatbelt. Officer Kennedy...