U.S. v. Faulkner

Decision Date20 April 2011
Docket NumberNo. 10–1271.,10–1271.
Citation636 F.3d 1009
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Appellee,v.James Antoine FAULKNER, also known as Hot Rod, Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Murray W. Bell, Davenport, IA, for appellant.Clifford R. Cronk, AUSA, Davenport, IA, for Appellee.Before MELLOY, HANSEN, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.HANSEN, Circuit Judge.

Following a jury trial, James Antoine Faulkner was convicted of one count of conspiracy to knowingly manufacture, distribute, and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of crack and heroin (count one); one count of knowingly and intentionally distributing a mixture and substance containing heroin (count two); and one count of knowingly and intentionally distributing a mixture and substance containing crack cocaine (count three). The jury also found that the Government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that heroin distributed pursuant to the conspiracy in count one was a contributing factor in the death of a third party and that the death was reasonably foreseeable to Faulkner. The district court 1 sentenced Faulkner to life imprisonment on count one and 360 months' imprisonment on counts two and three, to be served concurrently. Faulkner now appeals the convictions, arguing that the district court erred by: (1) failing to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a traffic stop; (2) admitting certain testimony at trial; (3) failing to give requested jury instructions; and (4) denying Faulkner's motion for acquittal. For the following reasons, we affirm.

I.

In 2007, police began to investigate Frederick Benjamin Boyd for distributing drugs and arranged to conduct controlled purchases from him. On December 7, 2007, a confidential informant (CI) met with Boyd, and they drove to Faulkner's apartment in Iowa City, Iowa. Boyd went into Faulkner's apartment, and when he came out he informed the CI that “Hot Rod” (Faulkner) did not have any crack but did have heroin. The officers told the CI to attempt to purchase heroin from Boyd. Later that night, Boyd and the CI returned to Faulkner's apartment and Faulkner sold Boyd .14 grams of heroin. Boyd was later arrested and agreed to cooperate with the police.

On July 1, 2008, police executed a search warrant at Faulkner's residence at 1516 Aver Avenue in Iowa City. During the search, the police found $3,900 in cash in Faulkner's bedroom. Faulkner was present during the search. Officer Jerry Blomgren read Faulkner his Miranda2 rights, and Faulkner agreed to speak with him without an attorney. Faulkner admitted that he had been supplying Boyd with crack cocaine and identified several of his suppliers.

Later that year, on October 5, 2008, officers were called to 1600 Yewell Street in Iowa City, where they located the body of a dead man, Joseph Van Hoe. Van Hoe's brother Martin told police that Van Hoe had purchased heroin earlier in the day from two black men. Van Hoe's body appeared to have a fresh needle mark in one arm, and the police found two hypodermic needles with liquid on the table in front of the body. The liquid was determined to contain heroin, and a later autopsy revealed that Van Hoe had died from ethanol and heroin intoxication. During the ensuing investigation, the police were able to work their way up the chain of sales to Jennifer Debaun. On October 9, 2008, police observed Charles Watson, the man who supplied heroin to Van Hoe, purchase drugs from Debaun in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. Police arrested Watson, who confessed to delivering drugs to Van Hoe on the day of his death, and who said that he had obtained the heroin from Kurt Harrington. At the time, Harrington and Faulkner were living with Debaun.

On October 13, 2008, working with the police, Watson arranged to purchase heroin from Harrington. Officer Blomgren took Watson to the Coral Ridge Mall in Coralville, Iowa. Watson got out of Officer Blomgren's car, eventually got into another vehicle, and met with a man who looked like Harrington and another man who Officer Blomgren testified “looked like” Faulkner, although he could not testify definitively that the man was Faulkner. Watson got out of the vehicle and returned to Officer Blomgren's vehicle, where he turned over six bags of heroin.

Approximately two weeks later, on October 28, 2008, again working with the police, Watson arranged to meet Harrington to purchase heroin at a McDonald's in Iowa City, although Harrington instead provided crack cocaine. Officer Blomgren drove Watson to the McDonald's, observed Watson get out of his car and meet with Harrington, and received four bags of crack cocaine from Watson after his meeting with Harrington.

On October 31, 2008, at around 10:00 pm, Lieutenant Steven Stange of the University of Iowa Police Department stopped a vehicle that he believed had made an illegal left turn against a red light. Unknown to the officer, the defendant Faulkner was driving the car, which was registered to Debaun, 3 and Debaun and Harrington were passengers. Lieutenant Stange approached Faulkner and asked him for his driver's license. Lieutenant Stange ran Faulkner's name through the computer and discovered that a federal arrest warrant had been issued for Faulkner. When additional officers arrived at the scene, the police arrested Faulkner on the outstanding warrant, searched him, and discovered approximately $2,600 in cash on his person. The three were placed in separate patrol cars. The police officers at the scene searched the car and found nothing. A drug dog was then called to the scene, sniffed the vehicle, and alerted officers to the presence of controlled substances by sitting down and staring at the passenger side car door. Lieutenant Stange searched the area near the glove compartment again and discovered a hiding place behind the glove compartment where he found crack and heroin hidden in a sock.

Faulkner was aware of the discovery of the hidden drugs and was removed from the patrol car. Officer Rarick began to administer Miranda warnings to Faulkner, but Faulkner interrupted her and asked to speak with Harrington to find out if Harrington was willing to accept responsibility for the portion of the drugs that belonged to him. Officer Rarick stopped Faulkner from talking so she could finish administering the Miranda warnings. She completed the Miranda warnings, which Faulkner waived. According to her testimony at the suppression hearing, after the Miranda warning but before she asked any questions, Faulkner said that he wanted to talk to Harrington “to make sure [Harrington] owned up because half the drugs belonged to [Faulkner] and half the drugs belonged to Mr. Harrington.” (Suppression Hr'g Tr. at 57.)

After his arrest and indictment, Faulkner moved to suppress the evidence recovered and the statements he made after he was stopped by police on October 31, 2008. Faulkner claimed that the traffic stop violated his Fourth Amendment rights because the officer did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle and that the fruit of the unjustified stop included the drugs found in the vehicle and his confession regarding those drugs. The district court denied Faulkner's motion to suppress. The court found that the police did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop Faulkner's car because there was no traffic violation, so the stop was improper. However, the district court further found that the arrest of Faulkner on the federal arrest warrant was an intervening circumstance that purged the taint of the unjustified stop and that the evidence was therefore admissible.

Faulkner appeals, arguing that: (1) the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress; (2) the district court erred in allowing Debaun's testimony over his objection; (3) the district court erred in denying his request for jury instructions on a buyer-seller relationship and multiple conspiracies; and (4) the district court erred in overruling his motion for a verdict of acquittal.

II.
A.

First, Faulkner asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized following the October 31 traffic stop. In reviewing a district court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we review the district court's factual findings for clear error and review de novo the court's legal conclusions based on those facts.” United States v. Rodriguez–Hernandez, 353 F.3d 632, 635 (8th Cir.2003). We must affirm an order denying a motion to suppress unless the decision is unsupported by substantial evidence, is based on an erroneous view of the applicable law, or in light of the entire record, we are left with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id.

Faulkner claims that the district court erred in its analysis of the motion to suppress. He asserts that the evidence from the stop was the fruit of the poisonous tree of the unjustified traffic stop and therefore should have been suppressed. Faulkner concedes that after the police had his name and determined that there was an outstanding federal warrant for his arrest, they did not act improperly in arresting him on the federal warrant. ( See Appellant's Br. at 29 (“The Appellant does not claim that the officers could not arrest the Appellant after having determined that a federal drug warrant [existed] for his arrest.”)); see also United States v. Green, 111 F.3d 515, 521 (7th Cir.) (“It would be startling to suggest that because the police illegally stopped an automobile, they cannot arrest an occupant who is found to be wanted on a warrant....”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 973, 118 S.Ct. 427, 139 L.Ed.2d 328 (1997). He argues, however, that any statements he made and the drugs found in the vehicle were inadmissible because they were the fruit of the poisonous tree of the unjustified traffic stop. Faulkner points out that without the unjustified traffic...

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