U.S. v. Fernandez, 97-50036
Decision Date | 22 January 1998 |
Docket Number | No. 97-50036,97-50036 |
Citation | 134 F.3d 379 |
Parties | NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lionil FERNANDEZ, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Before: LAY **, GOODWIN, and REINHARDT, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Lionil Fernandez appeals his conviction, following a jury trial, on three counts of bank robbery, and sentence of 87 months in prison. The relevant facts are set forth fully by the parties and are not in dispute.
We review de novo the issue of whether an investigatory stop constitutes a warrantless arrest or an investigatory stop pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). United States v. Torres-Sanchez, 83 F.3d 1123, 1127 (9th Cir.1996). Whether a stop pursuant to Terry has been transformed into an arrest requiring probable cause depends on the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Alvarez, 899 F.2d 833, 838 (9th Cir.1990). Officers making Terry stops are "authorized to take such steps as [are] reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo during the course of the stop." United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235 (1985). See also Alexander v. County of Los Angeles, 64 F.3d 1315, 1320 (9th Cir.1995) (); Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1186 (9th Cir.1996) ().
Although the police had no specific information that Fernandez and Dominguez were armed, they did know that a bank had just been robbed and that they were pursuing what appeared to be the getaway car with an occupant matching the robber's description. It was reasonable for the officers to believe that the suspects might have weapons on them or in the car in order to facilitate the getaway, making it necessary for them to approach the suspects with their guns drawn for protection. See id. at 1189, citing United States v. Jacobs, 715 F.2d 1343, 1346 (9th Cir.1983) and Alexander v. County of Los Angeles, 64 F.3d at 1317 (). See also United States v. Tilmon, 19 F.3d 1221, 1227 (7th Cir.1994); United States v. Jackson, 652 F.2d 244, 249 (2d Cir.1981). Compare United States v. Del Vizo, 918 F.2d 821, 825 (9th Cir.1990) ( ).
This reasonable belief that the suspects might be armed, along with the fact that there was more than one suspect, also justified the police in handcuffing them. See United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir.1982); Tilmon, 19 F.3d at 1228; Taylor, 716 F.2d at 709. Moreover, the police were justified in keeping the suspects handcuffed while in the patrol car, inasmuch as they were soon to be removed for witness identification. The police were not required to remove the handcuffs only to have to place them on again when the witnesses arrived. Handcuffing during that period "eliminated the possiblility of an assault or escape attempt ..., particularly if an arrest became imminent" upon witness identification. Bautista, 684 F.2d at 1290. See also Allen v. City of Los Angeles, 66 F.3d 1052, 1055 (9th Cir.1995). Thus, the officers used no more force during the investigative stop than was reasonably necessary to protect their own safety and ensure that they could maintain the status quo.
Finally, the fact that Fernandez was kept in the police car from 20 to 45 minutes did not serve to escalate the investigative stop into an arrest. While the duration of a stop alone may serve to make it violative of the Fourth Amendment, United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983), the duration of this stop fell within appropriate bounds. See, United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685, 686 (1985) (20-minute detention); United States v. Mondello, 927 F.2d 1463, 1471 (9th Cir.1991) (30-minute detention); United States v. Richards, 500 F.2d 1025, 1029 (9th Cir.1974) ( ). Thus, in order to determine whether this stop passes muster under the Fourth Amendment, we must also consider "the law enforcement purposes to be served by the stop as well as the time reasonably needed to effectuate those purposes," by "examin[ing] whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the [suspect]." United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685, 686 (1985). See also, United States v. $191,910.00 in U.S. Currency, 16 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir.1994).
Fernandez was detained in the patrol car only as long as was necessary for police at the scene to confirm or dispel their suspicions that Fernandez was the bank robber by communicating the information relating to the suspects and their vehicle and getting the necessary witness identifications. There is no evidence that the police were dilatory in their investigation, or that the police had an alternative, quicker means to accomplish their objectives which they unreasonably failed to use. See Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 687; Mondello, 927 F.2d at 1471 ( ); Richards, 500 F.2d 1025, 1029 (9th Cir.1974) ( ).
Whether exigent circumstances justify a warrantless arrest or seizure is a question of law reviewed de novo. United States v. Gooch, 6 F.3d 673, 679 (9th Cir.1993). Whether probable cause supports a warrantless search of a vehicle is a question of law reviewed de novo. Ornelas v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1663 (1996). We look to the totality of the circumstances known to the officers prior to any search conducted incident to an arrest, and will find that probable cause exists when police officers have reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the accused had committed an offense. United States v. Harvey, 3 F.3d 1294, 1296 (9th Cir.1993).
By the time Fernandez's car was searched and he was placed under arrest, police had abundant probable cause to believe that he was the robber and that his unusual El Camino was the getaway car. The teller's identification of Fernandez was sufficiently trustworthy to cause a prudent person to believe that Fernandez had committed the bank robbery. Where the suspect's race, build and distinctive clothing are known to an eyewitness, "the probabilities of all of these characteristics matching an innocent person at that time and place [are] not so great as to make it imprudent to rely upon ... [the eyewitness'] identification." Id. at 1296.
Inasmuch as the officers had probable cause to search Fernandez's car and arrest him, 1 the evidence seized as a result of this search was admissible at trial to prove that Fernandez robbed the Great Western Bank in Huntington Beach on December 7, 1995.
Before law enforcement agents question a person in Custody, they must advise that person of his constitutional rights. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). However, this applies only to statements which are made in response to interrogation. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980). Where the facts are not in dispute, the question of whether a defendant was subjected to an interrogation is a mixed question of law and fact reviewed de novo. United States v. Mereno-Flores, 33 F.3d 1164, 1168 (9th Cir.1994). Statements which are spontaneous and not in response to questions by agents are admissible as "volunteered statements." United States v. Gordon, 974 F.2d 1110, 1115 (9th Cir.1992) The court reviews de novo the voluntariness of a confession. United States v. Andaverde, 64 F.3d 1305, 1310 (9th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1055 (1996).
While Fernandez was indeed in custody for the purposes of the Miranda requirement, see United States v. Henley, 984 F.2d 1040, 1042 (9th Cir.1993), the circumstances of his being subjected to the field show-up after waiting in the police car were not the functional equivalent of interrogation. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. at 300, (interrogation "reflect[s] a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself"). The statements Fernandez made during the field show-up were spontaneous, and the police did not exert any measure of compulsion on Fernandez above and beyond that inherent in his being detained awaiting witness identification. Thus, this statement was not the product of interrogation, but rather was Admissible as a voluntary statement not subject to the Miranda requirement.
Pursuant to United States v. Henley, 984 F.2d 1040, the government agreed not to use the statements Fernandez made regarding the control and ownership of the El Camino incident to its search. Nevertheless, this "technical" Miranda violation (see Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985)) did not taint Fernandez's...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
United States v. Flowers
...40. Government Opposition at 7. 41. United States v. Gordon, 974 F.2d 1110, 1115 (9th Cir. 1992); See also United States v. Fernandez, 134 F.3d 379 (9th Cir. 1998) (unpublished). 42. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471; US v. IMM, 747 F.3d 754, 769 (9th Cir. 2014). 43. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479. 44. Ca......