U.S. v. Fisher
Decision Date | 16 October 1990 |
Docket Number | No. 89-5724,89-5724 |
Citation | 912 F.2d 728 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Bedford FISHER, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
James Clinton Turk, Jr., Stone, Hamrick, Harrison & Turk, Radford, Va., for defendant-appellant.
Thomas Jack Bondurant, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty., argued (John P. Alderman, U.S. Atty., Roanoke, Va., on brief), for plaintiff-appellee.
Before ERVIN, Chief Judge, and PHILLIPS and MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judges.
James Bedford Fisher was convicted on three felony narcotics and weapons counts following a jury trial. The guilty verdict was rendered by an eleven member jury, the twelfth juror having been excused for cause by the district court after the jury had been empaneled and the trial begun. On appeal, Fisher contends that his oral consent to have his case heard by eleven jurors was an ineffective waiver of his right to a trial by twelve jurors. He also claims that the evidence was insufficient for conviction on the count charging possession with intent to distribute narcotics. We find Fisher's contentions without merit and therefore affirm.
On June 16, 1988, Roanoke, Virginia, police executed a search warrant on a house owned by Neva Muse. Muse rented the basement of the house to Fisher. The police observed Fisher in the basement with a handgun in his possession. Upon searching the basement bedroom area, police seized 1.52 grams of cocaine, which was packaged in four small "baggie corners," 1 found inside a black leather pouch. The leather pouch containing the cocaine was found underneath a pair of Fisher's jeans. In the pockets of the jeans the police found $1655.42 in cash. The police also seized numerous plastic baggies and baggie corners, $150 in cash found near the waterbed in the room, a marijuana cigarette, and another handgun. Officer Cindy Matney testified that 1.52 grams of cocaine was not a very large amount but that packaging in baggie corners was commonly associated with street sales.
Fisher was charged in a three count indictment with using or carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking crime, see 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c)(1) (count one); possession with intent to distribute cocaine, see 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (count 2); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 2 see 18 U.S.C. Secs. 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (count three). A twelve member jury was empaneled; no alternates were retained. After opening statements were made, the government discovered that one of the jurors had not revealed in response to a question posed by the court that a family member (husband) had been convicted of a felony. The court excused the jury and held a session in chambers with the juror, the defendant and his counsel, and the prosecutor present. The session was recorded. The court noted disappointment that the juror had not paid attention, adding that "this is causing a great deal of problems for us, because we have let the other jurors go." Joint Appendix at 53. The juror admitted her misstatement and was excused by the court. The following colloquy then occurred:
MR. BONDURANT [prosecutor]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: All right. I'm glad we caught it at this stage of the game anyway. Anything else we need to get on the record?
MR. TURK [defense attorney]: No, sir.
The court reconvened the jury and explained that one of the jurors had been disqualified for her misstatement during voir dire. The court added that "[b]ut for the agreement of counsel that we could proceed with eleven jurors, we would have had to--everything that we've done today would have gone for nought." Id. at 54. The trial then proceeded without further comment from the court, counsel, or the defendant.
The jury convicted Fisher on all three counts. The court sentenced Fisher to ninety months imprisonment. Fisher timely noted his appeal and raises two principal issues for review. First, he contends that the government failed to present sufficient evidence of any "intent to distribute" on his part, mandating reversal of his conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Fisher's primary argument, however, is that a new trial is warranted because his oral, in-chambers consent was not an effective waiver of his right to a trial by twelve jurors. We address first the fundamental sufficiency of the evidence challenge, and then the waiver issue.
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence used to convict him, "the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in original). Conviction under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(a)(1) for possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance requires proof of specific intent to distribute. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez-Beltran, 867 F.2d 224, 226 (5th Cir.1989) (per curiam). Intent to distribute may be inferred from possession of drug-packaging paraphernalia or a quantity of drugs larger than needed for personal use. See United States v. Castellanos, 731 F.2d 979, 985 (D.C.Cir.1984). Possession of a small quantity of drugs by itself is an insufficient basis from which intent to distribute may be inferred. See United States v. Eng, 753 F.2d 683, 687 (8th Cir.1985).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could infer Fisher's intent to distribute. He possessed cocaine. The cocaine found in his room was packaged for street sale. Baggies and baggie corners are well-known tools of the narcotics distribution trade. The large amount of cash found in Fisher's possession and his ownership of handguns is additional circumstantial evidence of his involvement in narcotics distribution. Finally, the jury heard Fisher admit on cross-examination that he had prior narcotics convictions and might have evaluated as simply not credible his testimony that the cocaine seized was not his.
Our conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to support Fisher's conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine undercuts the related argument that his conviction under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c)(1) must also fall. Fisher argued that he could not be convicted of a "trafficking" crime and so could not be convicted under Sec. 924(c)(1) for using or carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking crime. 3 Possession with intent to distribute is unquestionably a drug trafficking crime, see, e.g., United States v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1105 (7th Cir.1990), and we therefore need not consider Fisher's contention that mere possession should not be considered a trafficking crime for purposes of the firearms statute.
A federal criminal defendant's right to a trial by jury is secured by the Constitution and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See U.S. Const. art. 3, Sec. 2, cl. 3; id. amend. VI; Fed.R.Crim.P. 23; see also United States v. Virginia Erection Corp., 335 F.2d 868, 870 (4th Cir.1964). The Federal Rules also require that a jury shall have twelve members, unless that right is waived.
Juries shall be of 12 but at any time before verdict the parties may stipulate in writing with the approval of the court that the jury shall consist of any number less than 12 or that a valid verdict may be returned by a jury of less than 12 should the court find it necessary to excuse one or more jurors for any just cause after trial commences. Even absent such stipulation, if the court finds it necessary to excuse a juror for just cause after the jury has retired to consider its verdict, in the discretion of the court a valid verdict may be returned by the remaining 11 jurors.
Fed.R.Crim.P. 23(b). The rule's requirement of a written stipulation has been deemed procedural, and courts have found oral stipulations valid where the defendant personally gave knowing and intelligent consent in open court. See, e.g., United States v. Lane, 479 F.2d 1134, 1136-37 (6th Cir.1973) (per curiam); United States v. Ricks, 475 F.2d 1326, 1328 (D.C.Cir.1973) (per curiam); United States v. Guerrero-Peralta, 446 F.2d 876, 877 (9th Cir.1971); see also Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312, 50 S.Ct. 253, 263, 74 L.Ed. 854 (1930) ( ). 4 See generally 8A J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice, p 23.04, at 23-26 (2d ed. 1990) ("[T]he courts of appeals have not imposed a rigid, 'bright-line' rule that the defendant must write or sign such a stipulation as a prerequisite to a valid consent to a reduced jury."). Some courts have gone even further, holding that oral consent of defense counsel, in open court and with the defendant present, is sufficient under Rule 23(b) to waive the right to a twelve member jury. See United States v. Roby, 592 F.2d 406, 408 (8th Cir.1979) (per curiam); Williams v. United States, 332 F.2d 36, 38-39 (7th Cir.1964); Horne v. United States, 264 F.2d 40, 41-43 (5th Cir.1959); see also United States v. Spiegel, 604 F.2d 961, 964-66 (5th Cir.1979) ( ). 5 But see United States v. Reyes, 603 F.2d 69 (9th Cir.1979) ( ).
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