U.S. v. Funds from Prudential Securities

• Decision Date: 28 February 2005
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A.00-3046(RMU).,CIV.A.00-3046(RMU).
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. FUNDS FROM PRUDENTIAL SECURITIES et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

362 F.Supp.2d 75

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. FUNDS FROM PRUDENTIAL SECURITIES et al., Defendants.

No. CIV.A.00-3046(RMU).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

February 28, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Linda Otani McKinney, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Latonya Denise Curtis, Clinton, MD, pro se.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

URBINA, District Judge.

GRANTING THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DECREE FOR FORFEITURE

I. INTRODUCTION

This in rem civil forfeiture¹ matter comes before the court on the United States's ("government" or "plaintiff") motion for summary judgment and decree for forfeiture. On December 21, 2000, the plaintiff filed a verified complaint for forfeiture in rem for Latonya Curtis's ("claimant") funds seized in August 2000. Specifically, the plaintiff seized $41,059.86² in financial account funds and a $50.00 money order to enforce the provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) and 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A). Because the plaintiff establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that claimant's financial account funds and money order are subject to civil forfeiture and the claimant fails to provide even a scintilla of evidence or allege specific facts that would enable a reasonable juror to find in her favor, the court grants the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and decree of forfeiture.

II. BACKGROUND

In or about 1996, a joint task force, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Washington D.C. Metropolitan Police Department, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development initiated an investigation of a drug trafficking organization run principally by Earl Garner, Sr., the claimant's then-boyfriend. Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 13-14 ("Pl.'s Mot."). The investigation allegedly revealed that the claimant assisted Garner, Sr. in various aspects of his drug trafficking. Id. at 3. The claimant and Garner, Sr. lived together in an apartment in North Bethesda, Maryland. Id. A search of the claimant's apartment, in connection with a related criminal case, revealed $529,919.00 in cash stored throughout the apartment.³ Id. at 24; Pl.'s Mot., Ex. VI-509-527. Despite the claimant's relationship with Garner, Sr., and the discovery of cash stored in the claimant's apartment, the claimant was acquitted of the criminal charges brought against her of conspiracy to distribute and possession with the intent to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin and five kilograms or more of cocaine. Id. at 14; Cl.'s Opp'n at 3. The government nonetheless seeks funds it believes are subject to forfeiture as drug proceeds and laundered money pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) and 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A).

From 1998 to August 2000, a time in which the claimant and Garner, Sr. lived together, Pl's. Mot. at 22, the claimant maintained the defendant funds in bank and investment accounts in her name. Id. at 19-22. The defendant funds consist of funds from Prudential Securities Account # 0GS257128-06 valued at approximately $18,019.54 at the time of forfeiture⁴ ("Prudential Fund"), funds from Allfirst Bank Account # 910334325 valued at approximately $13,500.54 at the time of forfeiture ("All First Fund 1"), funds from Strong Fund Accounts # 0631201014490 and # 0521201014454, together valued at approximately $6,453.16 at the time of forfeiture⁵ ("Strong Funds"), funds from Allfirst Bank Account # 536-8671-2 valued at approximately $3,086.62 at the time of forfeiture ("All First Fund 2"), and a $50 Global Express Money Order ("Money Order") (collectively, "defendant funds"). Pl.'s Mot. at 1-2.

The assets in the defendant funds, according to the financial records, consist of numerous cash and money order deposits. Id. All First Funds 1 and 2 consist of numerous large cash deposits of small denominations and occasionally, these deposits would occur multiple times per day. Id. at 19-20. The claimant opened Strong Fund with two Treasurer's checks worth $2,500 each, which the claimant obtained from her friend, Carrie Williams. Id. at 20. The assets in the Prudential Fund consist of five deposits of thirty-six money orders, totaling $19,200, made over the course of six months. Id. at 21. The overall 1998-2000 transactions in the defendant funds consisted of debits totaling $113,071.38 (withdrawals, credit card transactions, and written checks) and credits totaling $112,509.21 (deposits into the defendant funds). Id. at 30.

On December 21, 2000, the plaintiff filed a verified complaint for forfeiture in rem against the defendant funds. After five years of the plaintiff and claimant bitterly contesting the source of these funds, the plaintiff brings the instant motion for summary judgment and decree for forfeiture. The court now turns to that motion.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment

A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party's favor as to all or any part thereof. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(b). Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Diamond v. Atwood, 43 F.3d 1538, 1540 (D.C.Cir.1995). To determine which facts are "material," a court must look to the substantive law on which each claim rests. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A "genuine issue" is one whose resolution could establish an element of a claim or defense and, therefore, affect the outcome of the action. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must draw all justifiable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor and accept the nonmoving party's evidence as true. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A nonmoving party, however, must establish more than "the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" in support of its position. Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must show that the nonmoving party "fail[ed] to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. By pointing to the absence of evidence proffered by the nonmoving party, a moving party may succeed on summary judgment. Id.

In addition, the nonmoving party may not rely solely on allegations or conclusory statements. Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C.Cir.1999); Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 154 (D.C.Cir.1993). Rather, the nonmoving party must present specific facts that would enable a reasonable jury to find in its favor. Greene, 164 F.3d at 675. If the evidence "is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (internal citations omitted).

B. Legal Standard for Civil Forfeiture

Statutory in rem forfeiture is the only action of England's three forfeiture laws that this country adopted.⁶ "English Law provided for statutory forfeitures of offending objects used in violation of the customs and revenue laws — likely a product of the confluence and merger of the deodand tradition and the belief that the right to own property could be denied the wrongdoer." Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682, 94 S.Ct. 2080, 40 L.Ed.2d 452 (1974). The roots of forfeiture date further back to biblical times, for "if an ox gore a man or a woman, and they die, he shall be stoned and his flesh shall not be eaten." Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 681 n. 17, 94 S.Ct. 2080 (quoting Exodus 21:28); see also United States v. All Funds in Account Nos. 747.034/278, 747.009/278, & 747.714/278 Banco Espanol de Credito, Spain, 295 F.3d 23, 25 (D.C.Cir.2002). Thus, forfeiture is an in rem action brought against property, not the owner of the property. All Funds, 295 F.3d at 25.

Congress has set forth several types of property that are subject to civil forfeiture, two of which are proceeds from money laundering and illegal drug transactions. 18 U.S.C. § 981; 21 U.S.C. § 881. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981,

the following property is subject to forfeiture to the United States ... any property, real or personal, involved in a transaction or attempted transaction in violation of 1956 [laundering of monetary instruments] or 1957 [engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity] of this title, or any property traceable to such property.

18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A). Accordingly, the United States may successfully obtain a decree for forfeiture of property if it shows that the property was involved in a money laundering transaction or attempted transaction in violation of 18 U.S.C § 1956. 18 U.S.C § 981(a)(1)(A). As provided in § 1956, one of the several ways to commit money laundering is by:

knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conduct[ing] or attempt[ing] to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity ... knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity[.]

18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). The court may embark on two possible approaches for determining if property is involved in money laundering and thus subject to forfeiture. United States v. Real Prop. Identified as Parcel 03179-005R, 311 F.Supp.2d 126, 129 (D.D.C.2004). The...