U.S. v. $138,186.28

• Decision Date: 23 October 2007
• Docket Number: No. C07-3030-MWB.,C07-3030-MWB.
• Citation: 520 F.Supp.2d 1072
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-EIGHT THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-SIX DOLLARS AND TWENTY-EIGHT CENTS, ($138,186.28), Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

520 F.Supp.2d 1072

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-EIGHT THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-SIX DOLLARS AND TWENTY-EIGHT CENTS, ($138,186.28), Defendant.

No. C07-3030-MWB.

United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Central Division.

October 23, 2007.

Martin J. McLaughlin, U.S. Attorney's Office, Cedar Rapids, IA; for Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MARK W. BENNETT, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

This civil forfeiture action is a companion case to a criminal proceeding, case No. 07-3001-MWB. In the criminal case, Gary Draper, a resident of Randall, Iowa, was charged by information with one count of willfully evading federal income tax under 26 U.S.C. § 7201. Draper subsequently pled guilty to the charge under a written plea agreement. The written plea agreement stated Draper "agrees to a civil settlement in lieu of forfeiture pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1613(c) in the amount of $168,186.28."¹ The plea agreement also stated several stipulated facts, which included the following:

During the calendar years 1999, 2000 and 2001, [Draper] knowingly accepted, stored and sold livestock he knew to have been stolen from Iowa farms by another individual. [Draper] then divided the proceeds from these sales with the individual who had stolen the livestock. [Draper] received approximately $212,174.56 from this criminal venture. In each of the calendar years 1999, 2000 and 2001, [Draper] willfully attempted to evade and defeat the payment of the income tax due and owing by him to the United States of America in a total amount of $54,933, by concealing and attempting to conceal his illegal income from his criminal enterprise.

This court accepted Draper's guilty plea and he was subsequently sentenced to serve 12 months and one day in prison, pay a fine of $3,000, and pay $54,933 in restitution to the Internal Revenue Service.

In this civil proceeding, plaintiff United States of America (the Government) filed a complaint in rem "to enforce the provision of 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) for the forfeiture of property which represents or is traceable to the gross receipts obtained directly or indirectly of a specified unlawful activity (interstate transportation of stolen property), in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2314." Docket No. 1, Complaint, p. 1. On the same day the complaint was filed, April 26, 2007, the clerk of court issued a "warrant for arrest in rem" of the defendant property. The warrant directed the United States Department of the Treasury to seize the defendant property in order to protect and maintain it until further order of this court. The defendant property was seized on June 28, 2007. The Government now moves for summary judgment, alleging no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

II. STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Motions for summary judgment essentially "define disputed facts and issues and ... dispose of unmeritorious claims [or defenses]." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly ___ U.S. ___, ___, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1982, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ("One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. ..."). Any party may move for summary judgment regarding "all or any part" of the claims asserted in a case. Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a), (b) (allowing a claimant to move for summary judgment "at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party," and allowing a defending party to move for summary judgment "at any time"). Summary judgment is only appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Id. 56(c) (emphasis added); see Woods v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 409 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir.2005) ("Summary judgment is appropriate if viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.").

A fact is material when it "`might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.'" Johnson v. Crooks, 326 F.3d 995, 1005 (8th Cir.2003) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). Thus, "the substantive law will identify which facts are material." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Facts that are "critical" under the substantive law are material, while facts that are "irrelevant or unnecessary" are not. Id. An issue of material fact is genuine if it has a real basis in the record, Hartnagel v. Norman, 953 F.2d 394, 395 (8th Cir.1992) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus, Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)), or when "`a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party' on the question," Woods, 409 F.3d at 990 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505); see Diesel Machinery, Inc. v. B.R. Lee Indus., Inc., 418 F.3d 820, 832 (8th Cir.2005) (stating, genuineness depends on "whether a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party based on the evidence"). Evidence presented by the nonmoving party that only provides "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586; 106 S.Ct. 1348, such as a "scintilla of evidence," Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505; In re Temporomandibular Joint (TMJ) Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 113 F.3d 1484, 1492 (8th Cir.1997), or evidence that is "merely colorable" or "not significantly probative," Anderson at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, does not make an issue of material fact genuine.

Thus, a genuine issue of material fact is not the "mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties." State Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 358 F.3d 982, 985 (8th Cir.2004). "`Instead, "the dispute must be outcome determinative under prevailing law."'" Mosley v. City of Northwoods, 415 F.3d 908, 910-11 (8th Cir.2005) (quoting Get Away Club, Inc. v. Coleman, 969 F.2d 664, 666 (8th Cir.1992), in turn quoting Holloway v. Pigman, 884 F.2d 365, 366 (8th Cir.1989)). In other words, a genuine issue of material fact requires "sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute" so as to "require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Essentially, a genuine issue of material fact determination, and thus the availability of summary judgment, is a determination of "whether a proper jury question [is] presented." Id. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A proper jury question is present if "there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Id.

Procedurally, the moving party does not have to "support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim," Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, but the moving party does bear "the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record which show a lack of a genuine issue." Hartnagel, 953 F.2d at 395 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548). Thus, a movant need only demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment according to law. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ("[T]he motion may, and should, be granted so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for the entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied."). Once the moving party has successfully carried its burden under Rule 56(c), the nonmoving party has an affirmative burden to go beyond the pleadings and by depositions, affidavits, or otherwise, designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Mosley, 415 F.3d at 910 ("The nonmoving party may not `rest on mere allegations or denials, but must demonstrate on the record the existence of specific facts which create a genuine issue for trial.'" (quoting Krenik v. County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir.1995))). Thus, the movant must show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as it relates to the substantive law, and the nonmovant must show the alleged issue of fact is genuine and material as it relates to the substantive law. If a party fails to make a sufficient showing of an essential element of a claim or defense with respect to which that party has the burden of proof, then the opposing party is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct 2548; In re Temporomandibular Joint, 113 F.3d at 1492.

In considering whether a genuine issue of material fact is present the court must view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587-88, 106 S.Ct. 1348; Mosley, 415 F.3d at 910. Further, the court must give such party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the facts. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587-88, 106 S.Ct. 1348. However, "because we view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, we do not weigh the evidence or attempt to determine the credibility of the witnesses." Kammueller v. Loomis, Fargo & Co., 383 F.3d 779, 784 (8th Cir.2004). Rather than "attempt[ing] to determine the truth of the matter ... the court's function is to determine whether a dispute about a material fact is genuine." Quick v. Donaldson Co., Inc., 90 F.3d 1372, 1376-77 (8th Cir.1996).

Of course, the facts are not the sole concern...