U.S. v. Garcia

• Decision Date: 08 July 1980
• Docket Number: Nos. 79-1470,1471 and 1472,s. 79-1470
• Citation: 625 F.2d 162
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eugene Pete GARCIA, Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joe Anthony CONTRERAS and David Lucero, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 162

625 F.2d 162

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eugene Pete GARCIA, Defendant-Appellant.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joe Anthony CONTRERAS and David Lucero, Defendants-Appellants.

Nos. 79-1470, 1471 and 1472.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Argued Jan. 14, 1980.

Decided July 8, 1980.

David E. Booth, Federal Public Defender, East St. Louis, Ill., Russell W. Hartigan, Chicago, Ill., for defendant-appellant.

Theodore J. MacDonald, Asst. U. S. Atty., East St. Louis, Ill., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before CASTLE, Senior Circuit Judge, PELL and SPRECHER, Circuit Judges.

PELL, Circuit Judge.

Appellants Eugene Pete Garcia, Joe Anthony Contreras, and David Lucero, inmates at the federal penitentiary at Marion, Illinois were convicted by a jury of second degree murder and the illegal conveyance of a weapon within the prison, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111, and 1792, respectively. The convictions arose out of the violent killing of Michael Martinez, another inmate at Marion, who was stabbed to death in the prison by appellants on November 6, 1978.

The essential facts are not in significant dispute. Appellants introduced testimony of Marion inmates that Martinez had threatened Garcia's life prior to the fight between the two that led to Martinez's untimely death. The inmates also testified that Martinez had started the fight by attacking Garcia with a knife. Garcia, apparently, successfully repelled the attack with the aid of Contreras and Lucero. This stage of the fight occurred behind a partially closed door, thus out of the sight of the guards who were the prosecution's main witnesses. The struggle, however, soon moved into a corridor where guards testified to seeing all three appellants chasing Martinez down the hall, catching him, and stabbing him to death while ignoring the guards' orders to stop.

At trial, appellants did not contest that they were responsible for Martinez's death; rather, they relied solely on a theory of self-defense. Garcia claimed he killed Martinez while defending himself from the original attack by Martinez, and Contreras and Lucero maintained they were merely aiding Garcia's defense. On this appeal, appellants raise a variety of complaints regarding the trial which we shall consolidate and address in turn below.

I.

Prior to the trial, appellants obtained a court order requiring the disclosure of the Bureau of Prisons file on Martinez. At first, the Government refused to comply with the court order because it claimed the file contained nondiscoverable information, i.e., the name of an informant. After reviewing the file in camera, the court agreed with the Government and ordered disclosure of the complete file except for the name of an inmate who had claimed his life had been threatened by Martinez. The trial court based its decision on Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(d)(1). ¹ The information regarding the threat itself was left intact and only the name of the informant was removed. Appellants claim, based upon Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), that they were denied a fair trial by being denied the name of this potential witness who might have been able to testify to Martinez's reputation for violence. The prosecution contended, and the trial court specifically ruled, on the other hand, that the threat to the informant's safety by the release of his name to other inmates outweighed the prejudice to the defense from withholding the information.

We agree with the analysis and conclusion of the trial court. The decision of whether to release the name of an informant depends upon a careful balance of competing interests. We must weigh the need of the accused for the witness against the public interest in protecting the flow of information to the Government, Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 62, 77 S.Ct. 623, 628, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957), and against the interest of the witness in avoiding harassment, United States v. Hernandez-Berceda, 572 F.2d 680, 683 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 949, 98 S.Ct. 2856, 56 L.Ed.2d 792; United States v. Fink, 502 F.2d 1, 7 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 911, 95 S.Ct. 1562, 43 L.Ed.2d 775, and see Jimenez v. United States, 397 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1968). In the present case, the threat to the well being of a named inmate-informant and the public interest in protecting the flow of this type of information to prison authorities is obvious while the competing need of the appellants for the informant's name is relatively slight. The informant had no direct connection with the substance of this prosecution and even without the services of this prospective witness, the appellants presented substantial testimony of Martinez's reputation for violent behavior. Moreover, certain inmates testified that Martinez had specifically threatened Garcia's life and that Martinez had initiated the original altercation that eventually led to his death. The additional testimony of yet another witness could have provided no significant assistance on this issue, especially when the threat to the unnamed inmate, the central point of the relevant evidence, was disclosed. In light of the fact that the appellants have demonstrated no showing of what specific assistance the additional witness might have offered, we hold that the trial judge correctly exercised his discretion under Rule 16.

II.

Appellants complain that during the trial, the judge left his role as impartial arbiter of legal issues and became a partisan assistant to the prosecution. Appellants cite examples where they claim the judge "led" the prosecution to and through arguments and conclusions, ² point to the fact that the trial judge allowed Bureau of Prisons personnel to attend the in camera inspection of the Martinez file but denied admission to defense attorneys, and note that when allowing admission into evidence certain photographs of Martinez's body objected to by the defense, the judge stated that the photographs were relevant to the issue of "malice," a ground allegedly not advanced by the prosecution.

We believe the record as a whole demonstrates the trial judge's impartiality and neutrality in conducting the trial. The claimed instances of the judge's "leading" the prosecution through various arguments supporting its "position" are no more than examples of the method many trial judges follow in explaining their rulings to the parties. In the specific examples appellants cite, the judge was, in fact, explaining to the prosecution out of the presence of the jury why he was then inclined to rule against the Government's position. We refuse to find fault in the judge's offering this clarification, or in the manner he chose to explain it.

A similar holding is appropriate to appellants' other objections. The fact that Bureau of Prisons personnel were allowed into the in camera inspection while defense attorneys were excluded would seem simply an exercise of common sense. The employees were present to explain to the judge exactly what they thought should be excluded and why exclusion was required. The admission of defense attorneys would not have offered significant assistance to the trial judge as their position was explained adequately in the courtroom. The prosecution attorneys were also excluded from the inspection and a transcript of the proceeding reveals no instance of impropriety. Although the alternative of admitting the attorneys and requesting them not to reveal excised information was available, we do not regard it as necessary under the circumstances of this case.

As to the judge's stating sua sponte that "malice" was a justification for the admission of the photographs, we note that the judge was ruling at the time on a defense motion to exclude the evidence on the grounds that the potential prejudice to the defendants greatly outweighed the probative value of the photographs. The trial judge was under a duty to strike this balance, and his additional step of explaining his reasoning will not be condemned. We know of no authority for the proposition that a trial judge is limited, when ruling on various trial motions, to justifications offered by the parties. While a trial may have aspects of a fencing match between the adversaries, ultimately its purpose is to establish the truth, and the district judge handled this trial accordingly, and properly.

Nor do we believe the jury was prejudiced by the judge's stating that "malice" was an adequate ground for admission. The prosecution was seeking a conviction for first degree murder, a charge which explicitly and implicitly incorporated a charge of malicious conduct, and the jury was so instructed. Absent a specific showing of prejudice, we find that the judge's remark, if error at all, was harmless.

III.

Appellant Garcia objects to an instruction given to the jury on the issue of provocation which he contends improperly created the impression that he might have provoked the attack by Martinez. The trial judge instructed the jury:

A person who initially provokes the use of force against himself or another is justified in the use of force in defense only if the force used against him or another is so great that he reasonably believes that he is in danger of death or great bodily harm, and he has exhausted every reasonable means to escape the danger, other than the use of force which is likely to cause death or great bodily harm to the other person.

Garcia protests that there was no evidence presented at trial suggesting he provoked the dispute with Martinez, and therefore, that the issue should not have been submitted to the jury.

We believe the trial judge correctly ruled that the issue of provocation was a question of fact for the jury to consider. The Government presented eyewitness testimony that the appellants chased Martinez down a cellblock corridor before catching him, holding him, and stabbing him to...