U.S. v. Garcia
Decision Date | 10 February 1994 |
Docket Number | 92-4399,Nos. 90-5490,s. 90-5490 |
Citation | 13 F.3d 1464 |
Parties | 40 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 274 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Angel Amado GARCIA, Frank Chaves, Defendants-Appellants. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Frank CHAVES, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
J.C. Codias, Miami, FL, for Angel Amado Garcia.
Charles G. White, Miami, FL, for Frank Chaves.
William Xanttopoulos, Linda Collins Hertz, Lynne W. Lamprecht, Asst. U.S. Attys., Miami, FL, for U.S., in No. 90-5490.
James McAdams, III, U.S. Atty., Lynne W. Lamprecht, Asst. U.S. Atty., Miami, FL, for U.S., in No. 92-4399.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.
Before CARNES, Circuit Judge, FAY * and JOHNSON, Senior Circuit Judges.
Defendants-appellants Frank Chaves ("Chaves") and Angel Amado Garcia ("Garcia") appeal their convictions on charges arising from thefts in Florida of goods in interstate commerce. Chaves also appeals his sentence. 1 For the reasons that follow, we affirm appellants' convictions and Chaves' sentence.
On April 27, 1989, Luis Guevara, Eduardo Paula, and Orlando Brito stole a truck containing frozen seafood and drove to an abandoned warehouse. There, Guevara stated that he would ask Chaves, who owned a seafood company called J & F Seafood, to dispose of the seafood using one of Chaves' trucks. Upon Guevara's request, Chaves left the truck's key under the front seat.
On April 28, 1989, Guevara, Paula, Brito and Diego Diaz, Jr., picked up Chaves' truck at J & F Seafood and used the truck to transport part of the stolen seafood from the warehouse to Chaves' business. Chaves assisted them in unloading the truck's contents. Later that day, Chaves went to David Arthur Schlinder, a middleman in the sale of seafood, and offered him "a good deal on lobster tails," providing a sample case. Schlinder displayed the lobster tails to Henry Torres, a large distributor of seafood in the area. Torres told Schlinder that the lobster tails were stolen and belonged to him. Torres took the sample case and reclaimed the remainder of his seafood from Chaves. Later that day, Guevara and Diaz, Jr., returned to Chaves for payment, but Chaves refused to pay because he had returned the seafood to its rightful owner, Torres. When Guevara and Diaz, Jr., demanded Torres return the seafood, Torres threatened to call the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI").
The next day, Chaves purchased the remainder of the frozen seafood from Diaz, Jr., and Guevara. Chaves also gave Guevara two bottles of champagne in recognition of Guevara's lost profits from Torres' reclamation of his seafood. Later, Chaves brought Schlinder into a large walk-in freezer at J & F Seafood and told him that the FBI had approached Chaves and that Schlinder should not speak with them if contacted.
In June 1989, another theft of a truck containing frozen seafood occurred. 2 On June 22, 1989, Garcia identified to Paula and Brito the location of some tractor trailers. Four members of the group thereafter stole a tractor trailer loaded with frozen seafood and drove to a nearby warehouse where they set off the trailer's alarm. Garcia, who had since arrived, assisted them in quieting the alarm. After Garcia and two others left, Chaves was informed that the group had obtained frozen seafood and once again needed his truck.
Garcia and others used Chaves' truck to deliver part of the seafood to J & F Seafood. On June 24, 1989, Garcia, Paula, and Brito were paid their share of the proceeds of the delivered seafood, and Garcia and Paula were instructed to return to the warehouse to repair the refrigeration unit on the stolen tractor trailer. That evening, Garcia and Paula entered the warehouse and, when they exited, Garcia was carrying bolt cutters. 3 On June 25, 1989, Chaves refused to allow his truck to transport the stolen seafood. On June 26, 1989, Guevara, Paula, and Brito, who had since purchased another truck to transport the seafood, were arrested at the warehouse. 4
On August 4, 1989, a federal grand jury indicted Garcia and six others, including Brito but not Chaves, on charges arising out of the June theft. On October 6, 1989, the grand jury issued a superseding indictment replacing Chaves for Brito on charges arising out of the June theft and out of the earlier April theft. 5 Count I charged Chaves among others, with conspiracy to steal the April shipment in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 371 (West 1966). Count II charged Chaves, among others, with possession of the stolen April shipment in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 659 (West 1976) and 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2 (West 1969). Count III charged Chaves and Garcia, among others, with conspiracy to steal the June shipment in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 371. Count IV charged three non-appellants with theft of the June shipment in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. Secs. 2 & 659. Count V charged Chaves, Garcia, and others with possession of the stolen June shipment in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. Secs. 2 & 659.
A jury found Chaves guilty of counts I and II, related to the April theft, and not guilty of counts III and IV, related to the June theft. The jury found Garcia guilty of counts III and V, related to the June theft. 6 On May 10, 1990, the district court sentenced Chaves to a twenty-four month term of imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release, as well as restitutory payment of $18,000. The court sentenced Garcia to an eighteen month term of imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. Chaves and Garcia appealed. 7 Chaves is on bond pending appeal. Garcia is serving his term of supervised release.
Chaves raises the following claims: (1) the district court improperly limited the cross-examination of Brito, who testified as a government witness; (2) the court erred by amending the jury instructions; (3) the court erroneously added two points to Chaves' guidelines score for having engaged in relevant conduct that involved more than minimal planning and two additional points for obstruction of justice; and (4) the court abused its discretion by denying Chaves' motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Garcia raises the following claims on appeal: (1) the court improperly admitted evidence prejudicial to Garcia; (2) insufficient evidence was adduced at trial to support Garcia's conviction for knowing possession of stolen property; and (3) the prosecutor's closing argument violated Garcia's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
The district court has discretionary authority to rule on the admissibility of evidence, including the power to limit cross-examination. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679-80, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435-36, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); United States v. Lankford, 955 F.2d 1545, 1548 (11th Cir.1992). The district court's discretion is limited, however, by the requirements of the Sixth Amendment. 8 Id. A central function of the Sixth Amendment right to cross-examination is to expose the witness' motivation in testifying. Jenkins v. Wainwright, 763 F.2d 1390, 1392 (11th Cir.1985) (), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1164, 106 S.Ct. 2290, 90 L.Ed.2d 730 (1986). Full cross-examination by defense counsel is especially critical when the witness sought to be questioned is the chief government witness. Lankford, 955 F.2d at 1548. The right to cross-examine, however, is not unlimited. Once there is sufficient cross-examination to satisfy the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, further questioning is within the district court's discretion. United States v. Kopituk, 690 F.2d 1289, 1337 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 928, 103 S.Ct. 2089, 77 L.Ed.2d 300 and cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1209, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1391 (1983).
In this case, the district court limited Chaves' cross-examination of the chief government witness against him, Orlando Brito. Chaves sought to elicit from Brito, as evidence of a possible motive for Brito's cooperation with the prosecution, the Florida state attorney's nolle prosequi of a 1983 state false imprisonment charge against Brito. 9 The district court also forbade cross-examination concerning alleged wife-beating by Brito and the fact that Brito had formerly been shot. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by so limiting the cross-examination of Brito.
As previously noted, "[t]he Sixth Amendment does not require unlimited inquiry into the potential bias of a witness." United States v. De Parias, 805 F.2d 1447, 1452 (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 916, 107 S.Ct. 3189, 96 L.Ed.2d 678 (1987). The test for the Confrontation Clause is whether a reasonable jury would have received a significantly different impression of the witness' credibility had counsel pursued the proposed line of cross-examination. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680, 106 S.Ct. at 1436; United States v. Leavitt, 878 F.2d 1329, 1339 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 968, 110 S.Ct. 415, 107 L.Ed.2d 380 (1989). Here, all seven defense counsel, including Chaves' attorney, had the opportunity to raise doubts about Brito's credibility, and their examinations brought out that Brito had provided testimony favorable to the government in exchange for lenient treatment. In particular, counsel for Chaves cross-examined Brito as to the terms of his federal plea agreement and entered the agreement into evidence. Furthermore, when asked by a defense attorney to list all the state charges for which he was receiving leniency, Brito excluded the false imprisonment charge. 10 Therefore, a reasonable juror would not have received...
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