U.S. v. Garcia

• Decision Date: 21 June 1999
• Docket Number: 97-40855,Nos. 97-40854,s. 97-40854
• Citation: 179 F.3d 265
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Juan Felipe GARCIA, Defendant-Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael Angel Garcia, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 265

179 F.3d 265

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Juan Felipe GARCIA, Defendant-Appellant.

United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael Angel Garcia, Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 97-40854, 97-40855.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

June 21, 1999.

Kathlyn Giannaula Snyder, David Robert Steinman, Paula Camille Offenhauser, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Roland E. Dahlin, II, Federal Public Defender, H. Michael Sokolow, Juan Ramon Flores, Houston, TX, for Juan Felipe Garcia.

Sigifredo Perez, III, Kazen, Muerer & Perez, Laredo, TX, for Michael Angel Garcia.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before JOLLY, BARKSDALE and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:

Michael Garcia and Juan Garcia pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess, and actual possession with the intent to distribute, over 100 kilograms of marijuana in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 and 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B) and 846. They entered their guilty pleas after an adverse hearing on a motion to suppress evidence, including their confessions. The defendants conditioned their guilty pleas, however, preserving their right to appeal the denial of their motion. Thus, the only issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in refusing to suppress the evidence. We conclude that officials did not violate the defendants' Fourth Amendment rights, that the district court did not err in denying their motion to suppress, and that their convictions must be affirmed.

I

The parties do not dispute the relevant facts. The defendants first encountered Border Patrol agents when they emerged from the end of a dirt trail in Hebronville, Texas, at 11:15 P.M. This occasion was not, however, the first time that the agents knew of the defendants' presence on the trail. The defendants had set off sensors, located at several points along the trail, earlier in the evening.

The Border Patrol had placed sensors on this trail because the agents knew the trail frequently was used by drug smugglers. According to testimony given by a Border Patrol agent, the trail provided a convenient route for drug smugglers because it allowed them to circumvent the Border Patrol's nearby roadside checkpoint. On multiple occasions in the months preceding the defendants' arrests, Border Patrol agents learned of drug smuggling instances along the trail. Sometimes the agents caught the smugglers. Other times, the agents simply discovered drugs stashed in the brush around the trail. In the course of these events, the agents learned that the smugglers would typically use heavy backpacks to transport the drugs. The Border Patrol agents attempted to enhance their effectiveness in patrolling the area by placing sensors along the known drug route.

When these sensors alerted to activity on the evening the defendants were arrested, Border Patrol agents went to the location of the sensors. There they discovered several footprints, left in the dirt, bearing distinctive markings from the soles of what the agents later learned were the defendants' shoes. The agents also noted that these footprints were deep, indicating that the persons creating them either carried something heavy or that those persons were themselves heavier than average. The agents attempted to follow the footprints, hoping to catch up with the persons who had made them.

Although the agents traveling by foot on the trail never caught up to the defendants, another agent (who had been informed of the sensor alert) waited in his patrol vehicle at the end of the trail. When the defendants emerged from the trail, they began walking down a street adjacent to the trail's exit. After allowing the defendants to walk for less than one block, the agent in the patrol car began to approach the defendants. The defendants then saw the patrol vehicle and immediately ducked into the porch of a house along the road. The agent (Agent Charles) left his vehicle and found the defendants hiding in the shadows of the porch.

After Agent Charles--still some distance from the defendants--began to ask them questions, the defendants approached him. During the ensuing conversation, the defendants were evasive and appeared nervous. Agent Charles first asked the defendants what they were doing. Juan Garcia answered by saying that they were visiting a cousin who lived in the house. Shortly after Agent Charles made contact with the defendants, Agent Chavez arrived on the scene. After he arrived, Agent Chavez also asked the defendants what they were doing. Juan told this agent that they were out hunting. The defendants, however, had no hunting gear and it was not hunting season. The agents also asked the Garcias where they had come from. Juan replied that they had come from his house and he pointed in the relevant direction. Agent Charles, however, had seen the defendants come from a different direction. The agents also asked the defendants to show them the bottoms of their shoes. The soles of their shoes were identical to the markings made on the trail near the sensors. Finally, the agents asked Juan if they could look at his shoulders. Juan agreed and the agents saw fresh bruising on his shoulders in the pattern of strap marks that a heavy backpack would leave. After hearing the defendants' answers and seeing the bruises, Agent Chavez concluded that the defendants had probably been smuggling narcotics along the trail.

Agent Chavez then took the defendants to the nearby checkpoint station. Agent Perez was the only agent manning this station and he conducted traffic through the checkpoint as part of his duties that night. Agent Chavez told Agent Perez that he would be leaving the defendants at the checkpoint while he, Agent Chavez, left to help several other officers search the trail for the drugs. The two agents then read the defendants their Miranda rights and placed them into separate holding cells. Agent Chavez left. Within a few minutes, and after Agent Perez had asked the defendants if they knew anything about the drugs, Michael confessed and said that he would help the agents locate the drugs. Soon after, Juan also agreed to help the agents locate the drugs. The agents and the defendants eventually found that drugs sometime between 1:00 A.M. and 1:30 A.M.

II

At the suppression hearing, the defendants argued that the Border Patrol agents did not have probable cause to arrest at any time before the defendants gave their confessions. Furthermore, they argued that their Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the agents placed them in the holding cells because that confinement did not constitute a reasonable detention under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and its progeny. The defendants contended that their confessions and agreements to aid in locating the drugs were the direct result of the unconstitutional seizure of their persons. Therefore, they argued, the evidence of their confessions and the drugs should be suppressed.

The district court disagreed. The court concluded that it was reasonable to place the defendants in the holding cells as part of an investigatory detention, not rising to an arrest. Although the court noted that the case presented a close call, it concluded that a temporary detention was warranted in this case because of the entirely warranted reasonable suspicion that the defendants had smuggled narcotics, and because the agents needed time to sweep the area for drugs. Therefore, the court concluded that the defendants were not, de facto, under arrest without probable cause at the time they gave their confessions.

III

We conclude that the district court did not err in denying the defendants' motion to suppress the evidence. In our view, however, the denial was correct because the agents had probable cause to arrest the defendants at the time they transported them to the checkpoint. Thus, even if the decision to place the defendants in the holding cells constituted a de facto arrest, probable cause warranted that arrest. In coming to these conclusions, we review the district court's findings of fact for clear error. United States v. Ramirez, 145 F.3d 345, 352 (5th Cir.1998). We review the application of those facts to the relevant Fourth Amendment standards de novo. Id. ¹

A

We begin with a word about the relevant law. We have long known that law enforcement officials may arrest an individual in a public place without a warrant if they have probable cause to believe that the individual committed a felony. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-24, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976). "Probable cause for a warrantless arrest exists when the totality of facts and circumstances within a police officer's knowledge at the moment of arrest are sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense." United States v. Wadley, 59 F.3d 510, 512 (5th Cir.1995). When considering what a "reasonable person" would have concluded, we take into account the expertise and experience of the law enforcement officials. See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897, 95 S.Ct. 2585, 45 L.Ed.2d 623 (1975).

It is almost a tautology to say that determining whether probable cause existed involves a matter of probabilities, but it nevertheless fairly describes the analysis we undertake. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949) ("In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act."); Hart v. O'Brien, 127 F.3d 424, 444 (5th Cir.1997) (stating that probable cause requires "a showing of the probability of criminal activity"), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 119 S.Ct. 868, 142...