U.S. v. Garey
| Decision Date | 20 August 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 05-14631.,05-14631. |
| Citation | 540 F.3d 1253 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eddie Milton GAREY, Jr., a.k.a. Miles Garey, a.k.a. Milton Garey, a.k.a. Eddie Garey, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
William J. Mason (Court-Appointed), Atty. at Law, Columbus, GA, for Defendant-Appellant.
Elizabeth A. Olson, Elizabeth D. Collery, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Crim. Div. App. Sec., Washington, DC, Dean S. Daskal, Columbus, GA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia.
Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, and TJOFLAT, ANDERSON, BIRCH, DUBINA, BLACK, CARNES, BARKETT, HULL, MARCUS, WILSON and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
It is well-established that a defendant wishing to waive his right to counsel may do so by invoking his right to self-representation and confirming his knowing choice through a cooperative dialogue with the court. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). This case requires us to address the situation in which an uncooperative defendant adamantly and knowingly rejects the competent counsel to which he is constitutionally entitled, but also refuses to invoke affirmatively his right to self-representation.
Defendant-Appellant Eddie Milton Garey was indicted on 27 felony counts for his unsuccessful attempts to extort money by threatening to bomb various buildings in and around Macon, Georgia. In September 2003, he was appointed a lawyer, Scott Huggins, who represented him ably for 15 months. Three days before trial was slated to begin, Garey demanded a new lawyer, contending Huggins was unable to advocate zealously on his behalf. The trial judge disagreed, and offered Garey two options: accept Huggins' representation or try the case yourself. Not satisfied with either alternative, Garey refused to choose, repeatedly rejecting Huggins while adamantly refusing to waive his right to counsel.
After numerous attempts to elicit a clear choice from Garey failed, the court determined his conduct evinced a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel. The court demoted Garey's appointed lawyer to the position of standby counsel and allowed Garey to represent himself at trial, where he was convicted on all counts charged.
On appeal, Garey contends the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by forcing him to proceed pro se when he had not affirmatively asked to represent himself. In light of all the circumstances, we conclude Garey voluntarily waived his right to counsel by his conduct and, because he was forewarned of the consequences of his choice and the dangers it posed, we conclude the waiver was knowing. Therefore, we affirm.
For eleven days in early September 2003, the Macon-Bibb County 911 Center received a series of disturbing calls from the same unidentified caller. Using several different cellular telephones and a computer generated voice, the caller tried to extort money by threatening to bomb and gas various locations throughout the City of Macon, Georgia. On September 11, 2003, federal agents traced one of the calls to a local residence and found themselves at the home of Eddie Milton Garey.
When agents entered to execute a search warrant, they discovered Garey on the phone with a 911 operator. Scattered throughout the house were four cellular phones bearing phone numbers linked to the threatening 911 calls. Installed on Garey's computer was a text-to-speech program called CrazyTalk which "spoke" in a computerized voice when words were entered on the keyboard. On the basis of this evidence, Garey was taken into custody and was later indicted on eleven counts of obstructing justice, five counts of threatening to use a weapon of mass destruction, five counts of making a threat affecting interstate commerce, five counts of manufacturing counterfeit securities, and one count of possessing ammunition as a convicted felon.
Almost immediately following Garey's arrest, the Government asked the court to order a competency evaluation. Following a ten-hour assessment that included personal interviews, standardized mental health examinations, and a review of Garey's personal writings and social history, Garey was diagnosed with paranoid personality disorder with antisocial and narcissistic features. The psychiatrists responsible for the competency evaluation also concluded Garey had normal intelligence and understood the proceedings and charges against him.1 When the evaluation was completed, Garey stipulated to his competency to stand trial.
The day after his arrest, Garey appeared in court represented by appointed counsel Scott Huggins. Throughout fifteen months of pretrial proceedings, Huggins continued to represent Garey largely without incident.2 Then, on the afternoon of Friday, December 3, 2004—three days before trial was scheduled to begin—Garey filed a pro se "Motion to Disqualify Counsel and For Substitute Counsel Based Upon Ongoing Conflicts of Interest and Irreconcilable Differences with Court-Appointed Counsel." The following Monday, the court convened a hearing on the motion.
At the motion hearing, Garey argued Huggins had a conflict of interest because Huggins' law office was located in one of the buildings Garey had allegedly threatened to bomb. Finding no actual conflict of interest between Garey and his lawyer, the trial court denied Garey's motion for substitution of counsel. The court then explained Garey's options as follows:
You do not have the right to pick who your appointed attorney is, but you do have the right to proceed without an attorney.... [J]ust as you have the Constitutional right to have an attorney appointed for you, if you cannot afford one, you have the Constitutional right to represent yourself.
If you choose to represent yourself, or before making that decision, I would caution you that you should make that decision very carefully. There are advantages to having a[sic] attorney trained in the law to represent you, to have someone who is expert on the rules of evidence and the other rules of law applicable to your case. I think it would generally be a disadvantage not to have that experience and expertise available to you. And there are many pitfalls for someone to proceed without an attorney, with regard to various aspects of the trial, including the questioning of witnesses, the decisions on who to put up as witnesses, the decisions on whether to testify or not, decisions regarding impeachment, cross-examination. All of those things, in the court's view, it's very important to have an attorney providing you with legal advice.
The trial judge then asked Garey whether he wished "to proceed with the representation of [him]self without an attorney."
Instead of responding to the question posed by the court, Garey renewed his conflict of interest argument. Again the trial judge explained why no conflict existed, and again the judge asked Garey to indicate whether he wished to proceed to trial with Huggins or wished to represent himself:
Garey: I'm going to say it again. I'm not voluntarily waiving my right to have counsel.
Garey: Your Honor, if you'll be fair with me. I want to make one more statement and I'll answer your question affirmatively. Is that fair, Your Honor?
Court: Yes, sir.
The court permitted Garey to catalogue his tactical disagreements with Huggins. Garey then stated:
Garey: Your Honor, I am not going to let Mr. Huggins represent me. And if the Court is giving me no other choice, I will have to go along with the choice of involuntarily waiving my right to counsel, involuntarily waive. But I'm not going to let Mr. Huggins represent me, because he's a victim of the crime I'm accused of. I don't feel comfortable. Faretta says the right goes to the accused. 413 [422] U.S. at page 806, 819 through 20 , says it's the accused who suffers the adversity if the defense failed.
Garey: Conflict-free counsel.
Court: Conflict-free counsel to represent him. He has concluded, in his mind, that Mr. Huggins is not conflict-free; and therefore, he does not wish to have Mr. Huggins represent him. If the court does not appoint other counsel, and indicates to the defendant that the only counsel that he can be represented by, in an appointed capacity ... is Mr. Huggins, then it's the Court's understanding that the defendant wishes [to] proceed with representation of himself without counsel. Is everything I stated accurate?
Garey: Involuntarily without counsel, yes.
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