U.S. v. Garreau

• Decision Date: 19 August 2010
• Docket Number: No. CR 10-30014-RAL,CR 10-30014-RAL
• Citation: 735 F.Supp.2d 1155
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Jason Todd GARREAU, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Dakota

735 F.Supp.2d 1155

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,

v.Jason Todd GARREAU, Defendant.

No. CR 10-30014-RAL.

United States District Court,

D. South Dakota,

Central Division.

Aug. 19, 2010.

Ted L. McBride, U.S. Attorney's Office, Pierre, SD, for Plaintiff.

Edward G. Albright, Federal Public Defender's Office, Pierre, SD, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE AND STATEMENTS

ROBERTO A. LANGE, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 29) andCorrigendum/Clarification of Report and Recommendation (Doc. 32) issued by the United States Magistrate Judge, which recommends that this Court grant in part and deny in part Defendant Jason Todd Garreau's motion to suppress evidence (Doc. 14). Garreau filed a statement of objections (Doc. 37) to the Report and Recommendation and Corrigendum/Clarification of Report and Recommendation, as allowed by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Under section 636(b)(1)(C), this Court makes a de novo determination of those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which the parties object. United States v. Lothridge, 324 F.3d 599, 600-01 (8th Cir.2003).

II. FACTS

On January 5, 2009, Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") Agent James Van Iten contacted Pierre Police Officer John Wollman.¹ (T. 44). Agent Van Iten advised Officer Wollman that a confidential source had reported that Garreau was possibly in possession of a stolen firearm and was en route from Eagle Butte to Pierre, South Dakota, to sell the handgun. (T. 32-33). Agent Van Iten also informed Officer Wollman that Garreau was driving a gray 2005 Chevy Impala with South Dakota license plates 24R717.² Officer Wollman then contacted State Radio dispatch and Pierre Police Department dispatch, which advised him that Garreau's driver's license had been suspended and that there was an active warrant for Garreau's arrest in Pennington County, South Dakota, for failure to appear on a driving under suspension charge. (T. 33). After learning that Trooper Jon Stahl of the South Dakota Highway Patrol was in the vicinity, Officer Wollman notified him to be on the lookout for the vehicle being driven by Garreau.

While driving west of Fort Pierre, South Dakota, Trooper Stahl spotted a vehicle matching the description of Garreau's vehicle traveling east on U.S. Highway 14. (T. 8). Using his radar, Trooper Stahl clocked the speed of the vehicle at 71 miles per hour, which exceeded the speed limit of 65 miles per hour. (T. 8). Trooper Stahl pulled the vehicle over and advised the driver-the sole occupant-of the reason for the stop. Ex. 4, at 1. The driver could not produce a driver's license and instead presented a Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal identification card identifying himself as Garreau. (T. 8-9).

Trooper Stahl instructed Garreau to sit in the patrol car. (T. 9). While Garreau sat in the patrol car, Trooper Stahl completed a warning ticket for the speeding violation, ran a check on Garreau, and learned that Garreau's driver's license had been suspended and that an outstanding warrant for driving with a suspended license existed for Garreau. (T. 9). Trooper Stahl then placed Garreau under arrest, handcuffed him, searched him, and placed him in the back of the patrol car. (T. 9-10). The search of Garreau's person yielded a knife, which Trooper Stahl confiscated. Trooper Stahl then asked Garreau if he knew someone who could come and get the vehicle and Garreau responded in the negative. (T. 10). Trooper Stahl's report lists the time of the arrest as 1320 hours. Ex. 4, at 1.

After Trooper Stahl initially placed Garreau in the patrol car to complete the warning ticket and run a check on Garreau,Officer Wollman arrived at the scene as backup because of the probability of a handgun in the vehicle. (T. 23). Once Garreau was removed from the patrol car and placed under arrest, Officer Wollman exited his vehicle and engaged in conversation with Trooper Stahl. (T. 37). According to Trooper Stahl's case report, "[a] search of the vehicle was conducted," but the report made no reference to an inventory search. Ex. 4, at 2 (T. 21-22). The search was conducted without a warrant or Garreau's consent. (T. 21). Trooper Stahl searched the vehicle after Garreau was arrested, with Officer Wollman present, and the two discussed searching for the stolen gun. (T. 46). Trooper Stahl testified that he looked for the handgun while searching the car. (T. 22). After opening the trunk to the vehicle, Trooper Stahl lifted the carpeting covering a compartment underneath in which the spare tire sat. (T. 25-26). Upon lifting the spare tire and examining the tire well, Trooper Stahl discovered a white plastic bag underneath the tire. (T. 26). He searched the bag, which required removal of the spare tire, and found a Desert Eagle .44 caliber handgun. (T. 15, 49). Trooper Stahl seized the handgun, checked its serial number, and learned through State Radio that the gun had been reported stolen from Huron, South Dakota.

After Trooper Stahl found the gun, Officer Wollman went to Trooper Stahl's patrol car and asked Garreau about the firearm. (T. 37). During this conversation, Garreau acknowledged that he knew the gun was stolen. (T. 38). Officer Wollman testified that at no time prior to or during the conversation was Garreau advised of his Miranda rights. (T. 50). At no time prior to the search of the car and Officer Wollman's questioning did Garreau say anything about a stolen firearm. (T. 51).

Subsequently, police took Garreau to the Hughes County Jail in Pierre, where he was interviewed by Officer Wollman and Jason Baldwin, a Special Agent with the South Dakota Division of Criminal Investigation ("DCI"). (T. 39). The interview began at 1427 hours. Ex. 5, at 1. There, after being read his Miranda rights, Garreau agreed to talk to investigators and signed an advice of rights and waiver of rights form as well as a form consenting to a urine sample. (T. 40); Ex. 5. During the interview, Garreau made incriminating statements regarding the gun. (T. 41). At the conclusion of the interview, Garreau provided a urine sample. At no point during the interview did Officer Wollman or Agent Baldwin raise their voices at Garreau, and Garreau never raised his voice at them or indicated that he wanted to terminate the interview or speak with a lawyer. (T. 43-44).

At some point, Trooper Stahl completed form HP-219D, which is required by Section 9.1401 of the South Dakota Highway Patrol Vehicle Inventory Searches policy. Ex. 2. Form HP-219D, entitled "Vehicle Inventory," listed as inventory miscellaneous CD's, a cell phone, four empty Crown Royal bags, miscellaneous paperwork, a roofing hammer, a child seat, two presents consisting of children's toys, cold weather gear, and miscellaneous clothing. Ex. 3. Form HP-219D did not list the handgun. (T. 28). Officer Wollman's report characterized the search as a "search incident to an arrest" and prior to towing of the vehicle. (T. 49, 51). Officer Wollman's report made no specific reference to an inventory search. (T. 49).

Citing Arizona v. Gant, --- U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009), Garreau moved to suppress the handgun on the grounds that it was obtained during an invalid search incident to arrest. He further seeks to suppress the statementsmade at the scene for being obtained in violation of Miranda. In addition, he moves to suppress the statements made and the urine sample given at the jail as fruits of the poisonous tree.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Search and Seizure of the Handgun

In Gant, the Supreme Court held that:

Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe that a vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. When these justifications are absent, a search of an arrestee's vehicle will be unreasonable unless police obtain a warrant or show that another exception to the warrant requirement applies.

129 S.Ct. at 1723-24. Garreau argues that because he had already been removed from his vehicle, handcuffed, and placed in the back of Trooper Stahl's patrol car prior to the search, the search of the vehicle, incident to arrest, and the seizure of the handgun found in it. were unconstitutional. Defendant further contends neither the "automobile exception" nor the "inventory search" exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement may validate the search and seizure of the handgun in this case.

The Government concedes ³ that Trooper Stahl's search was not a valid search incident to arrest under Gant.⁴ Relying oncases decided after Gant, the Government argues that the search was a constitutionally valid inventory search. (Doc. 23, at 4); see e.g., United States v. Garrison, No. 10-00033-01-CR-W-ODS, 2010 WL 2076974, at *2-3 & n. 3, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51791, at *6-8 & n. 3 (W.D.Mo. May 24, 2010); Scroggins, 2010 WL 750057, at *3-4, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17357, at *9-12; United States v. Forte, No. 4:08CR00251 JLH, 2009 WL 3062313, at *1-2, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92378, at *2-4 (E.D.Ark. Sept. 18, 2009); see also United States v. Sands, 329 Fed.Appx. 794, 798 n. 1 (10th Cir.2009) (inventory exception applies to post- Gant searches of vehicles). The Government contends that "the search incident to arrest was conducted simultaneously with an inventory search." (Doc. 23, at 4).

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. A "cardinal principle" in Fourth Amendment search and seizure jurisprudence is that searches conducted outside the judicial process, i.e. without prior approval by a judge, are per se unreasonable, "subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978). When the government seeks to introduce evidence that was...