U.S. v. Gjurashaj, s. 675

• Decision Date: 18 April 1983
• Docket Number: D,Nos. 675,676,s. 675
• Citation: 706 F.2d 395
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Rok GJURASHAJ and Gjon Dushaj, Defendants-Appellants. ockets 82-1307, 82-1308.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Page 395

706 F.2d 395

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Rok GJURASHAJ and Gjon Dushaj, Defendants-Appellants.

Nos. 675, 676, Dockets 82-1307, 82-1308.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Argued Jan. 3, 1983.

Decided April 18, 1983.

Michael E. Norton, Asst. U.S. Atty., New York City (John S. Martin, Jr., U.S. Atty., S.D.N.Y., Gerard E. Lynch, Asst. U.S. Atty., New York City, on the brief), for appellee.

Phylis Skloot Bamberger, The Legal Aid Society, Federal Defender Services Unit, New York City, for defendant-appellant Dushaj.

Howard L. Jacobs, New York City, filed a brief for defendant-appellant Gjurashaj.

Before KEARSE, WINTER, and PRATT, Circuit Judges.

KEARSE, Circuit Judge:

Defendants Gjon Dushaj and Rok Gjurashaj appeal from judgments entered in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York after a jury trial before Charles L. Brieant, Jr., Judge, convicting them on one count of engaging in the business of unlicensed dealing in firearms and the interstate transportation of firearms during the course of such business, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(a)(1) (1976) (count 1); one count of conspiracy to deal in firearms without a license and to transport firearms interstate, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 371 (1976) (count 2); and twelve counts of unlicensed interstate transfer of firearms, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(a)(5) (1976) (counts 18-20 and 23-31). Each defendant was sentenced, by Charles E. Stewart, Judge, to a term of five years' imprisonment on each of these fourteen counts, to be served concurrently. On appeal, defendants contend that their convictions on count 31 should be reversed for failure of proof, and that their convictions on all other counts should be reversed because the government's emphasis on count 31 influenced the jury's consideration of the other counts. We reverse the convictions on count 31 and affirm the judgments in all other respects.

BACKGROUND

Since there is no general challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, a brief summary of the proof at trial will suffice. The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable Berisha was arrested on March 26, 1980, after selling three guns at his Bronx apartment, one to an undercover agent of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms ("ATF") and two to a confidential informant wearing a hidden recording device. A search of Berisha's apartment later that day by ATF Special Agent Larry Amaker pursuant to a search warrant yielded ten additional guns. Dushaj and Gjurashaj were arrested in February 1982 and indicted shortly thereafter. ¹

to the government, showed that during 1979 and 1980, Dushaj and Gjurashaj, who are related, attended a number of gun shows in California at which they purchased more than 200 guns. During this period, Gjon Berisha, who was a relative of Dushaj and Gjurashaj and lived in the Bronx, New York, was engaged in selling in New York, for the profit of himself, Dushaj, and Gjurashaj, guns purchased by the defendants in California. None of the three had ever held or applied for a federal firearms license entitling him to deal in or transport firearms.

Each of the counts of the indictment numbered 18-20 and 23-31 charged that Dushaj and Gjurashaj, residents of California, had unlawfully transported or transferred a particular gun to Berisha, knowing him to reside in New York, ² in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(a)(5). ³ As to each gun the government introduced proof of purchase in the form of the testimony of the seller of the gun, together with a receipt given by the seller, showing the gun's serial number and indicating either Dushaj or Gjurashaj as purchaser. The guns themselves, each given a government exhibit ("GX") number to correspond with the count that charged its unlawful transfer, were introduced. The guns introduced as GX 18 and 19 were identified by Amaker as those purchased from Berisha at his home by the confidential informant. The gun introduced as GX 20 was identified by ATF Special Agent Ken Pribil as the gun he had purchased, operating undercover, from Berisha at the latter's home. The eight guns introduced as GX 23-GX 30 were identified by Amaker as guns seized from Berisha's apartment pursuant to the search warrant. The record does not indicate that GX 31 was ever identified as having been found in New York.

In addition to the detailed evidence as to particular guns, there was evidence that Berisha, prior to his arrest, had accompanied Dushaj and Gjurashaj to gun shows in California at which the defendants had purchased guns. There was evidence of numerous telephone calls between Berisha's apartment and the telephones of Dushaj and Gjurashaj during the period when the defendants were buying guns in California. And there was testimony by Amaker and another ATF agent that, during an interview with Dushaj following his arrest, Dushaj admitted having purchased guns in California and stated that he had taken some of these to New York, that he had sent some to New York by bus, and that Berisha had sometimes come from New York to California to pick up the guns.

At the close of the government's case--the defendants did not present any evidence--Dushaj and Gjurashaj moved pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(a) for judgments of acquittal on the ground that the government had failed to prove interstate transfer of the guns by the defendants. The motions were denied, and Dushaj and Gjurashaj were convicted on all counts submitted

to the jury, i.e., counts 1, 2, 18-20, and 23-31.

DISCUSSION

Dushaj and Gjurashaj contend that their convictions on count 31 must be reversed, and count 31 dismissed, since there was no proof of their transfer of GX 31 to a person believed to reside outside of California, an essential element of the crime charged under Sec. 922(a)(5). In addition, they contend that their convictions on all other counts should be reversed, and a new trial ordered, on grounds of prejudicial spillover from the government's summation emphasis on count 31. We agree that the defendants' convictions on count 31 must be reversed, but we affirm the convictions on all other counts.

A. Failure To Prove an Essential Element of Count 31

It is axiomatic that in a criminal prosecution, the government bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which the defendant is charged. Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 487, 16 S.Ct. 353, 358, 40 L.Ed. 499 (1895) (burden of proof "is on the prosecution from the beginning to the end of the trial and applies to every element necessary to constitute the crime"); see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). Where the government has failed to present proof of an essential element of the crime, a judgment of conviction must be reversed and the indictment dismissed. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978); United States v. Tavoularis, 515 F.2d 1070, 1077 (2d Cir.1975).

In the context of the present case, if there was no evidence that GX 31 was found in Berisha's possession, there was no proof as to its transfer to a person known to reside outside of California--an essential element of the offense charged under Sec. 922(a)(5), see note 2 supra --and the defendants were entitled to acquittals on count 31. The government makes a number of arguments in its effort to have the convictions on count 31 sustained. We find none of them meritorious.

First, the government suggests that perhaps GX 31 was in fact identified by Agent Amaker as one of the guns seized from Berisha's apartment and that the transcript's reflection that Amaker identified only Exhibits 23 through 30, and not 31, was stenographic error. (E.g., United States' brief on appeal at 9.) At the same time, however, the government concedes that the absence of any reference to GX 31 may have resulted from the Assistant United States Attorney's "oversight or mispeaking." (Id. n. *.) The government apparently did not move in the trial court for a correction of the record, and we are provided no creditable ground for concluding that GX 31 was identified as having been found in Berisha's possession. ⁴ We can hardly sustain a conviction on the basis of the government's speculation--equivocal, at that--that essential facts may have been placed in evidence.

The government's principal contention is that, if GX 31 was not identified as having been seized from Berisha's apartment, the defendants have waived the defect. The government argues that because the defendants' motions for acquittal did not explicitly refer to count 31 and did not pinpoint the deficiency in the government's proof, defendants are not entitled to raise the issue on appeal. We disagree. Both defendants moved pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(a) for judgments of acquittal at the close of the evidence, and the very nature of such motions is to question the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction. See United States v. Jones, 174 F.2d 746, 748 (7th Cir.1949) (motion for acquittal "is a challenge to the Government in the presence of the court that the Government has failed in its proof"); 2 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 466, at 654 (1982). Further, the defendant need not specify the ground of the motion in order to preserve a sufficiency claim for appeal. United States v. Brothman, 191 F.2d 70, 72-73 (2d Cir.1951); United States v. Cox, 593 F.2d 46, 48 (6th Cir.1979); United States v. Jones, supra, 174 F.2d at 748; 8A Moore's Federal Practice p 29.03, at 29-7 (2d ed. 1982) ("[T]he grounds for the motion need not be stated with specificity, at least not unless the government demands such a statement." (footnote omitted)); 2 C. Wright, supra, Sec. 466, at 653. ⁵ Thus, when a defendant moves for acquittal, even without specificity as to the grounds, it is incumbent upon the government to review its proof as to the facts required to establish each...