U.S. v. Goldman, No. 77-1227
Decision Date | 14 October 1977 |
Docket Number | No. 77-1227 |
Citation | 563 F.2d 501 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Joseph GOLDMAN, Defendant, Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Nathan Lewin, Washington, D. C., with whom Jamie S. Gorelick and Miller, Cassidy, Larroca & Lewin, Washington, D. C., were on brief, for defendant, appellant.
William A. Dimitri, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Providence, R. I., with whom Lincoln C. Almond, U. S. Atty., Providence, R. I., was on brief, for appellee.
Before COFFIN, Chief Judge, CAMPBELL, Circuit Judge, and WOLLENBERG, District Judge. *
Defendant Goldman appeals his conviction on one count of transporting in interstate commerce a falsely made and forged check. 18 U.S.C. § 2314. Goldman cashed an $8,000 check in Providence, Rhode Island. The check was made out to Goldman and drawn on a Canadian bank account containing three dollars in the name of Max Lurner. The government presented testimony that Goldman was in fact the individual who had opened the account as Lurner and that the defendant had four blank checks on that account in his pocket when he was arrested. The defendant put on no defense at trial.
We will address ourselves only to the three issues that, as the defendant himself recognized, are the most compelling: (1) whether defendant's decision not to answer certain questions during an interview while he was in the custody of the FBI was an exercise of his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself; (2) whether the prosecutor's remarks concerning the defendant's religion were so prejudicial as to require reversal; and (3) whether the prosecutor commented improperly on the defendant's decision not to take the stand in his own defense.
Agent Burleigh of the FBI arrested the defendant on November 10, 1975. After the arrest and before interrogation Burleigh read the defendant his Miranda rights and then gave the defendant a standard The defendant objects to the use during the prosecution's case-in-chief and summation of two questions asked by Agent Burleigh during the interrogation to which the defendant either refused to respond or did not respond. 2 Defendant suggests that when he did not answer the questions relating to the location of Mr. Lurner's cousins and his possession of the blank checks he was exercising his right to remain silent. If that were so, it is clear that the prosecution would not be entitled to introduce evidence of that silence at trial or to comment on it during summation. See Miranda v. United States, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); Chapman v. United States, 547 F.2d 1240, 1249 (5th Cir. 1977).
FBI "Waiver of Rights" form. 1 The defendant signed this form and, answering Agent Burleigh's questions, gave an exculpatory story, the core of which was that the signature on the check was not forged, but rather was the genuine signature of a business associate, Max Lurner, who had opened the account in Canada.
Here, however, as in Vitali v. United States, 383 F.2d 121 (1st Cir. 1967), the defendant did not stand on his rights. After hearing the Miranda warnings, he chose to make an exculpatory statement, and he answered most of the agent's questions probing that statement. We find that these facts meet the high standards of proof of waiver that Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. 1602, sets out.
Vitali, supra, 383 F.2d at 123. 3 Defendant further argues that even if he did waive his rights initially he was entitled to reassert those rights at any time. The FBI form had advised him that he could stop answering questions at any time. Miranda clearly gives a suspect under interrogation the right to "(indicate) in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent." 384 U.S. at 473-74, 86 S.Ct. at 1627, (emphasis added). We can find no passage in the record, however, where Goldman did indicate that he wished to reassert his right to remain silent. The consistent indication, to the contrary, is that he wished to give his interrogator a complete exculpatory story. We find on the basis of the record that he thought he did answer the question about the checks 4 and that his decision not to answer the question about Lurner's Israeli cousins was simply a strategic choice, perhaps based on a fear that any answer might weaken the story. 5 Based on this finding we need not decide what would constitute a sufficient indication of a wish to remain silent, nor need we decide whether the Fifth Amendment gives a suspect the right to answer questions selectively. Because the defendant waived his rights and made a statement, the prosecutor was entitled to introduce that statement at trial and comment on it during summation.
Finally, the defendant argues that choosing not to respond to questions during interrogation, quite apart from constitutional privilege, has no probative value because the silence is ambiguous and may be prejudicial. See United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176, 180, 95 S.Ct. 2133, 45 L.Ed.2d 99 (1975). This case, however, is not controlled by Hale. Goldman did not remain silent. What he said provided a context that enhanced the probative value of his silent response to a particular question. Moreover, the jury knows that Goldman was not silent at the time of his arrest, dispelling the particular prejudice feared by the Supreme Court that the jury would draw a "strong negative inference . . . from the fact that the defendant remained silent at the time of his arrest." Id. at 180, 95 S.Ct. at 21.38. We are satisfied that admitting this evidence was not an abuse of discretion.
Defendant next complains about the following statement by the prosecutor during summation:
The prosecutor showed extremely poor judgment. Defendant's religion had no bearing whatsoever on any legitimate issue in the case. Whether or not the statement was prejudicial, it clearly invited the jury to consider religion as somehow relevant.
Prosecutorial zeal cannot excuse such grave misconduct.
Nonetheless, we are loath to apply a rule that such a reference to religion necessarily requires reversal. At the close of the prosecutor's argument the judge told the jury, He made a similar statement during his general instructions after the close of the defense argument. We hold that the trial judge, by his prompt and definite instruction, cured the prosecutor's error. Cf. Taglianetti v. United States, 398 F.2d 558, 566 (1st Cir. 1968) ( ); aff'd, 394 U.S. 316, 89 S.Ct. 1099, 22 L.Ed.2d 302 (1969).
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