U.S. v. Gomes

Decision Date25 October 2004
Docket NumberDocket No. 04-1004-CR.
Citation387 F.3d 157
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Aaron GOMES, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, Christopher F. Droney, J Jeremiah Donovan, Old Saybrook, CT, for Defendant-Appellant.

Thomas V. Daily, Assistant United States Attorney, District of Connecticut (Kevin J. O'Connor, United States Attorney, and Jeffrey A. Meyer, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief), for Appellee.

Before: VAN GRAAFEILAND, JACOBS, and POOLER, Circuit Judges.

JACOBS, Circuit Judge:

Aaron Gomes has been declared mentally incompetent to stand trial, but examining doctors at a government medical facility have determined that competency could be achieved by treatment with anti-psychotic drugs. After Gomes's repeated refusal to undergo the prescribed course of treatment, the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Droney, J.) granted a motion to authorize the Bureau of Prisons to medicate him involuntarily.

In Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 123 S.Ct. 2174, 156 L.Ed.2d 197 (2003), the Supreme Court held that the Government may involuntarily medicate a mentally ill defendant to render him competent for trial. This case, returning to us following a post-Sell remand, presents the first opportunity this Court has had to review a district court's application of the Sell factors. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the district court did not err.

BACKGROUND

Aaron Gomes was indicted October 27, 1998 on one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). By virtue of (at least) three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses, Gomes faces a mandatory minimum of fifteen years' imprisonment. See id. § 924(e).

In May 1999, defense counsel requested a psychiatric evaluation of his client, but Gomes refused to cooperate. In June 1999, the district court ordered on its own motion a psychiatric examination to assess Gomes's competency to stand trial. When Gomes again refused to cooperate, the district court ordered a 30-day commitment for evaluation. Gomes was placed in the custody of the U.S. Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri ("USMC-Springfield").

At a competency hearing in May 2000, the court heard testimony from Dr. David Mrad, one of the psychologists who had examined Gomes at USMC-Springfield, that Gomes was delusional, suffered from a general "psychotic disorder," and lacked a "rational understanding" of the proceedings against him. The district court found that Gomes lacked the competence to be tried, and ordered him committed to the custody of the Attorney General for three months to determine whether there was a substantial possibility that he would attain such competency in the foreseeable future.

Gomes was returned to the custody of USMC-Springfield for further evaluation. His doctors there prescribed a course of anti-psychotic medication that they believed would help restore competency, but Gomes repeatedly refused the treatment. The Government eventually sought an order from the district court to authorize the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") to medicate him involuntarily. After conducting a full hearing, the district court issued the order.

On appeal of that order, this Court affirmed, see United States v. Gomes, 289 F.3d 71 (2d Cir.2002) (hereinafter Gomes I), and Gomes petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. While Gomes's petition was pending, the Supreme Court issued Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 123 S.Ct. 2174, 156 L.Ed.2d 197 (2003), holding that, under specified circumstances, a defendant may be involuntarily medicated in order to render him competent for trial. Granting Gomes's petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded to this Court for reconsideration in light of Sell. This Court remanded to the district court.

In July 2003, the district court ordered that Gomes be transferred back to USMC-Springfield for 30 days to re-evaluate his ability to stand trial and the prospect of his attaining competence. At the subsequent hearing, the court heard expert testimony from USMC-Springfield psychologist Dr. Mrad and from Dr. Robert Sarrazin, a psychiatrist. Both testified that Gomes has a delusional disorder of grandiose and persecutory type, and that there is a 70 percent chance that he could be rendered competent through treatment with anti-psychotic medication. In February 2003, the court issued an order, in light of Sell, permitting the BOP to medicate Gomes involuntarily. Gomes filed a timely notice of appeal and the district court granted his motion for a stay pending appeal. Gomes is currently in custody.

DISCUSSION

In Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 123 S.Ct. 2174, 156 L.Ed.2d 197 (2003), the Supreme Court held that the Government may involuntarily medicate a mentally ill defendant to render him competent for trial if: [i] there are important governmental interests in trying the individual; [ii] the treatment will significantly further those interests; [iii] the treatment is necessary to further those interests, considering any less intrusive alternatives; and [iv] the treatment is medically appropriate. See id. at 180-81, 123 S.Ct. 2174.

The Supreme Court did not articulate a standard of proof to govern consideration of these factors. This Court in Gomes I read Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 112 S.Ct. 1810, 118 L.Ed.2d 479 (1992), to suggest that the relevant findings must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. See Gomes I, 289 F.3d at 82. Although Gomes I was vacated and remanded for consideration in light of Sell, its analysis on this point remains sound. The Court in Sell also did not specify the standard of review that should be applied to a district court's analysis of these factors. Whether the Government's asserted interest is important is a legal question that is subject to de novo review. The district court's findings with respect to the other Sell factors are factual in nature and are therefore subject to review for clear error. See Benjamin v. Fraser, 343 F.3d 35, 43 (2d Cir.2003).

The Sell factors control when the sole purpose of forced chemical treatment is to render a defendant competent for trial; therefore, a threshold inquiry is whether the forced treatment is justified for other reasons, such as those "related to [the defendant's] dangerousness, or ... where the refusal to take drugs puts [the defendant's own] health gravely at risk." Sell, 539 U.S. at 182, 123 S.Ct. 2174. Drs. Mrad and Sarrazin testified that Gomes is not a danger in the prison population; there is no evidence that Gomes presents a danger to himself nor that he faces a serious health risk absent medical treatment. The Sell test thus applies.

I

Sell first directs us to consider whether "important governmental interests are at stake" in Gomes's prosecution. Id. at 180, 123 S.Ct. 2174. Generally, "[t]he Government's interest in bringing to trial an individual accused of a serious crime is important"; at the same time, however, certain circumstances "may lessen the importance of that interest." Id. For instance, if the incompetent defendant faces lengthy commitment to a mental institution, that consideration "affects, but does not totally undermine, the strength of the need for prosecution." Id.

Prior to Sell, this Court concluded in Gomes I that the governmental interest in trying Gomes is strong:

In this case, we believe that the government has an essential interest in bringing Gomes to trial. Gomes faces trial for a serious felony — possessing a firearm as a felon. Both the seriousness of the crime and Gomes's perceived dangerousness to society are evident from the substantial sentence Gomes faces if convicted. Because he has committed at least three prior violent felonies or serious drug offenses, Gomes faces a possible statutory minimum of fifteen years' imprisonment.

289 F.3d at 86. Again, though Gomes I was vacated and remanded for further consideration, nothing in Sell undermines this persuasive reasoning.

Gomes emphasizes that he was charged only with illegal possession of a handgun, not use. But his possession is compounded by his three prior convictions for serious drug offenses. Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), an armed felon with three convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses is subject to an enhanced sentence regardless of whether the firearm was deployed; Congress evidently believed when it enacted the statute that possession in the hands of an "armed career criminal" such as Gomes is a serious threat in itself. Accord United States v. Dillard, 214 F.3d 88, 94 (2d Cir.2000) ("The risk of violent use posed by a convicted felon's possession of firearms is significant.").

We then consider whether the potential for civil commitment abates the Government's interest in prosecuting Gomes. After oral argument, we requested supplemental briefing from the parties on whether the Government would lose the ability to pursue the present indictment if Gomes were civilly committed or if at some point, by some means, he achieves sufficient competence to assist in his defense. The parties agree that in either case, the Government could still proceed against Gomes on the present indictment. Nevertheless, as the Government points out, "it may be difficult or impossible to try a defendant who regains competence after years of commitment during which memories may fade and evidence may be lost." Sell, 539 U.S. at 180, 123 S.Ct. 2174. Gomes responds that because the district court conducted a suppression hearing at which the Government's crucial witnesses testified, that testimony would be admissible at trial if any of these witnesses forget, die, or become otherwise unavailable. See Fed.R.Evid. 804(a), (b)(1). It is not entirely...

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