U.S.A. v. Goodson

• Decision Date: 01 December 1999
• Docket Number: No. 99-4262,99-4262
• Citation: 204 F.3d 508
• Parties: (4th Cir. 2000) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COREY DEON GOODSON, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 508

204 F.3d 508 (4th Cir. 2000)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COREY DEON GOODSON, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 99-4262.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT.

December 1, 1999, Argued.

February 11, 2000, Decided.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond.

James R. Spencer, District Judge. (CR-98-216).

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] ARGUED: Vincent L. Gambale, Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Barbara Lynn Hartung, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Helen F. Fahey, United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia; James B. Comey, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant.

Before WILKINSON, Chief Judge, NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, and Samuel G. WILSON, Chief United States District Judge for the Western District of Virginia, sitting by designation. Judge Niemeyer wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge Wilkinson and Chief Judge Wilson joined.

OPINION:

NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:

When Corey Goodson refused to accept a proposed plea agreement on the day of his trial for firearms violations, the government renewed a request made the prior week for a postponement of trial for at least eight days because it had not adequately secured the attendance of crucial witnesses. The district court denied the government's motion for a continuance. Thereafter, when the government made a motion to dismiss the case voluntarily under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a) to permit it to start again with a new charging document, the court invited Goodson to make a motion to dismiss, which it then granted. After the government issued a warrant to reprosecute Goodson, the court stated that its prior dismissal had been "with prejudice," denying the government any opportunity to retry Goodson for the alleged violations.

On the government's appeal, we reverse the "with prejudice" aspect of the district court's dismissal order.

I

Following a police search of an apartment in Richmond, Virginia, where Corey Goodson was staying, police recovered a firearm and ammunition. Goodson was indicted on July 8, 1998, on five counts relating to possession of an unregistered firearm and ammunition. At arraignment, the court scheduled trial for January 13, 1999. Two days before the scheduled trial date, the United States obtained a superseding indictment against Goodson to correct an error in the allegation of the date of his charged criminal conduct, changing it from April 6, 1998, to February 17, 1998. Other than the change in date, however, the superseding indictment was the same as the original indictment. Because Goodson asserted his right not to be tried sooner than 30 days after the superseding indictment was filed, see 18 U.S.C. 3161(c)(2), the district court rescheduled trial for February 16, 1999, a date to which the parties agreed.

Approximately two weeks before the scheduled February trial date, government prosecutors learned that one of the government's key witnesses, Henrico County Officer Robert Augustine, would be on a prepaid vacation in Europe on February 16, returning shortly before February 24, 1999. The government notified Goodson that if he did not agree to a proposed plea agreement by February 5, 1999, the government would have to seek a continuance because of Officer Augustine's absence. At Goodson's request, the government agreed to extend this deadline to February 8 so that Goodson could consult with his mother.

On February 8, Goodson informed the government that he would not accept a plea agreement and intended to go forward with trial. Accordingly, the government requested a continuance from the court because of Officer Augustine's expected absence. When the court denied the motion, the government attempted to contact Officer Augustine, whom it had not subpoenaed, but learned that he had already left the country. On February 12, 1999, the government moved for reconsideration of the court's denial of its motion for a continuance, stating that it could be prepared for trial on February 24, 1999, shortly after Officer Augustine's return from Europe. The court again refused to grant a continuance.

On the morning of February 16, the date set for trial, the government prosecutors learned that the government's other critical witness, Henrico County Officer Evan Young, also would be unable to testify at trial. Although Officer Young had been subpoenaed to attend trial on February 16, he could not appear because he was a member of a SWAT unit that was involved in a standoff with a man who had taken his estranged wife hostage. The government prosecutor also learned on the morning of trial that Goodson had signed the plea agreement and intended to plead guilty when the case was called.

When the case was called and the court entered into a plea colloquy with Goodson, Goodson refused to admit factual guilt or to accept the court's invitation to enter an Alford plea.^* He maintained his innocence and stated that he wished to proceed with a bench trial. At that point the government advised the court that because neither Officer Augustine nor Officer Young was available, it could not present its case on that date. Accordingly, the government renewed its motion for an eight-day continuance. When the court denied the motion, the following colloquy ensued:

[Prosecutor]: Your Honor, then, it is the United State position that we will need to dismiss the indictment.And just for the benefit of Mr. Goodson and Mr. Parker[Good son's attorney], it is our intention to file a criminal complaint this morning with regard to the charges.

The Court: Thank you. You can have a seat. Mr. Parker, do you have a motion?

Mr. Parker: I guess, Your Honor, if the government has a motion to dismiss at this point, Your Honor, I don't think --

The Court: I didn't ask you that. I heard the government's motion. I asked you did you have a motion. Mr. Parker, the government is not prepared to proceed to trial today. Today was the day set for trial. Nobody is dead. Nobody is sick. People are, because of the press of other business, are not here in Court. That is not a sufficient basis for a continuance. Do you have a motion? Represent your client, Mr. Parker.

Mr. Parker: Motion to dismiss, Your Honor.

The Court: Granted. Thank you.

The court then adjourned and entered an order which stated, "The matter was . . . called and the Government was unprepared to proceed. As such, the Court GRANTED the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. The Indictment in this action is hereby DISMISSED."

A few days later, when the government obtained a warrant for Goodson's arrest for reprosecution of the firearms charges, the court quashed it, ordering that the government not "issue another Warrant of Arrest for Mr. Goodson on these same charges and set of facts."

On the government's motion for reconsideration, the court denied the motion, indicating that it had dismissed Goodson's indictment with prejudice. The court noted that the parties had previously agreed on a mutually acceptable date and that the court's "calendar was very congested and trial days were difficult to come by." The court stated that neither Officer Augustine's vacation in Europe nor Officer Young's SWAT team duty was a sufficient basis for a continuance.

This appeal followed.

II

The government contends that the district court erred in not granting its motion to dismiss the indictment under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a) because the court made no finding of bad faith and the record was "devoid of any [such] evidence." It contends also that the court erred in granting, with prejudice, Goodson's motion to dismiss the indictment, whether under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b) or under its general supervisory power, because Goodson demonstrated no prejudice or substantial threat thereof from the government's proposed delay. The government argues that the court may dismiss an indictment with prejudice "only in extreme circumstances involving prosecutorial misconduct, demonstrable prejudice, and oppressive delay." The government does not challenge the district court's exercise of discretion in denying the government's various motions for a continuance.

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a) provides:

The Attorney General or the United States attorney may by leave of court file a dismissal of an indictment, information or complaint and the prosecution shall thereupon terminate. Such a dismissal may not be filed during the trial without the consent of the defendant.

While the rule confers discretion on the district court to deny the government's motion to dismiss a charging document, this discretion is not broad. See United States v. Perate, 719 F.2d 706, 710 (4th Cir. 1983) ("The trial court has little discretion in considering a government motion to dismiss made pursuant to [Rule 48(a)]" (internal citations omitted)). Indeed, the court must grant the government's Rule 48(a) motion unless the court concludes that to grant it would be clearly contrary to manifest public interest, determined by whether the prosecutor's motion to dismiss was made in bad faith. See Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 30, 54 L. Ed. 2d 207, 98 S. Ct. 81 (1977) (per curiam) ("The decision to terminate this prosecution . . . was motivated by considerations which cannot fairly be characterized as 'clearly contrary to manifest public interest'" (internal citations omitted)); United States v. Smith, 55 F.3d 157, 159 (4th Cir. 1995) ("The disposition of a government's motion to dismiss an indictment should be decided by determining whether the prosecutor acted in good faith at the time he moved for dismissal. A motion that is not motivated by bad faith is not clearly contrary to manifest public interest, and it must be granted"); Perate, 719 F.2d at 710 (stating that a Rule 48(a) motion must be granted "absent a finding of bad faith or disservice to...