U.S. v. Gray
| Decision Date | 05 April 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 94-1298,94-1298 |
| Citation | 63 F.3d 57 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. Roy GRAY, Defendant-Appellant. . Heard |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Jamie Ann Sabino, with whom Klibaner and Sabino, Cambridge, MA, was on brief, for appellant.
Roberta T. Brown, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Donald K. Stern, U.S. Atty. and Thomas C. Frongillo, Asst. U.S. Atty., Boston, MA, were on brief, for appellee.
Before TORRUELLA, Chief Judge, CYR and STAHL, Circuit Judges.
Appellant Roy Gray challenges the district court's denial of his motion to withdraw his plea of guilty to charges of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and distribution of cocaine. Because we find that Gray reasonably misunderstood the consequences of his guilty plea, we remand to the district court for further proceedings.
On January 20, 1993, a federal grand jury returned an indictment charging Gray with one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 846, and one count of distribution of cocaine and aiding and abetting, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2, respectively. Gray was arrested on April 8, 1993, and pled not guilty at his arraignment. On October 18, 1993, the scheduled trial date, Gray changed his plea to guilty as to both charges.
At his change of plea hearing, the court asked Gray a series of questions pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 11. In response to these questions, Gray stated that he had attended school through the "eighth or ninth grade;" he denied taking any medicine, drugs, or alcohol on the day of the hearing, and stated that he had not been treated recently for any mental condition or mental illness. Gray also stated that he had no trouble understanding the court's questions.
The court advised Gray of his rights in specific detail, and informed him that he would waive these rights when he pled guilty. Gray stated that he understood his rights as they had been explained, that he understood that by pleading guilty he would lose those rights, and that he gave up those rights freely and voluntarily.
The government then summarized the evidence that it would have offered if Gray's case had gone to trial, and the court explained the nature of the charges.
The court asked Gray if he was entering his guilty plea freely and voluntarily, to which Gray answered yes. With respect to Gray's possible sentence, the following colloquy took place COURT: Do you believe it is in your best interest to enter a plea of guilty at this time?
The court subsequently found that: 1) Gray's plea was made freely and voluntarily; 2) Gray understood the nature of the charges against him and the nature and consequences of his plea; 3) Gray was competent to enter his plea; 4) Gray understood his rights, and had freely and voluntarily waived them; and 5) the factual basis for the guilty plea was adequate, and that Gray had indicated that it was in his best interest to enter a plea of guilty.
Thirty-six days later, on November 23, 1993, Gray moved to withdraw his plea, alleging that: 1) he did not understand the plea agreement which he signed; 2) he took no part in the sale of drugs as part of the alleged conspiracy; and 3) he did not understand that the consequences of his plea, specifically as to his sentence. On February 3, 1994, the district court held a hearing on Gray's motion. At the hearing, the arguments proffered by Gray's counsel focused almost exclusively on the second of these claims and Gray's assertions of innocence at his change of plea hearing. Essentially, Gray argued that he had only pled guilty because his co-defendants and defense counsel had suggested that it was the best course of action. The district court denied Gray's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In so doing, the court pointed out that it had found that Gray had understood what he was doing and had pled guilty because he felt it to be in his best interests to do so. The district court explained to Gray that "there is no question in my mind that you were hesitant in pleading; but I have to conclude that your hesitation was brought about not so much from your protested innocence as much as it is from the penalty that you faced." 1
While a defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea, United States v. Ribas-Dominicci, 50 F.3d 76, 78 (1st Cir.1995), a district court may allow such a request upon a showing of "a fair and just reason." Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(d); see also Ribas-Dominicci, 50 F.3d at 78; United States v. Cotal-Crespo, 47 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1995). We have recently reiterated that the factors to be considered in determining whether there is such a reason are: 1) the force and plausibility of the proffered reason; 2) the timing of the request; 3) whether the defendant has asserted his legal innocence; and 4) whether the parties had reached a plea agreement. Cotal-Crespo, 47 F.3d at 3-4. These factors are relevant to the ultimate issue to be addressed, namely, whether the plea was "knowing, voluntary and intelligent within the meaning of [Fed.R.Crim.P.] 11." Id. at 3.
We have explained that by entering a guilty plea, a defendant effectively waives several constitutional rights. For that waiver to be valid, the plea must amount to a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. Id. at 4 (citing McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1171, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969)). Rule 11 was intended to ensure that a defendant who pleads guilty does so with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea. Id. at 4. We have identified the three "core concerns" of Rule 11: 1) absence of coercion; 2) the defendant's understanding of the charges; and 3) the defendant's knowledge of the consequences of the guilty plea. Id. While technical violations of Rule 11 may often be deemed harmless, a total failure to address one of Rule 11's "core concerns" mandates that the guilty plea be set aside. Id. In the absence of such a "total failure," the question to be determined is whether deficiencies in the Rule 11 hearing affected the defendant's "substantial rights." Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(h); see also Cotal-Crespo, 47 F.3d at 5.
In determining whether there has been a violation of one of the core concerns of Rule 11, we review the totality of the circumstances surrounding the Rule 11 hearing at which the defendant pled guilty. Cotal-Crespo, 47 F.3d at 4. We have explained that "[w]hat is critical is the substance of what was communicated by the trial court, and what should reasonably have been understood by the defendant, rather than the form of the communication." Id. at 4-5.
We will reverse a district court's decision disallowing the withdrawal of a guilty plea only upon a showing of a "demonstrable abuse of discretion." Id. at 5. The district court's subsidiary findings of fact in connection with the plea-withdrawal motion are reviewed only for clear error. Id. With these principles in mind, we turn to Gray's claims.
Gray claims that because of certain deficiencies in his Rule 11 hearing, his guilty plea was not given voluntarily and intelligently. Although Gray offers several grounds to support his claim, we find that only one of them merits discussion. In his motion to withdraw his plea, Gray stated essentially that he did not understand that he was pleading to a crime with a minimum ten-year sentence. He claims now that this misunderstanding of the consequences of his plea "tainted his decision to plead guilty," and constitutes a violation of one of Rule 11's core concerns. Although it is a close question, we agree.
When asked by the court at his Rule 11 hearing whether he understood "what the maximum punishment" could be, Gray responded, "Not exactly," thus alerting the court to his uncertainty about the consequences of his plea....
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