U.S. v. Hampton

• Decision Date: 09 February 2011
• Docket Number: No. 10–10035.,10–10035.
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee,v.Stephanie HAMPTON, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

633 F.3d 334

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Stephanie HAMPTON, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 10–10035.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Feb. 9, 2011.

Jay Stevenson Weimer, Asst. U.S. Atty. (argued), Fort Worth, TX, for U.S.Kevin Joel Page (argued), Fed. Pub. Def., Dallas, TX, Christopher Allen Curtis, Asst. Fed. Pub. Def., Fort Worth, TX, for Hampton.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.Before KING, STEWART and OWEN, Circuit Judges.KING, Circuit Judge:

The opinion issued on January 6, 2011, United States v. Hampton, No. 10–10035, 2011 WL 31789 (5th Cir.2011), is withdrawn and the following is substituted.

Defendant–Appellant Stephanie Hampton was sentenced to 24 months' imprisonment when her supervised release was revoked. On appeal, Hampton argues that her revocation sentence was illegal because, when aggregated with her prior revocation sentence, the amount of imprisonment exceeded the maximum amount of supervised release authorized for her original offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). We hold that § 3583(e)(3) does not require aggregation of imprisonment imposed upon revocation of supervised release and AFFIRM the district court's revocation sentence.

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 3, 2007, Hampton pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess stolen mail, a Class D felony. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 3559(a)(4) (2006). Hampton was sentenced to six months' imprisonment and two years' supervised release. Hampton violated the conditions of her first supervised release, and it was revoked by the district court. The district court then sentenced Hampton to 24 months' imprisonment and 12 months' supervised release.

Hampton violated the conditions of her second supervised release, and the district court again revoked her release. At her revocation hearing, Hampton argued that the statute governing supervised release revocation sentencing, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2006), caps the aggregate amount of revocation imprisonment that a defendant can serve at the amount of supervised release authorized for the original offense by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b). According to Hampton, § 3583(b) authorized a maximum of three years' supervised release for her Class D felony and, thus, she could not receive more than one year's imprisonment as a second revocation sentence because she had already served two years' imprisonment on her prior revocation sentence. The district court rejected this argument and sentenced Hampton to 24 months' imprisonment with no additional supervised release. Hampton timely appealed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo whether Hampton received a revocation sentence in excess of the statutory maximum. See United States v. Vera, 542 F.3d 457, 459 (5th Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. Sias, 227 F.3d 244, 246 (5th Cir.2000)).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Plain Meaning of § 3583

When interpreting a statute, this court first looks to the language of the statute itself. United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 742 (5th Cir.2004). We are bound to “follow the plain and unambiguous meaning of the statutory language.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Terms not defined in the statute itself should be given their “ordinary and natural meaning” and should be interpreted according to the “overall policies and objectives of the statute.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Under § 3583, a sentencing court may impose a term of supervised release following the defendant's imprisonment as part of the sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a). The amount of supervised release the sentencing court may impose depends on the severity of the defendant's offense. The authorized terms of supervised release are:

(1) for a Class A or Class B felony, not more than five years;

(2) for a Class C or Class D felony, not more than three years; and

(3) for a Class E felony, or for a misdemeanor (other than a petty offense), not more than one year.

§ 3583(b).

If the district court imposes a term of supervised release, that court then sets conditions that must be followed by the defendant while on supervised release. § 3583(d). If a court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant has violated a condition of supervised release, that court may

revoke a term of supervised release, and require the defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in such term of supervised release without credit for time previously served on postrelease supervision ... except that a defendant whose term is revoked under this paragraph may not be required to serve on any such revocation more than 5 years in prison if the offense that resulted in the term of supervised release is a class A felony, more than 3 years in prison if such offense is a class B felony, more than 2 years in prison if such offense is a class C or D felony, or more than one year in any other case ....

§ 3583(e)(3). In addition to revoking the defendant's supervised release and imprisoning the defendant, the district court

may include a requirement that the defendant be placed on a term of supervised release after imprisonment. The length of such a term of supervised release shall not exceed the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in the original sentence, less any term of imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation of supervised release.

§ 3583(h).

Hampton argues that § 3583(e)(3) imposes two separate limits on the amount of imprisonment a defendant can receive when the court revokes her supervised release: an aggregate limit and a per-revocation limit. First, she argues that the language at the beginning of § 3583(e)(3) allowing the district court to “revoke a term of supervised release, and require the defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in such term of supervised release” is an aggregate limit. According to Hampton, this portion of § 3583(e)(3) ensures that a defendant's aggregate amount of revocation imprisonment does not exceed the amount of supervised release authorized for the underlying offense in § 3583(b). Second, she argues that the language at the end of § 3583(e)(3) limiting the revocation sentence “on any such revocation” to a number of years based on the severity of the underlying offense is a per-revocation limit.

We note that Hampton's argument presents an issue of first impression. Our last opinion to address whether § 3583(e)(3) required aggregation of prior revocation imprisonment was United States v. Jackson, 329 F.3d 406 (5th Cir.2003) (per curiam). In Jackson, we accepted the government's concession that the pre–2003 version of § 3583(e)(3) imposed an aggregate cap on revocation imprisonment. Id. at 407–08. That reading of § 3583(e)(3) was derived from language in the subsection stating that a defendant “whose term of supervised release is revoked under this paragraph may not be required to serve more than” a specified term of imprisonment based on the offense class. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2000). Congress amended § 3583(e)(3) in 2003 to state that a defendant “may not be required to serve on any such revocation more than” a specified amount of imprisonment. PROTECT Act, Pub.L. No. 108–21, § 101(1), 117 Stat. 650, 651 (2003) (amendment italicized). Hampton has conceded that the portion of § 3583(e)(3) interpreted in Jackson, and amended by the PROTECT Act, does not require aggregation.¹ Thus, we need only determine whether the phrase “term of supervised release authorized by statute” at the beginning of § 3583(e)(3) caps the aggregate amount of revocation imprisonment at the amount of supervised release authorized by § 3583(b).

We disagree with Hampton's interpretation and conclude that the language at the beginning of § 3583(e)(3) allowing the district court to “revoke a term of supervised release, and require the defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in such term of supervised release” does not require that court to credit the defendant for prior terms of revocation imprisonment. Section 3583(e)(3) allows a court to “revoke a term of supervised release,” and therefore, refers to one particular revocation. Id. (emphasis added). Section 3583(e)(3) does not explicitly require the sentencing court to consider any previous revocation imprisonment, and the only reference to a previous term of supervised release is an instruction not to credit “time previously served on postrelease supervision” against the term of revocation imprisonment. Therefore, the language at the beginning of § 3583(e)(3) does not require aggregation of revocation imprisonment.

Our reading of § 3583(e)(3) is harmonious with § 3583(h). Cf. United States v. Caldera–Herrera, 930 F.2d 409, 412 (5th Cir.1991) (per curiam) (“Where possible, statutes must be read in harmony with one another so as to give meaning to each provision.”). That subsection provides that a district court may impose additional supervised release as part of a defendant's revocation sentence. The amount of supervised release the district court may impose “shall not exceed the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in the original term of supervised release, less any term of imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation of supervised release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h). This provision requires the revoking court to aggregate all revocation imprisonment and credit that amount against any post-revocation supervised release. Vera, 542 F.3d at 462. Section 3583(h), therefore, acts as a cap on the aggregate amount of post-revocation supervised release a defendant may receive. This, in turn, imposes an indirect limit on the aggregate amount of revocation...